Discourse Connectives in Syrian Arabic

BY

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Dedication

To the memory of my father and my mother.

"وَقُل رَبِّ اسْتِرِحمَا كَا رَبِّيَّ نَفْسِي"
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Abstract

The scope of this work is certain linguistic elements which make no contribution towards the truth-conditional content of their utterances. Nevertheless, they play a crucial role in utterance interpretation. They function as constraints on the inferential computations the hearer performs in order to establish the relevance of the proposition in which they occur. The sort of expressions this work is concerned with are items like so, after all, you see, however and although in both English and their counterparts in the Syrian dialect of the Arabic language spoken in two cities, Lattakia and Homs. The framework of this study is supplied by Sperber and Wilson who argue that relevance is the key to communication. This relevance-based framework is adopted by Blakemore (1987) in terms of whose ideas the English and the Syrian Arabic expressions are analysed as semantic constraints on relevance. The concept of a "discourse connective" adopted in this study differs greatly from those discourse analysts who use this term in a broader sense. In this study the term "discourse connective" is reserved for those expressions whose function is not to contribute to the truth-conditional content of their utterances rather to indicate how the interpretation of one utterance contributes to the interpretation of the other. As one expects similarities and differences between the English expressions and their Syrian counterparts arise but the similarities are much greater than the differences.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phonetic symbols adopted in the study</th>
<th>The International Phonetic Alphabet</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[gh]</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>raghm inno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[dh]</td>
<td>d</td>
<td>bichall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[9]</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>gala fikra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[h]</td>
<td>h</td>
<td>gala kil hail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[sh]</td>
<td>s</td>
<td>lahashshi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[?]</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>fou? hashshi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[s]</td>
<td>s</td>
<td>nash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[t]</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>tarixet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[kh]</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>bukhari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[q]</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>iqtarah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[th]</td>
<td>θ</td>
<td>thalathata</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTENTS

Chapter One

Introduction

1.0 The data 1
1.1 The organization of the study 10

Chapter Two

Introducing Relevance Theory

2.1. The goals of a theory of pragmatics 13
2.2. The code model of communication 16
2.3. The inferential account of communication 22
2.4. Relevance: cognition 27
2.5. Relevance: communication 35
2.6. Semantics and pragmatics 41
2.6.1. The truth-conditional approach to semantics 42
2.6.2. Semantics-pragmatics distinction in Relevance theory 49
Chapter Three

Semantic Constraints on Relevance in English

3.1. Because, therefore and so
3.2. After all, and you see
3.3. Moreover, furthermore and also
3.4. But: denial and contrast
   3.4.1. But: denial of expectation
   3.4.2. But: contrast

Chapter Four

Further Semantic Constraints on Relevance

4.1. In addition, as well and too
4.2. Too and related items
4.3. Either and related items
4.4. Further indicators of denial
   4.4.1. Although, in spite of and while
   4.4.2. However, yet and still
4.5. Further indicators of contrast: while, whereas and unlilke
4.6. Anyway, incidentally and by the way
Chapter Five

**Innama and Bass: Denial and Contrast**

5.1. The Syntax of: *u, innama and bass*  
5.2. **Innama** and **bass**: denials of expectation  
5.3. **Bass**: contrast and exclusion

Chapter Six

**Premises and conclusions**

6.1. The syntax of: *min shan heik, laheik, lizalek, lahashsabbab, lahashshi, ma6natu*  
and *la?inno*  
6.2. **Min shan heik, laheik, lizalek, lahashsabbab**  
and **lahashshi**  
6.3. **Ma6natu**

Chapter Seven

**Evidence, Explanation and Addition**

7.1. The syntax of: *bidhall, tab6ann*  
and *ba6d kil shi*  

viii
Chapter Eight

Further Syrian Indicators of Denial and Contrast

8.1. Further indicators of denial of expectation

8.1.1. The syntax of further Syrian indicators of denial of expectation: ma6 inno, raghm inno, raghm kawno and ma6 heik

8.1.2. Ma6 inno, raghm inno, raghm kawno and ma6 heik

8.2. Further indicators of contrast

8.2.1. The syntax of: bainama and 6aks

8.2.2. Bainama and 6aks

8.3. The syntax of: 6ala kil hal, 6ala fikra and bilmunasabeh

8.4. 6ala kil hal, 6ala fikra and bilmunasabeh

Conclusion

Notes

Bibliography
Chapter One

Introduction

1.0 The data

This study will be concerned with the analysis of certain expressions which do not contribute to the truth-conditions but which in some sense connect utterances together. The challenge for any Pragmatic theory is to explain how these expressions connect utterances together and to explain what a discourse connective is. We can approach this point through a consideration of the dialogue in (1) (which is a real-life example):

1- A- The wild dogs have come to the river.
    B- The lion isn't hunting.

B's remark could be relevant in the context of A's utterance in different ways. In a typical conversation, as Blakemore (1989: 23) notes, the connection between these two remarks would not be left unspecified. Blakemore (1987: 23) points out that specifying the way in which B's remark is relevant in relation to A's utterance could be accomplished either by intonation or by the use of linguistic elements like you see, after all, so, anyway or however as in (2 A-E):

2- A- You see, the lion isn't hunting.
    B- After all, the lion isn't hunting.
    C- So, the lion isn't hunting.
D- Anyway, the lion isn't hunting.

E- However, the lion isn't hunting.

Each one of these responses in (2 A-E) represents a different interpretation. A’s remark might be relevant as giving an explanation for why the wild dogs came to the river; B’s remark might be relevant as an evidence for A’s statement; C’s remark could be viewed as specifying the implication of A’s statement; D’s relevance could lie in that it is dismissing A’s remark as irrelevant and E’s remark could be relevant in virtue of its contrast with the fact that wild dogs came to the river.

Now, although many people (Arapoff (1968), Halliday and Hasan (1976) and Rudolph (1988), etc., have written about discourse connectives, all fell short of identifying a clearly-defined class of words as discourse connectives. For instance, Halliday and Hasan’s (1976) classification of discourse connectives is problematic because they bring together words with different functions. For example, they group together words like then and so. Then, in an example like (3) contributes to the propositional content.

3- John arrived and then Mary arrived.

In contrast, so in (4) connects two propositions but does not contribute to the propositional content of the utterance.

4- John is a chemist so he should know how to do this.
The function of *so* is to show that the two propositions it connects are related in a way where the second segment is to be understood as a conclusion and the first segment as a premise.

Halliday and Hasan's classification of *then* and *so* as discourse connectives reflects their vague conception of what a discourse connective is. Similarly, Rudolph (1988) uses the term "discourse expressions" to refer to a wide range of expressions which she regards as discourse connectives. She admits (p.110) that her classification of these items as connective expressions is based on a survey of the most commonly used English connective expressions mentioned in grammars and handbooks and not on any clear concept of a discourse connective.

Like Halliday and Hasan (1976), the way grammars of standard Arabic classify discourse connectives is also problematic because they group together expressions with rather different functions. Discourse connectives are traditionally referred to as *huruf* "prepositions." Many people have written about discourse connectives in standard Arabic (Al-Harawi (1981), Qabawa (1972), Al-Muradi (1973), Al-Maliqi (1974) and Al-Ansari (1972)) but none of them have been able to provide a specific class of words which can be called "discourse connectives." There is even a controversy over the number of what standard Arab grammarians call discourse connectives. This is not surprising because if one does not know what
a discourse connective is, one will not be able to know how many there are in a specific language. Some say (Al-Muradi, 1973: 28) that these connectives are seventy-three in number. Others, however, argue (Al-Maliqi, 1974: 99) that they are ninety-five connectives.

It is not surprising that works on discourse connectives in both English and standard Arabic have failed to distinguish a clear class of discourse connectives. This, I suggest, is because works in this field have not tried to study discourse connectives within the framework of a general theory of utterance interpretation. To decide what words should be analysed as discourse connectives we need a general theory. For, only within a reasonably well-developed theory does the term "discourse connective" have a clear meaning and only if it has a clear meaning can we decide what is and what is not a discourse connective. Sperber and Wilson's theory of utterance interpretation (Relevance theory) is one that seeks to account for all aspects of human verbal communication. The study of discourse connectives within this theory enables us to provide a clear conception of the words that function as discourse connectives.

According to Sperber and Wilson's (1986) framework utterances interact with background assumptions through certain inferential computations to derive contextual effects. Within this theory, it is natural to assume
that some words contribute to the representations that are processed while others do not but guide the interpretation process. Blakemore (1987) refers to the latter as semantic constraints on relevance. They function as constraints on the inferential computations the hearer performs in order to establish the contextual effects or the relevance of the utterance in which they occur. Thus, for instance, while you see and after all in (2A) and (2B) respectively indicate that the utterance they introduce must be interpreted as a premise, the utterance introduced by so in (2c) must be interpreted as a conclusion.

Blakemore's (1987) uses the term "semantic constraints on relevance" as an alternative to the term "discourse connective". Her concept of a discourse connective is narrower than that adopted by people like (Arapoff, 1968, Halliday and Hasan, 1976 and Rudolph, 1988). In this study I will use the term "semantic constraint on relevance" to refer to the narrower sense of a discourse connective adopted by Blakemore.

As we have said, semantic constraints on relevance make no contribution to the propositional representation whose relevance is being assessed. This means that they cannot be part of the level of semantic representation that Sperber and Wilson call "logical forms." This, Blakemore (1987a: 713) suggests, shows that there is no unitary theory of linguistic semantics. On one side, there is the conceptual theory concerned with the way in
which elements of linguistic structure map onto constituents of propositional representations. On the other side, there is the procedural theory concerned with the way in which elements of linguistic structure affect pragmatic computations (semantic constraints on relevance).

Following Wilson and Sperber (1990a), Blakemore (1991) offers a more elaborate picture of the nature of semantics. There are two distinctions which are equated in Blakemore (1987) but distinguished in Blakemore (1991) to give a four-way classification of semantic phenomena. According to the new picture not all conceptual meaning is truth-conditional nor is all procedural meaning non-truth-conditional. Wilson and Sperber (1990) discuss sentence adverbials like sadly, seriously, frankly, confidentially, etc. They argue that although such sentence adverbials have conceptual meaning, they do not contribute to the truth-conditions of the utterances in which they occur. These sentence adverbials, they argue, contribute to the higher-level-explicatures of an utterance. We will see what is meant by the higher-level-explicature in the following discussion.

An utterance usually has a determinate propositional form and a number of higher-level-explicatures. To distinguish the propositional form of an utterance from its higher-level-explicatures consider example (5):

6
5- A- Peter: Can you help?
   B- Mary (sadly) I can't.

(Wilson and Sperber, 1990a: 98)

The propositional form expressed by Mary's utterance is the one in (6A) below. (6B), (6C) and (6D) are higher-level-explicatures because Mary's utterance in (5B), as Wilson and Sperber argue, is true or false depending on whether she can or cannot help Peter to find a job, not on whether she does or doesn't say, or believe, or regret that she cannot help him. Although these higher-level-explicatures are true or false of their own right, they do not generally contribute to the truth-conditions of the utterances carrying them.

6- A- Mary can't help Peter to find a job.
   B- Mary says she can't help Peter to find a job.
   C- Mary believes she can't help Peter to find a job.
   D- Mary regrets that she can't help Peter to find a job.

(Wilson and Sperber, 1990a: 98)

Now consider the utterances in (7) and (8):

7- A- Seriously, I can't help you.
   B- Frankly, I can't help you.
   C- Confidentially, I can't help you.

8- A- Mary told Peter seriously that she couldn't help him.
   B- Mary said Frankly to Peter that she couldn't help him.

7
C- Mary informed Peter confidentially that she couldn’t help him.

(Wilson and Sperber, 1990a: 105)

Wilson and Sperber (1990: 105) argue that the sentence adverbials in (8) must be treated as encoding concepts which contribute to truth-conditions. The sentence adverbials in (7) encode the same concepts. They differ only in that in interpreting the utterances in (7) the hearer must incorporate these concepts into a higher-level-explicature some elements of which are not encoded but inferred. The sentence adverbials make no contribution to the truth-conditions of the utterances in (7) is because, as I said earlier, the higher-level-explicatures with which they are associated make no contribution to truth-conditions.

A number of considerations argue against a procedural analysis of these adverbials. Firstly, many sentence adverbials are highly complex as in (9):

9- A- Frankly speaking, he has negative charisma.

B- Speaking frankly, though not as frankly as I’d like to, he isn’t much good.

(Wilson and Sperber, 1990a: 106)

The resulting interpretations are easily dealt with on the assumption that sentence adverbials encode conceptual representations, which are typically compositional. But it is not clear, Wilson and Sperber argue, what compositionality would mean in procedural terms.
Secondly, in some cases, by using sentence adverbials the speaker can lay himself open to charges of untruthfulness in their use as in (10):

10- A- Mary: Seriously what a gorgeous tie.
   B- Peter: That’s not true. You’re never serious.

   (Wilson and Sperber, 1990a: 106)

Wilson and Sperber show that in some cases a sentence adverbial seems to contribute to the truth-conditions of the utterance which conveys it as in (11):

11- A- Peter: What can I tell our readers about your private life?
   B- Mary: On the record, I’m happily married; off the record, I’m about to divorce.

   (Wilson and Sperber, 1990a: 106)

Without the contribution of sentence adverbials on the record and off the record to the truth-conditions, Mary’s utterance in (11B) should be perceived as contradictory; yet intuitively it is not. This shows that sentence adverbials encode conceptual representations and that they should be analysed in conceptual terms.

My main concern in this thesis is with semantic constraints on relevance but I will make some reference to items that contribute to higher-level-explicature.

If it is true, as Sperber and Wilson (1986) suggest, that the processes of utterance interpretation are the same for all humans, then we should expect to find items in other languages that do not contribute to the truth-conditions but have the function of facilitating the
interpretation process of utterances by minimizing the processing effort. And, indeed, as research has shown this is the case in languages like Greek (Rouchota, 1990), Dutch (Tongerloo, 1989), Sissala and German (Blass, 1990) and as we will see in this research it is also true of Syrian Arabic.

In this study I will be discussing semantic constraints on relevance in both English and Syrian. The majority of English examples used in this study are my own, except some examples which are real-life examples. The method of collecting the Syrian data used in this work is based mainly on spontaneous conversations of the Syrian dialect of Arabic.

1.1 The organisation of the study

In the previous section I tried to introduce the main idea of this study. In this section I will specify how this work is organised.

Chapter (2) deals with three main issues. First, identifying a variety of problematic issues which any explanatory theory of pragmatics is expected to address. Second, presenting a review of the two models of communication, the "code model" and the "inferential model", showing their merits and weaknesses and arguing that neither of them alone can form the basis of an adequate theory of pragmatics. Third, introducing
Relevance theory which forms the theoretical framework within which the semantic constraints on relevance in both English and Syrian Arabic will be accounted for.

Chapter (3) is a review of the English expressions analysed by Blakemore (1987), chapters three and four and related articles as semantic constraints on relevance.

Chapter (4) discusses some further English expressions not accounted for by Blakemore as semantic constraints on relevance. However, their analysis is based largely on her ideas presented in her book (1987). Thus, on the basis of her analysis of the function of moreover I will analyse the function of expressions such as in addition, as well and too. And building on her analysis of but I will provide analyses of although, however, in spite of, while, nevertheless, yet and still, which are similar to but in its "denial-of-expectation" sense. Other items which exhibit a similarity to but in its "contrast" function, while, whereas and unlike, will also be analysed.

Chapters (5) and (6) present a relevance-based analysis of a large number of Syrian expressions. These expressions are the Syrian counterparts of the English but, therefore and so.

Chapter (7) presents an analysis of the Syrian counterparts of five English expressions after all, you see, moreover, furthermore and also. This chapter includes also an analysis of the Syrian counterparts of
the further English semantic constraints on relevance in addition, as well and too. Bil?idhafeh lahashshi, fou? hashshi and kaman are not only regarded as the Syrian translations of expressions like moreover, furthermore and also but of expressions such as in addition, as well and too where bil?idhafeh lahashshi is the Syrian translation of in addition and kaman is the translation of both as well and too.

Chapter (8) deals with the analysis of some of the Syrian counterparts of the further English indicators of "denial-of-expectation" and "contrast" like ma6 inno, raghm inno, raghm kawno and ma6 heik which have the function of indicating a "denial-of-expectation" sense and bainama and 6aks which indicate a "contrast" sense. It also deals with expressions like 6ala kil hal, 6ala fikra and bilmunasabeh which are the Syrian counterparts of the English anyway, incidentally and by the way respectively.
Chapter Two

Introducing Relevance Theory

In (1986) the French anthropologist D. Sperber and the English linguist D. Wilson published their book: *Relevance: Communication and Cognition* in which they introduced the first fully worked out theory of pragmatics, (Relevance theory). As the title of their book indicates, this theory is viewed not only as a theory of communication but as a theory of cognition. It is built on the assumption that human information processing is guided by the search for relevance. In sections 2.4 and 2.5 I will present an outline of this theory. In section 2.4 I will discuss the cognition aspect and in section 2.5 I will discuss the communication aspect. Before I introduce this theory, I will consider what the goals of a theory of pragmatics should be, and what are the sort of phenomena a theory of pragmatics should account for?

2.1 The goals of a theory of pragmatics

Wilson and Sperber (1990: 35) define pragmatics as "the study of the general cognitive principles and abilities involved in utterance interpretation, and of their cognitive effects." From this definition one may
realise that the main concern of a theory of pragmatics is to describe the non-linguistic elements that affect the interpretation of utterances. They identify a variety of problems for any explanatory theory of pragmatics to solve.

Utterances may be ambiguous and referentially ambivalent as in (1):
1- The boy sprinkled the tea on the page.
Pragmatic theory should analyse the way in which the hearer of (1) decides which boy the speaker refers to. It also should explain whether "page" was intended to mean "a page in a book" or "a servant". Utterances have not only explicit content but also implicit meaning as in (2):
2- A- Mary: Do you want to go on a holiday ?
   B- Peter: Poor people do not go on holidays.
Pragmatic theory should explain how (2B) is understood to imply that Peter cannot go on a holiday and that he is poor. Moreover, utterances may be metaphorical or ironical as in (3) and (4):
3- The manager is a hard nut to crack.
4- This even-tempered manager is rarely angry more than once a day.
Pragmatic theory should clarify and explain the difference between literal and non-literal interpretations. The style of an utterance may affect its interpretation. Compare the ironical (4) with the
critical (5):
5- This manager is always angry.
Pragmatic theory should describe these stylistic effects and explain how they are achieved. Utterances could be vague due to the presence of what Sperber and Wilson (1986: 189) call "semantically incomplete items" such as too and big. Consider example (6):
6- The bycicle was big.
Pragmatic theory has to explain how the semantic representations of (6) could be enriched by specifying exactly the thing to which the bycicle was big.

From the examples I have presented in this section it can be seen that understanding an utterance involves more than a mere knowledge of the linguistic meaning of that utterance. The hearer of sentence (1), for example, should not only know the two possible meanings of the word page, but also decide which meaning the speaker intended to convey. The hearer of (2B) must not only know the explicit meaning of the utterance but infer what was implicitly conveyed. The hearer of (3) or (4) must not only know the literal meaning but decides whether the utterance is intended to be literal, metaphorical or ironical. Moreover, the stylistic differences between sentences like (4) and (5) can not be explained mainly in semantic terms; an explanatory theory of pragmatics should provide answers to all these cases.
2.2 The code model of communication:

From the time of Aristotle until recently, Sperber and Wilson (1986: 2) argue, communication, particularly the verbal, is assumed to be achieved by encoding and decoding messages. The way this model works is represented in the following figure:

(1)

(From Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 5)

This approach, until almost twenty years ago, seemed to be the only approach possible to pragmatics. According to this approach communication involves three main elements: unobservable messages, observable signals, and a code. A code, as Sperber and Wilson (1986: 3) say, is "a system which combines messages with signals enabling two information processing devices to communicate." If
the speaker wants to pass a particular message he transmits the signal associated with that message by a code. The hearer in turn recovers the message associated with that signal also by a code. The observable signals in verbal communication are the phonetic representations of utterances, the messages are the thoughts that the speaker wants to convey and the central aim of pragmatics in this case is to discover the code that hearers use to recover the intended message from the observable signal.

For many linguists, Sperber and Wilson (1986: 6) point out, this semiotic approach to communication is regarded not as a mere hypothesis but as a fact. They believed that this approach is the only possible way to account for communication. However, nobody, as Sperber and Wilson argue, can deny that utterance interpretation involves an element of decoding. The grammar of a natural language is a code which pairs phonetic and semantic representations of sentences. For any listener to understand any utterance he should recover the phonetic representations of that utterance and decode it into the associated semantic representations. All this is achieved by a code. But it is clear from examples (1)-(6) discussed in section 2.1 that understanding an utterance involves more than just recovering the semantic representations of an utterance. That is to say, what is communicated by a certain utterance is generally far more than what is conveyed by its semantic representations. This difference is what Sperber and Wilson (1986: 9)
refer to as "a gap between the semantic representations of sentences and the thoughts actually communicated by utterances."

Proponents of the code model believe that speakers have an extra pragmatic code which fills this gap. For them, pragmatics is seen as an extension of grammar where they assume speakers of English, for example, to have an extra pragmatic code which they use to disambiguate utterances, recover their implicit meanings, distinguish their literal and figurative meanings, and specify their stylistic effects. This supposition, however, is rejected by Sperber and Wilson as being implausible and far from being justified.

The examination of any piece of conversation shows that reproduction of implicit imports, figurative interpretations and stylistic effects can scarcely be achieved. Decoding, Sperber and Wilson argue, cannot even account for the explicit meaning of sentences. The implicit import, however, is never achieved. The implicit message conveyed by example (3), for instance, (repeated here as (7)) can be characterized in various ways.

7- The manager is a hard nut to crack.
It could be that he is a difficult person to deal with, that he is a difficult person to get what you want from, and so on. Proponents of the code model of communication claim that a determinate subset of these messages must
have been encoded and decoded. But their assumption, Wilson and Sperber (1990: 37) suggest, does not seem to be remotely plausible.

The presence of indeterminacies in interpretation suggests a fundamental inadequacy in the code model of communication. Where such indeterminacy occurs it seems that what communication can achieve is some similarity between the thoughts of communicator and audience. How can the code model provide a specific description of those cases where resemblance rather than identity is achieved? Wilson and Sperber suggest that one might add to the determinate output of the decoding process some blurring mechanism. This problem of indeterminacy hints to the real inadequacy of the semiotic approach.

There is no doubt that the code model of pragmatics has achieved some successes. However, this is due to the fact that the range of data to which this model is applied was very small. Utterances are highly context-dependent; therefore, context has a very important role in utterance interpretation. The successes of the code model in this area have mainly been achieved by examining those utterances in which the role of context is very easily characterized.

For example, in utterances like (8) the pronoun I, in spite of its reference to different people in different contexts, usually refers to the speaker of the utterance. So, it is not difficult to have a decoding rule that instructs the hearer of this utterance to
specify who is speaking and define the pronoun I as referring to Peter:

8- Peter: I will leave tomorrow.

For the semiotic approach to be successful it must provide rules to account for all pronouns and not restrict its scope to simple ones such as the pronoun I. There are more complex cases. Indexical expressions such as that, this, here, there etc., are a very clear example of such cases. Consider example (9):

9- You can find a better job there.

The interpretation of the demonstrative pronoun there differs from one context to another. It can be "a factory", "a city", "a country" etc. What decoding rule similar to that written for the pronoun I can the hearer of this utterance use to identify the object of this pronoun in example (9)? Suppose that there is a decoding rule that instructs the listener, on hearing the demonstrative pronoun there, to interpret it as referring to a factory, for example. This rule will certainly fail because this pronoun does not always pick out one particular object. Its referents can be as many as the number of contexts in which it can be uttered. Such cases have generally been ignored by the code model of pragmatics. A successful theory of pragmatics must provide an answer to all this.

Moreover, in dealing with the implicit import of utterances the code model of pragmatics seems to focus on
very restricted cases where the implicit import is minimally context-dependent. The hearer of (10), for example, would automatically in all contexts convey the implicit import represented in (11).

10- Some of the students danced.

11- Not all of the students danced.

In a case such as this, it is plausible to formulate a decoding rule relating utterances such as (10) to implications of the sort in (11).

But implicit import is usually more context-dependent than what we can see in the case of the two examples above. Consider example (12):

12- I will be at home on Friday.

This utterance could have different implications in different contexts. Suppose it is said by John to Peter who has asked to see him in the clinic on Friday it will mean that John can not see Peter. Similarly, if it is said to Edgar, who wants to know when he can see John at home it will mean that Edgar can see John on Friday, and so on. To write decoding rules which can assign to each utterance of (12) its appropriate interpretation in the appropriate context seems to be pointless. To see the different implications of (12), the listener does not need decoding rules. Wilson and Sperber (1990:39) suggest that to work out the different implications of (12) and other similar utterances the hearer would not have to use decoding rules but make use of three main things. First, his knowledge of the speaker; second,
the situation in which the utterance is said and third, his reasoning abilities (the assumption that the speaker is being relevant).

2.3 The inferential account of communication

There is no denying that a code has a substantial role in human communication. However, communication, sometimes, does not necessarily involve the use of a code. There are cases where thoughts and messages are conveyed through non-verbal communication. Consider (13):

13- A- Peter: Did you finish peeling the potatoes?
   B- Mary: (Showing her bandaged finger).

Here Mary's behaviour conveys the information that she did not finish peeling the potatoes. There is no code that would inform Peter to interpret on seeing somebody showing his bandaged finger to mean that he has not finished peeling the potatoes. For Peter to understand Mary's message he does not need to use a code. All he needs, Wilson and Sperber suggest, is to make use of his knowledge of the world and his general reasoning abilities.

The existence of non-verbal communication weakens the position of the code model approach and makes it fail to achieve its aims of accounting for communication. This phenomenon reduces the motivation for handling verbal communication in terms of encoding and decoding.
processes. A number of writers such as Grice (1975) and Sperber and Wilson (1986) have described comprehension as an inferential process. They realised that to have a complete account of verbal and non-verbal communication, the code model needs to be supplemented by an account of inferential processes.

According to the inferential account, communication is not achieved by encoding and decoding messages. The way the inferential model operates is quite different from that of the code model. Communication on the inferential account is achieved, as Sperber and Wilson (1986: 24) put it, "by the communicator providing evidence for her intentions and the audience inferring her intentions from the evidence." That is to say, the hearer understands the speaker's intention by interpreting the evidence he provides. In (13) above, for instance, Mary provides evidence that she has cut her finger. By uttering this evidence Peter will probably come to the conclusion that Mary did not finish peeling the potatoes.

Context is very important for the inferential account of communication. Sperber and Wilson (1986: 15) characterize it as "a psychological construct, a subset of the hearer's assumptions about the world." Failure in communication is often a consequence of a mismatch between the context envisaged by the speaker and the one actually assumed by the hearer. Suppose that Mary in
uttering (14B) envisages, for instance, the context or means that she does not want to go to the cinema because the film is about spying. Here Peter might mistakingly assume that Mary has accepted his offer to go to the cinema because she likes spying films. There would be a misunderstanding between Mary and Peter.

14- A- Peter Do you want to go to the cinema?
   B- Mary It is a spying film.

This misunderstanding is the result of the mismatch between the context envisaged by the speaker and the one actually used by the hearer. Communication will be successful if the hearer interprets the evidence provided in the same context envisaged by the speaker.

There is a fundamental difference between the code model and the inferential model in terms of their degree of success in utterance interpretation. On the inferential account, utterances are always exposed to the risk of misinterpretation. This is due to the fact that one utterance could sometimes provide evidence for a range of hypotheses. Wilson and Sperber (1990: 39-40) argue that there are always different ways of interpreting a given piece of evidence, even when all the correct procedures for interpretation are applied. By contrast, when decoding procedures are correctly applied to any undistorted signal they guarantee the recovery of the correct interpretation.

Although the basic assumptions of the two approaches about the nature of communication are fundamentally
different, proponents of Relevance theory believe that communication can be achieved by the contribution of both of them. Sperber and Wilson (1986), for example, believe that the code model and the inferential model are not incompatible. They can be united in more than one way. For them both models have to be united in their contribution to communication. They believe that though both approaches contribute to the study of communication neither of them alone can provide the framework for a general theory of communication.

Until recently, they argue, very few philosophers had the motivation to develop the inferential model into a general theory of communication. The philosopher Paul Grice in his work "Logic and Conversation" (1975) proposed the first theory of communication with the formation and evaluation of hypothesis about the communicator's intentions as its basis.

This theory is based on the idea that there are certain standards which speakers have to fulfil in their communicative behaviour. The hearers, in return, use these standards in evaluating different hypotheses about the speaker's communicative intentions. Grice formulated a general principle, the "Co-operative Principle" and maxims of conversation. Under this Co-operative Principle he distinguished four categories: QUANTITY, QUALITY, RELATION, and MANNER. Under each category there are different maxims. Although his work was concerned
with implicature, it can be seen to provide the basis of a theory which is based around the idea of inferential processes. He believed the adequate application of these maxims would guarantee the success of conversation.

Co-Operative Principle: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

Maxims of Conversation

Quantity:

(1) - Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).

(2) - do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true.

(1) - Do not say what you believe to be false.

(2) - Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Relation: Be relevant.

Manner:

(1) - Avoid obscurity of expression.

(2) - Avoid ambiguity.

(3) - Be brief.

(4) - Be orderly.

(Grice, 1975: 45-46)
According to this theory, both speaker and hearer are responsible for the success of communication because the success of communication requires both speaker and hearer to observe the maxims. Although this theory seems to be more plausible than that of the code model, it contains sufficient defects to reject it as a general theory of communication.\(^1\)

Sperber and Wilson reject it as a theory because it is a less fully worked out theory of communication. But they consider it, as I have said earlier, to form the point of departure for the development of an adequate theory of communication the basis of which are inferential processes. Sperber and Wilson's theory of communication replaces Grice's maxims by one principle, the Principle of Relevance. The Principle of Relevance is not a maxim. However, it can be seen as, incorporating what is valid in the maxims of RELEVANCE, QUANTITY and MANNER. The Principle of Relevance on its own, they argue, is adequate enough to account for all types of communication verbal and non-verbal.

2.4 Relevance: Cognition

The standards governing inferential communication, as Wilson and Sperber (1990: 41) argue, "have their source in some basic facts about human cognition." That is to say, inferential communication has its origins in
the human mind and especially its propensity to maximize the relevance of processed information. Building on the work of Fodor (1983), Sperber and Wilson (1986: 17) describe the human mind as consisting of different specialised systems. This idea is, in fact, an old one but, the fullest modern development is in Fodor (1983). These systems are of two types: "input systems" (processing visual, auditory, linguistic and other perceptual information) and "central systems" (integrating the input from the different perceptual sources with background information stored in memory, performing inferences on it and arriving at conclusions about the world).

Input systems, Fodor argues, are modules. That is, each one of them has its own form of representation and computation. To put it in another way, each input system can process information with the properties for which its computations are defined. For example, the auditory system can only process acoustic information, and the visual system can only process visual information. Central systems, on the other hand, are modality neutral: they, as I have mentioned before, integrate and perform inferences on information derived from all the input systems and from memory. According to this distinction pragmatic interpretation is viewed as a function of the central systems.

People, Wilson and Sperber (1990:41) argue, usually
pay different degrees of attention to different phenomena. That is to say, what I consider important and pay attention to, might, to my neighbour, represent very little value if any. What I represent to myself in one way, he represents to himself in another; and what I process in a certain context, he processes in another. But what is it that makes us decide what is important for each of us and what is not? The answer Sperber and Wilson give is "relevance". They suggest that humans, guided by relevance, tend to pay attention to the most relevant phenomena available. They tend to form the most relevant possible representations of these phenomena and process them in a context that maximizes their relevance.

But how is information relevant to an individual, and what is it that it should be relevant to? Sperber and Wilson argue that an assumption is relevant to an individual if it is relevant in one or more of the contexts accessible to him. In other words, for new information to be relevant to an individual it should produce some modification of the context he uses to process this new information. Context is characterized (1986: 132) as "a subset of the individual's old assumptions with which the new assumptions combine to yield a variety of contextual effects". The interaction between new information and old assumptions would result in modifying the context.

Newly presented information may have three types of contextual effects. First, it may lead to the creation
of a new assumption; second, it may strengthen an existing assumption and finally it may lead to the abandoning of an existing assumption. In each of these cases, Blakemore (1987: 53) points out, the listener is left with an improved set of background assumptions available to him to use in evaluating the effect of other propositions.

This interaction is what Sperber and Wilson (1986: 107) refer to as "contextualisation". For example, the act of deduction based on the combination of new information (A) and old information (B) is referred to as a contextualisation of (A) in (B). This notion of contextualisation is very important for relevance. It is important because not all newly presented information have contextual effects. For example, the newly presented information will not yield any contextual effects if it is already present in the context. Moreover, no contextual effects will be achieved if the newly presented information is unrelated to any assumption contained in the context. The newly presented information that is relevant is the one that yields an adequate number of contextual effects.

The interaction of new information with old assumptions may result in conclusions not derivable from new information or old assumptions alone. These conclusions are what Sperber and Wilson call "contextual implications", which is the first type of contextual
effects. Their definition (1986: 107-8) is in (15):

15- Contextual implications

A set of assumptions \{P\} cotextually implies an assumption \(Q\) in the context \{C\} if and only if
(i) the union of \{P\} and \{C\} non-trivially implies \(Q\),
(ii) \(\{P\}\) does not non-trivially imply \(Q\), and
(iii) \(\{C\}\) does not non-trivially imply \(Q\).

Suppose, for example, that I go to the city centre with the thought that:

16- A- If the shops are open, I will buy a new jumper.

I go there and I find that:

16- B- The shops are open.

In this case, (16A) is the existing assumption and (16B) is the new information. From this new information (16B) and old assumption (16A) we can derive, by deduction, the further information (16C):

16- C- I will buy a new jumper.

As I have mentioned, the conclusion (16C) can never be derived from the existing assumption (16A) or from the new information (16B) alone. The only way to deduce it is by combining both of them as related premises in an inferential process. The new information (16C) is relevant in the context (16A) because it makes it possible for the joint inference process to occur. New information then is relevant in a context in which it has contextual implications; and the more contextual implications it has, the more relevant it will be.

So far, we have seen one type of contextual effects,
contextual implication. The other two types of contextual effect which a newly presented proposition may have are strengthening an existing assumption or leading to the abandoning of an existing assumption. Suppose, for example, that I see somebody walking with a tennis racket in his hand. I will assume that:

17- He knows how to play tennis.

The point is that my mere observation of that person carrying a tennis racket in his hand is not enough on its own to imply the assumption in (17). The way to obtain this assumption, is to provide other premises such as (18 A,B):

18- A- Anyone who carries a tennis racket intends to play tennis.
B- Anyone who intends to play tennis knows how to play tennis.

Suppose that after a short period of time while I am leaving, the same person is entering the University Sport Centre with his racket in his hand. This new information will strengthen and confirm my assumption in (17). Its relevance is represented in confirming my existing assumption and the more it confirms, the more I consider it to be relevant to me.

Again, suppose that later on in a social meeting for the overseas students where there is a discussion of the sort of sport facilities the university provides I come across the same person and he utters (19):
19- I wish I knew how to play tennis.

This utterance conveys the proposition in (20):

20- He does not know how to play tennis.

In a situation like this where two assumptions are contradicting each other I cannot maintain both. I have to abandon one of them. The most likely one to be abandoned is the one that I think is less likely to be true. In the case of the two propositions (17) and (20), the one which is more likely to be true is, of course, (20) because it provides decisive evidence against my old assumption (17). (17) is less likely to be true because it is only a hypothesis with no confirmation value. So new information is relevant in a context in which it contradicts and eliminates an existing assumption and the more assumptions it eliminates and the stronger they are the more relevant it will be.

These are then the three types of interactions by which a newly presented information can modify a context. We can group all these types of interactions under the general heading "contextual effects". In doing so, we can claim that new information is relevant in a certain context if it has contextual effects in that context, and other things being equal, the greater its contextual effects, the more relevant it will be.

This definition of relevance, however, is incomplete because it ignores the processing effort involved in processing information. That is to say, in evaluating the relevance of a certain piece of information,
measuring its contextual effects is not sufficient; we should measure its contextual effects against the processing effort required to process it. To illustrate this notion of processing effort consider, for instance, a situation in which I go out thinking that:

21- A- If the library is open, I’ll borrow some books.

As I arrive there I find either that:

21- B- The library is open.

Or

21- C- The library is open and it is raining.

Quite clearly, in the context of (21A), (21B) would be more relevant to me than (21C) although both of them have the same contextual effects in the context (21A). They both have the same contextual implication (21D):

21- D- I’ll borrow some books.

Yet what makes (21C) less relevant is the extra processing effort involved in processing it. It contains (21B) as a subpart; therefore, to process it we need the same effort needed for processing (21B) and some more effort to process the extra information which is in this case "it is raining". Processing the extra information contained in (21C) demands more processing effort and this extra processing effort consequently leads to the lessening of its relevance. In this way, we can obtain a complete and more sufficient definition of relevance characterized in the following two equations:
X is directly proportional to Y
Z is inversely proportional to Y

or as Wilson and Sperber (1990:44) put it in (22):

22- Relevance

(A) Other things being equal, the greater the contextual effects, the greater the relevance.
(B) Other things being equal, the smaller the processing effort, the greater the relevance.

2.5 Relevance: Communication

As we have seen in the previous section, Wilson and Sperber argue that people, guided by relevance, only pay attention to information they believe to be relevant to them. For example, as a student attending a seminar, I would pay attention to what the speaker is saying rather than to what is going on between two students by my side. This is because I believe that what the speaker is saying is more relevant to me than what is going on between my two colleagues.

The relevance of an act of ostensive inferential communication is assessed on two levels; the contextual effects it achieves and the processing effort it requires. On the contextual effect side, the guarantee is one of adequacy. Adequacy of contextual effects depends on the situation and varies from one situation to
another. Thus, one expects more contextual effects in a seminar than in a pub conversation afterwards. Contextual effects achieved, as we saw in the previous section, could be one of three types: contextual implication, strengthening or abandoning an assumption. The more contextual effects, the more relevant the act will be. From their definition of the Principle of Relevance (1986: 158) given in (23) it is clear that they believe that in each act of inferential communication the communicator guarantees that if it is processed in a context which he believes to be accessible to his audience, it would be relevant enough to be worth their attention.

23- Principle of Relevance:

Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance.

All acts of ostensive communication, as already mentioned, are accompanied by a guarantee of optimal relevance. This relevance, as it is clear from its characterization in (22) in the end of the previous section, is not of the same degree. That is to say, certain utterances are more relevant than others. In this section I will try to clarify the criteria used to compare the relevance of different assumptions in a context and to demonstrate on what basis the relevant interpretation is chosen.

On the processing effort side, the guarantee is more than mere adequacy. A speaker who intends to achieve a
variety of contextual effects, as Grice (1975) suggests in his Manner maxims, must be satisfied that they are as easy as possible for the hearer to recover. In other words, he must make sure that the utterance puts the hearer to no unjustifiable processing effort. Wilson and Sperber (1990:45) point out that this is for the benefit of both speaker and hearer. On the one hand, it is for the benefit of the speaker because speakers usually want what they say to be understood; so any increase in the unjustifiable processing effort leads to the increase in the risk of misunderstanding. On the other hand, it is for the benefit of the hearer because any increase in unjustifiable processing effort minimizes the relevance. This minimization of relevance lessens the chance of the hearer to identify an interpretation that justifies the guarantee of relevance.

According to Relevance theory, an utterance has maximally one interpretation consistent with the Principle of Relevance. An interpretation is consistent with the Principle of Relevance if it achieves an adequate range of contextual effects for the minimum necessary processing effort. I now return to the question of consistency with the Principle of Relevance. The same factors (contextual effects and processing effort) used in the assessment of relevance I discussed in the previous section are also used for assessing to what degree certain interpretation is consistent with the
Principle of Relevance.

But the fact that each act of inferential communication is accompanied by a guarantee of optimal relevance does not necessarily mean that it will be always optimally relevant to the hearer. Wilson and Sperber (1990: 45-46) point out that there are cases where the communicator may provide a guarantee which is unjustified or given in a bad faith. For example, the communicator might speak in order to direct the hearer's attention away from relevant information somewhere else. In such a case, the hearer fails to find any interpretation that justifies the guarantee of optimal relevance; therefore, communication in such a situation will fail.

Wilson and Sperber (1990:46) claim that the procedure of assessing whether a certain interpretation is consistent with the Principle of Relevance may take three routes. Consider example (24) (mentioned in 2.1 as (1)):

24- The boy sprinkled the tea on the page.

This example can be interpreted to mean either (25A) or (25B):

25- A- The boy sprinkled the tea on the paper.

B- The boy sprinkled the tea on the servant.

Suppose that interpretation (25A) is more accessible than (25B) and is the first to be tested for consistency with the Principle of Relevance. Suppose, furthermore, that there is an accessible context in which this
interpretation would have an adequate range of contextual effects with minimum processing effort. Then for a sensible communicator who predicts this situation, interpretation (25A) is consistent with the Principle of Relevance and is the only interpretation consistent with the Principle of Relevance.

If the speaker by uttering (24) wants to convey interpretation (25B) but realised that interpretation (25A) would be more easily accessible and consistent with the Principle of Relevance, then what Wilson and Sperber suggest is that the speaker has to reformulate his utterance to exclude the undesirable interpretation by saying something like "the boy sprinkled the tea on the servant". By reformulating his utterance the speaker avoids the hearer the effort of accessing and processing interpretation (25A), accessing and processing interpretation (25B), and engaging in some inference process to select one of them.

Which interpretation would be consistent with the Principle of Relevance if, for example, both interpretations (25A) and (25B) are equally accessible and both can be tested for consistency with the Principle of Relevance? Suppose that the hearer has an easy access to a context in which (25A) would yield an adequate range of contextual effects while interpretation (25B) has a less accessible context or not accessible at all. Then for a speaker who rationally could have
foreseen this situation, interpretation (25A) is consistent with the principle of relevance and is the only interpretation consistent with the Principle of Relevance.

Finally, suppose that interpretation (25A) and (25B) are, on the one hand, equally accessible and on the other have the same range of contextual effects at the same cost in processing effort. In a situation like this there will be a failure in communication since we cannot choose one interpretation to be consistent with the Principle of Relevance because both interpretations are equally preferrable.

This discussion of cases where disambiguation fails clarifies the basis on which Relevance theory considers a certain interpretation to be consistent with the Principle of Relevance. We have seen that the first interpretation tested and found consistent with the Principle of Relevance is the only interpretation consistent with the Principle of Relevance. We have seen also the cases where the disambiguation process fails and no interpretation could be consistent with the Principle of Relevance. This, of course, makes it quite clear that the Principle of Relevance not only accounts for successes in communication but for failures as well. Notice that the fact that I restricted my discussion to an example of disambiguation does not mean that the Principle of Relevance is only capable of clarifying the disambiguation process. It can be applied to all
aspects of utterance interpretation such as: explaining how the implicit meaning is recovered, explaining the difference between literal and non-literal interpretations etc., as the remaining examples in section 2.1 clarify.

2.6 Semantics and Pragmatics

Within the framework of Relevance theory semantics and pragmatics are relevant and both contribute to utterance interpretation. One function of semantics is the assignment of logical forms to sentences. It is viewed as one aspect of grammar. A "logical form" is an incomplete propositional form. Sperber and Wilson (1986: 72) define it as "a well-formed formula, a structured set of constituents, which undergoes formal logical operations determined by its structure." Pragmatics is concerned with the "central system of thought" which is responsible for the interpretation of utterances. As far as the interpretation of utterances is concerned, the contribution of pragmatics is not less than that of semantics. In other words, Relevance theory stresses the importance of non-linguistic information in utterance interpretation. I argued in section 2.1 that the linguistic properties are unable to determine the full propositional content of an utterance. They might determine a number of probable
interpretations; but, in fact, as Blakemore (1987) points out, the actual interpretation the hearer recovers is generally due to the contextual knowledge rather than to the linguistic meaning. The linguistic meaning of an utterance, Sperber and Wilson (1986: 72) argue, does not constitute more than a "logical form" or what Blakemore (1987: 15) refers to as "blueprint" of a proposition. I will postpone the discussion of the distinction between semantics and pragmatics in Relevance theory until section 2.6.2. First, I will be looking critically at the truth-conditional approach. My aim will be to clarify its conception of semantics and point out its main defects. I want to introduce this approach because this approach has been widely assumed but rejected by Relevance theory which has a very different conception of semantics.

2.6.1 The truth-conditional approach to semantics

The basic assumption of this approach, as Dowty, et al., (1981: 4) put it, is that "to know the meaning of a sentence is to know what the world would have to be like for the sentence to be true." Sentences, Dowty, et al., (1981: 8) argue, are composed of "basic expressions". They believe that the propositional form of an utterance is determined mainly by the meaning of
its basic expressions and the way they are combined with one another. They admit that context plays a role in determining the propositional forms of utterances, but nevertheless their main belief is that the propositional form of an utterance is primarily determined by the meaning of its basic expressions. I will evaluate the position of two proponents of the truth-conditional approach (Gazdar and Lewis) to see to what degree the claims of this approach about the determination of the propositional forms of utterances can be maintained.

Gazdar (1979), like Montague and Lewis (1972), assumes that natural-language sentences have truth-conditions, an assumption which Sperber and Wilson reject, for reasons we will see later in the discussion. His definition of semantics could be described as a way of assigning truth-conditions to the sentences of natural language. Pragmatics, however, is defined as the study of all those aspects of meaning which cannot be determined in terms of truth-conditions. To put it in another way, he defines it (1979: 2) as:

Pragmatics = Meaning - Truth conditions

This definition is not a psychological one. In other words, it is not based on a well-worked out theory of how sentences are interpreted. It is a definition, as Blakemore (1987: 2) indicates, the grounds of which are rooted in a particular conception of semantics.

Gazdar's concept of semantics is similar to that of
Levinson's (1983) although Levinson's concept clashes with the data he discusses. He argues (1983: 28) that the domain of semantics should be restricted to truth-conditions. He assumes that the data of indexical expressions he analyses lie within the domain of truth-conditional semantics. As we have seen in section 2.2, assigning the analysis of indexical expressions to the field of semantics is untenable. Levinson, in fact, admits at the end of his Deixis chapter (p. 96) that the treatment of indexical expressions should be left to pragmatics. But his claim that the meaning of these expressions should be part of semantics is a necessary consequence of his view of the domain of semantics. He believes that semantics should be concerned with truth-conditions.

Dowty, et al., (1981: 138) seem to be more decisive than Levinson concerning this matter. They abstract the study of indexical expressions from the domain of pragmatics. I quite agree with Blakemore’s point (1987: 2) that in defining pragmatics as meaning minus truth-conditions, Gazdar tries to maintain the truth-conditional view of semantic meaning in the face of counter-examples. In fact, saying that pragmatics is concerned with aspects of meaning that cannot be accounted for in terms of truth-conditions, means that he is using the term "pragmatics" as a wastebasket.

Before I consider what would be left in our pragmatic wastebasket as a result of the claim made by
the truth-conditional semanticists, I would like to have a look at the sort of phenomenon in which Gazdar is interested. His main concern was to set up a formal procedure according to which pragmatic interpretations are assigned to utterances. The type of phenomenon he is concerned with are interpretations of the sort in sentences (26) and (27):

26- Some of the men were married.
27- Not all of the men were married.

If this phenomenon is what Gazdar regards as worth studying, then he must have ignored a phenomenon which is far more important. He must have not realised that everyday conversation is usually full of utterances the meaning of which is far more than what is actually conveyed by their linguistic properties. Suppose, for example, that the milkman comes to your door everyday at seven o’clock and see how you would interpret the answer in (28B):

28- A- What is the time?
   B- The milkman is at the door.

There are many ways in which you could interpret (28B), but the right one would be the one expressed in (29):

29- The time is seven o’clock.

This interpretation, Blakemore (1987: 4) suggests, is obtained through an idiosyncratic feature of the context.

There are two main assumptions which proponents of the truth-conditional approach claim to be true. First,
they claim that the linguistic meaning of utterances determines their propositional forms. Second, they assert that all aspects of linguistic meaning can be defined truth-conditionally though there are some advocates of this approach, for example Grice (1975) and Karttunen and Peters (1975), who believe that the second claim is untenable because there are certain linguistic constructions whose meaning cannot be defined in terms of truth-conditions and so should be handled within pragmatics. In view of this claim, the claim made by Grice, Karttunen and Peters, we can distinguish between two versions of truth-conditional semantics. A strong version which asserts that semantics is just concerned with truth-conditions and a weak version which takes semantics to be concerned mainly, but not solely, with truth-conditions.

Grice (1975) drew the attention of linguists to the fact that there are aspects of linguistic meaning which are not truth-functional such as the meaning of the expression therefore which, he suggests, must be accounted for in terms of pragmatics. Surely there will be certain phenomena that resist the treatment of linguistic semantics and so will be left to be discussed within the domain of pragmatics. Concerning the claim that the linguistic meaning of utterances determines their propositional form, I will consider the resistance of context-dependence utterances as a counter-evidence. As far as the assumption that all aspects of linguistic
meaning can be defined truth-conditionally is concerned. I will try to discuss one objection, made by proponents of Relevance theory and those who are in favour of the weak version of truth-conditional semantics, that there are words which have meaning but do not contribute to establishing the propositional content of the utterances that contain them. I will try to approach each one of these two cases in turn.

The objection to the first claim of the truth-conditional approach that the linguistic properties of utterances can on their own determine their propositional forms is a serious objection to both versions because context-dependence is a matter of pragmatics. Sperber and Wilson (1986: 183-90) argue that the linguistic meaning of an utterance cannot determine its propositional form. As I have mentioned at the outset of this section, the linguistic meaning of an utterance for them does not provide more than a logical form. To get a complete propositional form, the linguistic meaning has to be complemented by pragmatic considerations (I will use the term "pragmatic considerations" to refer to all aspects of meaning that cannot be accounted for in terms of linguistic semantics. That is to say, without the pragmatic considerations any utterance, depending on its linguistic meaning, will fall short of expressing a full propositional form. The determination of the context, as I argued in chapter two section (2.1),
includes the treatment of problems such as: disambiguation, reference assignment, enrichment etc.

Let us now return to the objection of the second claim that all aspects of linguistic meaning can be defined truth-conditionally. The existence of certain expressions which have meaning but do not contribute to the propositional content of the utterances that contain them is a real threat to the strong version of truth-conditional semantics. This threat, as Blakemore (1987: 5) argues, results from the mistaken assumption that natural language-sentences have truth-conditions. I pointed out in chapter one that my treatment of discourse connectives is different from that of a number of writers. My concept of a discourse connective applies to those expressions which are regarded as threat to the truth-conditional semantics such as therefore, you see, so, after all, however etc. Since these expressions have different effects, their properties have to be learnt rather than left to pragmatics to account for. These objections show that first, semantics cannot provide an account of truth-conditions given that context-dependence is a matter of pragmatics; second, is that there are non-truth-conditional aspects of meaning that must fall within the scope of semantics. In 2.6.2 we will see that Relevance theory can provide solutions to the problems facing the truth-conditional semantics approach and why the expressions I have just mentioned create a threat to truth-conditional semantics.
2.6.2 The semantics-pragmatics distinction in Relevance theory

So far I have been looking at the truth-conditional approach. I have sought to clarify its concept of both semantics and pragmatics and the way the propositional form of an utterance is established. We saw that according to this approach the propositional content of an utterance is based solely on its linguistic properties. This, of course, raised some problems in the face of the truth-conditional approach, problems for which there have been no answers. In what follows I will draw a picture of the distinction between semantics and pragmatics according to the way they are characterized in Relevance theory. I will also try to illustrate how Relevance theory provides an answer to all the obstacles facing the truth-conditional semantics approach.

I mentioned at the beginning of section 2.6 that within the framework of Relevance theory both semantics and pragmatics are involved in utterance interpretation. That is, interpreting an utterance is a process which does not only involve semantics or pragmatics alone; it requires the interaction and the contribution of both aspects. Semantics is concerned with one element of grammar. One of its functions is to assign logical
forms to sentences. This is not the only function of semantics. Later we will see two more types of its functions. These logical forms, however, function as an input to the central cognitive mechanism. Pragmatics is concerned with the general cognitive principles and abilities involved in utterance interpretation.

What does this exactly mean? It means that according to this picture, utterance interpretation has two distinct aspects: first, establishing the propositional form and the force of the utterance; second, relating it to a context or a body of assumptions to establish its relevance. So according to Relevance theory, interpreting an utterance is not only confined to the process of establishing its propositional form. What the hearer is required to do is to link this propositional form to a set of contextual assumptions to establish its relevance. The right interpretation is the first one tested and found consistent with the Principle of Relevance (see section 2.5).

The process of utterance interpretation according to Relevance theory takes three stages as in (30):

30- Sentence ---> Logical form --->

Propositional form ---> Contextual effects.

As this outline indicates utterance interpretation involves two types of processes: a linguistic process (semantics) and a non-linguistic process (pragmatics). If we look at the first stage (the process of assigning
logical forms to sentences), we find that it is a purely semantic one. This process is regarded, as I have already mentioned, as an aspect of grammar where pragmatic considerations have no role. These logical forms function as an input system to the central cognitive mechanism. They represent a small part of the overall meaning conveyed by the utterance. The process of deriving a propositional form is a pragmatic one. It is seen as a function of the central cognitive mechanism where the meaning of the logical form is enriched by certain pragmatic processes such as the processes of disambiguating the utterance, establishing the referents of referring expressions and resolving its vagueness if certain aspects are to be enriched.

Kempson (1988a) argues that the grammar associates sentences not just with logical forms but also with various constraints on the processing of the logical forms. The identification of an antecedent value for an anaphoric expression, for example, is not provided by the grammar. The anaphoric expressions constrain the construction of a propositional form by forcing the hearer to supply certain contextual assumptions to derive the exact value of the antecedent. This phenomenon, Blakemore (1987) states, does not only show that grammar provides incomplete logical forms but also that the principles of grammar constrain the process of proposition construction. There is no need to go into
detail in Kempson's proposals here because my concern is not with the semantic constraints on proposition construction but the semantic constraints on relevance.

Now, after we have obtained a complete propositional form, the third step is to link this propositional form to a body of contextual assumptions to establish its relevance. This process (the process of establishing the relevance of an utterance) is primarily a pragmatic one but has semantic constraints on it. The pragmatic process of proposition construction as well as the process of assigning utterances for relevance are constrained by principles of grammar. Blakemore (1988a: 246-249) talks about three ways in which the process of establishing the relevance of utterances may be constrained: first, by increasing the processing costs of interpreting an utterance; second, by focus; and third, by using specific linguistic expressions such as those I mentioned earlier which are the main concern of this research. I will look at these three devices respectively.

The first is a pragmatic device. The indirect answer in (31B) to the question in (31A) costs more processing effort than a direct one.

31- A- Does Meraz eat hot?
B- All Indians eat hot.
32- Meraz eats hot.

For the hearer to derive (32) as a contextual implication from (31B) he should supply the contextual assumption in
The fact that (31B) made the hearer supply the contextual assumption in (33) in order to derive the contextual implication in (32) serves to show how the speaker of (31B), by increasing the processing effort, constrained the interpretation of his utterance. The second and third, however, are linguistic devices. To illustrate the second type let us consider examples (34) and (35):

34- It was Peter who interviewed the new student.
35- It was the new student whom Peter interviewed.

It is clear that while the relevance of (34) lies in the identity of the person who interviewed the new student, in (35) the relevance lies in the identity of the person Peter interviewed. These two sentences have the same propositional content; hence the difference in their meaning is due to the fact that they are intended to be processed in two different contexts.

What concerns us in this study is the third device, the means of using certain linguistic expressions to constrain the process of establishing the relevance of utterances. In fact, the existence of these linguistic expressions whose meaning cannot be defined truth-functionally, Blakemore (1987: 144) suggests, makes the theory of linguistic semantics a non-unitary theory. That is to say, since utterance interpretation has three distinct elements it is not surprising that certain words
contribute to the establishment of the propositional content of utterances and others function as semantic constraints on the establishment of the relevance of an utterance. Linguistic meaning, then, can be said to give logical form, constrains the process of proposition construction and provides expressions whose role is to constrain the interpretation of utterances in which they occur. If this is true then, as Blakemore (1987) claims, such items cannot be part of the semantic representation which Sperber and Wilson (1986) call "Logical form." Therefore, the theory of linguistic semantics has to be split into two theories. On the one hand, a conceptual semantic theory to study the linguistic aspects which contribute to the establishment of the logical form. On the other, a procedural semantic theory to study the way in which elements of linguistic structure affect the pragmatic computations.

As I mentioned above, semantic constraints such as therefore, you see, after all, so, however etc., are the sort of items which I will regard as discourse connectives. In general (with some exceptions such as Karttunen and Peters (1975)), proponents of truth-conditional semantics have offered no account of these expressions. As Blakemore (1987a: 712) points out, they have always acknowledged their existence but offered no explanation to them hoping that one day there will be an adequate theory of pragmatics that could account for them. Sperber and Wilson's Relevance theory is capable
of providing a precise account of both truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional aspects of meaning.

Blakemore (1987a: 712) argues that these items have meaning but their function is to "impose constraints on the context in which utterances containing them can occur." That is to say, the constraints which a certain expression imposes on the proposition which it introduces is a constraint on the inferential assumptions or the context in which it is interpreted.

I do not intend to go far in explaining the function of each one of these items here. Chapters three and four will be completely devoted to the discussion of this phenomenon. In the meantime I just want to present some examples illustrating the way in which two of these expressions constrain the propositions they introduce. Consider the following examples:

36- Peter has not finished his work. After all, he is a buisnessman.

37- He is an Englishman; he is, therefore brave.

(Grice, 1975: 44)

The function of these two words after all and therefore, as I said earlier, is to constrain the relevance of the utterances which contain them. The constraint they impose consists in forcing the hearer to entertain certain assumptions on the basis of which certain interpretations can be obtained. After all in (36), for example, indicates two things: the proposition
it introduces is already known to the hearer; second, its proposition has to be understood as an evidence for the proposition expressed by the previous sentence. In this way, the proposition introduced by after all functions as a premise for an inference process to derive a conclusion which is a justification for the first sentence.

On the other hand, therefore introduces a proposition understood to be justified by the preceding sentence. The role of the proposition introduced by therefore is to function as a conclusion in an inference process as is illustrated in (38 A-C):

38- A- All Englishmen are brave.
    B- He is an Englishman.
    C- Therefore, he is brave.

Here the hearer entertains the assumptions in (38 A-B) for which the proposition introduced by therefore will be derived as a conclusion. In this way, each one of these two expressions after all and therefore constrains the process of interpreting the proposition it introduces to serve either as a premise or as a conclusion for an inference process respectively.

Context-dependence, as I mentioned earlier, was one of two obstacles for the strong version of truth-conditional semantics. It poses no problems for Relevance theory. It will be explained in terms of the Principle of Relevance. For instance, in an example like (39):
It is going to explode.

We realise that to recover the intended reference of a referring expression the hearer has to use linguistic and non-linguistic information. The use of the linguistic information is represented by the constraints which the grammar imposes on the reference of the pronoun "it" where it should not refer to any human object. This, of course, gives the hearer, as Sperber and Wilson (1986: 187) indicate, a large choice of reference. The non-linguistic information is used to find an interpretation consistent with the Principle of Relevance. Given this principle, the hearer could substitute the pronoun "it" by any non-human object to see if it yields a propositional form consistent with the Principle of Relevance.

If this substitution does not yield an interpretation consistent with the Principle of Relevance the hearer should extend the context repeating the same procedure. If the hearer, for example, knows that there is a timed-grenade somewhere near his house, then it would be easy for him to test the object "grenade" as one possible referent for the pronoun "it". Again if this does not yield an interpretation consistent with the Principle of Relevance, then the hearer should add to the context the encyclopaedic entries of the various concepts which have "explode" as their lexical entry. In this way Relevance theory provides an adequate account of the
meaning of context-dependence utterances in terms of the Principle of Relevance.

The existence of expressions the meaning of which cannot be defined truth-conditionally was, as I mentioned earlier, one of two obstacles for the strong version of truth-conditional semantics. We have already seen how Relevance theory provides an explanation for the phenomenon of non-truth-conditional meaning represented by items like **after all** and **therefore**.
Chapter Three

Semantic Constraints on Relevance in English

As we saw in chapter two, for Relevance theory inference processes are fundamental for working out the contextual effects of newly presented propositions. We also noticed that according to the Principle of Relevance the hearer is expected to interpret any utterance in the smallest and most accessible context that yields adequate contextual effects. In such a framework it will not be at all surprising to find some linguistically specified elements that have no contribution to the propositional content of the utterances in which they are contained, but function as constraints on the context in which these utterances will be interpreted.

My main concern in this chapter is to provide a summary of the items analysed by Blakemore (1987), particularly chapters three and four and related articles, as semantic constraints on relevance. Blakemore (1987: 77), argues that such expressions make no contribution towards the propositional content of their utterances but "guide the interpretation process by specifying certain properties of context and contextual effects." Although I introduced the notion of semantic constraints on relevance at the end of
chapter two by considering very briefly the role of two expressions after all and therefore, I will be analysing more extensively the role of a number of expressions as semantic constraints on relevance here.

Blakemore (1987) follows the line of enquiry initiated by Grice (1975) when he introduced the notion of conventional implicature. His remarks were mainly concerning the use of therefore as in (1) (which is mentioned in section (2.6.2) as (37)):

1- He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave.

Karttunen and Peters (1975) have also acknowledged the existence of what Grice calls "conventional implicature". They referred to it under their term "pragmatic presuppositions" which is used to cover different types of phenomena. They believe that what Grice has said about therefore can also be said about what they call "implicative verbs" such as manage, fail, again, ever, yet and too which all, according to their analysis, tend to carry pragmatic presuppositions as in (2):

2- Mary has managed to convince Peter.

The word manage in this example can give rise to the two pragmatic presuppositions in (3) and (4):

3- Peter is not easy to convince.

4- Others, apart from Mary, have tried but failed to convince Peter.

The word too can have such implications but
Karttunen and Peters suggest that unlike manage to give rise to its non-truth-conditional effect it has to interact with intonation. For example, according to the way it is pronounced, the utterance in (5) will implicate any of the propositions in (6):

5- Peter has got the experience too.
6- A- Someone else, you know who, has got the experience.
   B- Peter has got something else in addition to the experience.

Returning now to Grice's example in (1) we find that all that Grice has said about the use of therefore in this example is that its meaning does not contribute to truth-conditions. He argues that the use of the word therefore in (1) indicates that his being brave is a consequence of his being an Englishman. This account, Blakemore (1987: 78) suggests, is quite insufficient because it does not say whether the word "consequence" means that his bravery was caused by his being an Englishman or whether the fact that he is English provides evidence for the assumption that he is brave. That is, he does not say whether the sentence in (1) has the causal meaning expressed in (7) or the inferential meaning expressed in (8):

7- He is an Englishman. Because of that he is brave.
   (Blakemore, 1987: 80)
8- It is because he is an Englishman that I believe he is brave.

The main reason for mentioning Grice's example in
above is to draw a clear distinction between the so-called causal relation between two states of affairs and an inferential relation between two propositions. I will be concerned with the second case where the meaning of these expressions has no contribution towards the propositional content of their utterances. So I am interested in the meaning of these expressions as expressed in number (8) where there is an inferential connection between two propositions rather than in their causal function as it is expressed in (7).

3.1 Because, therefore and so

As we have seen earlier, Blakemore (1987) argues that Grice's analysis of the meaning of therefore was inadequate because it is not known whether it indicates a causal relation between states of affairs or an inferential relation between propositions. She points out that the distinction she is making between the two senses of the word therefore can be compared to the ambiguity of utterances containing the subordinating conjunction because. In (9), for example, the clause introduced by because may be interpreted in either of two ways. First, it can be interpreted as indicating that the fact that John is a linguist causes him to understand this. Second, it can be understood as providing evidence for the belief that John understands this. That is, it can be interpreted either as (10) or (11):

9- John will understand this because he is a linguist.
Because John is a linguist he will understand this.

It is because John is a linguist that I believe he will understand this.

So, as I have said, a clause introduced by because is usually ambiguous between indicating a causal relation between states of affairs or expressing an inferential relation between propositions. What makes this distinction clearer, Blakemore (1987: 79) points out, is the tone-group boundary associated, though not always, with the because clause when interpreted as providing evidence for the belief expressed in the first clause. So according to this account, a because-clause falls within the scope of logical operators when it is not marked off intonationally.

Like because, therefore is also associated with a tone-group boundary marking off its clause when interpreted as providing evidence for the fact presented in the first clause in examples like (1) above. In this section I will be analysing the meaning of three words because, therefore and so. The meaning of the first two is ambiguous between indicating a causal relation between two states of affairs and indicating an inferential relation between two propositions. The meaning of the third one is analysed in purely inferential terms.

According to Sperber and Wilson's framework inference rules are either analytic taking one proposition as input or synthetic taking more than one as
The proposition introduced by *therefore* is always associated with synthetic inference rules where it functions as an output to a synthetic inference rule (i.e. as a conclusion). That is, its inferential interpretation requires the hearer to supply an additional premise. In this case the function of *therefore* is to constrain the relevance of the proposition in the first clause as a premise for the derivation of the proposition it introduces as a conclusion. So in Grice’s example in (1) we find that the conclusion (he is; therefore, brave) cannot be derived solely on the basis of the premise in the first clause. In order to derive it the hearer has to supply from the context an additional premise such as that in (12):

12- All Englishmen are brave.

(Blakemore, 1987:82)

The focus on the use of *therefore* in non-conjoined utterances is because it is only in non-conjoined utterances that this word can be used to establish an inferential connection between propositions and only when it is used to indicate this relation that it can be said to impose constraint on the interpretation of the proposition it introduces. However, in conjoined utterances *therefore* cannot be said to function as a semantic constraint on relevance rather it contributes to the propositional content. Thus, while it is acceptable to interpret the proposition introduced by *therefore* in
(13) as a conclusion, the second conjunct in (14) can never be understood as a conclusion derived from the first:
13- He is an Englishman and he is therefore brave.
14- He is an Englishman and he is brave.

It seems that some of what I have said about therefore can be said about so. Like therefore, so can be used to express a relation of consequence between two propositions and its meaning can fall within the scope of logical operators when it is used in conjoined utterances. Consider examples (15) and (16) where in (15) the connection is part of the propositional content and in (16) it is due to the presence of the word so:
15- He is an Englishman and so he is brave.
16- He is an Englishman. So he is brave.
Although its meaning may appear to be ambiguous between indicating a causal and an inferential relation, following Blakemore (1987), I will argue that so has purely inferential meaning.

I argued earlier that the clause in which the word therefore appears functions as a conclusion in an argument where the same speaker provides the premise (the evidence) and the conclusion. In this case what functions as a conclusion is the clause containing the word therefore. It is important to realise here that arguments are not necessarily presented by one speaker only. They can be presented by two speakers where one
presents the premise and the other the conclusion as is illustrated in (17):

17- A- The players didn’t recover from the tragedy which happened to their supporters.

B- So you have decided not to replay the game.

Although the use of so in (B) indicates that the proposition it introduces is a conclusion derived from the premise presented by (A), the speakers, Blakemore (1987:85) suggests, are not sharing the presentation of an argument or proof. (B’s) utterance, in this case, is relevant as a confirmation of the relevance of the utterance presented by (A).

Notice that the basic meaning of so according to Blakemore’s analysis is that it encodes an instruction indicating that the proposition it introduces is to be interpreted as relevant as a conclusion. However, the fact that the proposition introduced by so functions as a conclusion does not necessarily mean that it is always associated with a proof or a justification. In certain cases the proposition introduced by so may be understood either as checking the relevance of a previous remark or as drawing the attention to an implication of a previous utterance as in (18) and (19) respectively:

18- A- You take the first turning on the left.

B- So I don’t go past the hospital.

(Blakemore 1987: 85)

19- A- Mary sent the flowers to the wedding party.

B- So she decided not to come.
In both (18B) and (19B) the proposition introduced by so is relevant as a contextual implication. Since contextual implications are, by definition, conclusions, it can be suggested that the propositions introduced by so in both (18B) and (19B) are conclusions. These conclusions are presented for various reasons and relevant in various ways. There are different reasons for drawing the speaker’s attention to a certain contextual implication of a previous remark. First, it may be that the speaker is sure of the fact that the hearer does not have the contextual resources to derive the implication on his own initiative. Second, it may be that the speaker believes that the hearer has derived the implication but has assigned insufficient degree of importance to it.

Blakemore (1987) mentions that there are cases where the speaker is not confirming the effect of another speaker’s remark but musing on the implications of his first remark as in (20):

20- There’s $5 in my wallet. So I didn’t spend all the money then.

(Blakemore, 1987: 86)

Here we have to imagine that the speaker is talking to herself. She opens her wallet and finds $5. How could this be relevant? and what conclusions will she draw? Suppose that she thought that she had spent all the money and so there should be no money in her wallet. In this
context it would be relevant to her to find that she was wrong. In this case the relevance of the second segment lies in the fact that it specifies a conclusion that can be derived from the first segment. That is to say, it makes the relevance of the first segment explicit.\(^3\)

In all the cases we have seen so far we noticed that the speaker is drawing attention to the implication of a deliberately communicated proposition. However, we should realise that this is not always the case. That is to say, speakers may draw attention to the implications of a proposition that has not been deliberately communicated. In such a situation the attention will be drawn to a proposition derived from a certain state of affairs. For example, a speaker, on seeing a friend of his taking a number of books out of the library, might produce the utterance in (21):

21- So you've started to work hard again.

In (21) the speaker used *so* to draw attention to the implications of a proposition which has not been deliberately communicated. In this use the word *so* seems to diverge from the word *therefore* because the use of the word *therefore* is unacceptable when it introduces a proposition that does not have a linguistic antecedent.

Compare (21) with (22):

22- ? Therefore you have started to work hard again.

Even when *therefore* is used to introduce a proposition that has a linguistic antecedent, its use may sometimes seem to be unacceptable. Compare the use of *so* in (23)
with that of **therefore** in (24):

23- We’ve passed one hundred miles so far. So there are still fifty miles to go.

24- We’ve passed one hundred miles so far. ? Therefore, there are still fifty miles to go.

The unacceptable use of **therefore** in example (24) shows that there are cases where **so** cannot be substituted by **therefore**.

The clearest difference between **therefore** and **so** appears when a hearer cannot see the relevance of a certain remark. In such a situation, Blakemore (1988b: 189) points out, his response will be with **so**? rather than with **therefore**?. The speaker’s response in this case does not necessarily mean that he does not understand the content of what has been said, rather he could not see its relevance.⁴

Although the meaning of **so** might seem to be ambiguous between an inferential and a causal sense, following Blakemore (1987), I will argue that it has an inferential sense only. Consider (25):

25- One engine exploded. So he landed ten minutes later.

In this example, for instance, the proposition introduced by **so** appears as if it can be interpreted as a causal consequence of the state of affairs described by the first proposition. The causal flavour of **so** here, Blakemore (1987: 88) suggests, does not mean that the meaning of **so** is ambiguous between causal and inferential
one rather it arises in examples where the hearer is expected to provide a contextual assumption which is a causal generalization for establishing the inferential connection between the two propositions. Notice that the acceptability of examples like (25) depends on a hearer taking for granted that if a plane loses one engine it will land ten minutes later.

To see whether the word so can express a causal connection we need to substitute it for expressions such as because of that or as a result of that. If no unacceptability or difference in meaning emerges, then the meaning of the expressions because of that and as a result of that can be identified with the meaning of the word so and there can be no difference between the two. But, as Blakemore (1987: 88) notes, there seems to be certain cases where the substitution of so for one of these expressions tends to produce different outcome. Consider (26):

26- One engine exploded. Because of that/As a result of that he landed ten minutes later.

Because of that and as a result of that in this example are different from so in example (25). (26) and (25) are different in that while the inferential connection expressed by so in (25) is a contextual assumption which the hearer is expected to supply for establishing the inferential connection, the one expressed by because of that or as a result of that in (26) is regarded as part of the propositional content. That is, with (25) we
have to assume that normally if an engine explodes one lands ten minutes later. With (26) we do not have to assume that.

Grice (1989), unlike Blakemore (1987), analyses the word *so* in conceptual terms. He argues that in an example like (27):

27- Our computer is down. So I can't help you.

(Blakemore, 1991: 237)

the speaker is performing two speech act, a lower-order one in which he communicates (28 A,B):

28- A- The computer at the speaker's office is down.

    B- The speaker can't help the hearer.

(Blakemore, 1991: 237)

and a higher-order one in which he communicates (29):

29- The proposition in (28 A) is an explanation for the state of affairs represented in (28 B).

(Blakemore, 1991: 237)

Grice's representational analysis of *so* contrasts with Blakemore's procedural analysis. As we have seen above, Blakemore's procedural analysis of *so* treats the speaker of an example like (27) above to instruct the hearer to interpret the second proposition as a conclusion.

Grice's account might work in examples like (27) but it does not work, as Blakemore (1991: 240) argues, in examples where the utterance containing *so* is not preceded by another utterance as it is the case in example (21) above which will be repeated here as (30).
A speaker, on seeing a friend of his carrying a pile of books out of the library, produces the utterance in (30):

30- So you’ve started to work hard again.

Because there is no preceding utterance which can be interpreted as an explanation here, the speaker cannot be explaining why the hearer is carrying a pile of books and going out of the library.

3.2 After all and you see

In the previous section I analysed the meaning of because, therefore and so. The meaning of because and therefore, as we saw, is ambiguous between establishing a causal relation between two states of affairs or an inferential relation between two propositions. So, however, has a purely inferential meaning. I then concentrated on the inferential connection which these expressions establish between two propositions because it is only in virtue of this that these words can be analysed as semantic constraints on relevance.

The question of causal or inferential connections raised by these expressions does not appear in the case of expressions like after all or you see. Although the question of a causal connection sometimes does appear in the case of you see, both after all and you see always function as semantic constraints on relevance. Thus, for example, the proposition introduced by you see in (31) will be interpreted as an explanation for the
proposition presented in the first only if it is understood that there is a causal connection between Autumn and the falling of leaves.

31- Leaves are falling. You see, it's Autumn.

This causal connection, as I said, does not appear in the case of after all. Thus, (32), for example, will never be construed as (33):

32- Peter didn't win the race. After all, he has an injured ankle.

33- Peter didn't win the race because he has an injured ankle.

In (32) the proposition introduced by after all is relevant as providing an explanation for the first proposition. The explanatory sense of you see in examples like (31) above will make appeal to a certain type of connection between two states of affairs. But, of course, this is not true of all explanations. As Blakemore (1987:89) points out, explanations are not always provided by assuming a causal connection between states of affairs. She argues that propositions introduced by you see can be construed as explanations without the appeal to such connections. In (34), for instance, the speaker cannot be said to have assumed a causal connection between Sunday and going out:

34- John is not here. You see, it is Sunday.

(Adapted from Blakemore (1987) example (43))

The proposition introduced by you see here is relevant as
an explanation for the fact presented in the first proposition. In other words, the proposition introduced by you see explains John's absence. In such a situation the hearer will not assume a causal connection between Sunday and going out, rather he will be expected to supply an assumption such as the one in (35):

35- John goes out every Sunday.

As we saw in the previous section, the proposition introduced by therefore functions as a conclusion in a synthetic inference rule. That is, the proposition introduced by therefore is a conclusion which cannot be derived on the basis of the proposition introduced by the first clause alone. To derive this conclusion, the hearer has to supply, from the context, another premise in addition to the one presented in the first proposition. Like therefore, after all and you see are also associated with synthetic inference rules. But there is a difference between therefore on the one hand and after all and you see on the other. This difference is that while therefore introduces a conclusion (the consequence), after all and you see introduce a premise (the explanation) to a synthetic inference rule. Consider for example (36) and (37):

36- He is brave; he is, after all, an Englishman.

(Blakemore, 1987: 81)

37- We have missed the train. You see, we were late.

For the derivation of the first proposition in (36) and (37) the hearer will have to supply further premises from
the context. For example, for the derivation of the proposition in the first clause of (36) he will have to supply a premise such as that in (38). For (37) he will need to supply something like that in (39):

38- All Englishmen are brave.
39- If we are late, we will miss the train.

Although the common use of *therefore*, as I said, is to introduce a proposition derived as an output to a synthetic inference rule, and that *after all* is used to introduce a proposition which is part of the input to a synthetic inference rule, there seems, as Blakemore (1987:82) denotes, a subtle difference in the extent to which this generalization holds. Thus, the use of *therefore* in (40) seems to be more acceptable than that of *after all* in (41):

40- Tom is a bachelor. Therefore, he’s not married.
41- Tom is not married. After all he’s a bachelor.

(Blakemore, 1987: 83)

One difference between *therefore* and *after all* is that whereas the proposition introduced by *therefore* is always associated with synthetic inference rules, the one introduced by *after all* is not necessarily so. The proposition introduced by *after all* might be a premise in an analytic inference rule where no extra assumption is needed to be supplied from the context as is illustrated in (42):
42- You can’t divide 997 by anything other than itself.

After all it’s a prime number.

(Blakemore, 1987: 83)

In examples like this, Blakemore argues, the hearer is not expected to supply an extra assumption from the context. This is because once the hearer gets the concept of a prime number, he gets its logical entry and hence the proposition in the first clause.

Although both after all and you see have an identical role in that the proposition they introduce indicates that what precedes is expected, the one introduced by after all has an additional function of suggesting that what is introduced is already known to the hearer. Compare (43) and (44):

43- He understands syntax. You see, he is a linguist.
44- He understands syntax. After all, he is a linguist.

While the proposition introduced by you see in (43) is believed to provide new information, the one introduced by after all in (44) functions as a reminder which the speaker uses to draw the hearer’s attention to an unnoticed assumption in order to justify a proposition he has just presented. If the proposition introduced by after all functions as a reminder it means that the proposition it is used to remind of is already contained in the hearer’s belief set. Propositions already contained in the hearer’s belief set have no relevance (see Sperber and Wilson (1986: 142-144). If this is true, then how can a proposition already contained in the
hearer's belief set be relevant? We should notice here that if information is contained in some part of the hearer's memory, it does not mean that it is contained in the most accessible context. What is meant by most accessible context here is a context which is neither contained in nor logically implied by the most immediately accessible context. In such a situation (i.e. where the information is contained in a larger context and not in the most accessible one) the hearer will understand the utterance as a reminder.

3.3 Moreover, furthermore and also

So far we have seen that the meaning of all the expressions analysed in terms of logical consequence were analysed so in virtue of their function as connecting two propositions as input and output to an inference rule. For example, the function of therefore in example (1) section 3.1 was to connect two propositions one as a premise and the other as a conclusion. The meaning of the expressions I am going to analyse in this section will be accounted for in terms of logical consequence although the propositions they connect are not construed as input and output to an inference rule. The propositions connected by expressions like moreover, furthermore and also I will argue, following Blakemore (1987), are related as two
premises and the relevance of the second premise is due to the further evidence it provides for the factuality of what is indicated by the first.

For example, if we compare Grice's example in (45) (mentioned in section (3.1) as (1)), with the one in (46), we notice that they are different. This difference is a direct result of the use of therefore and moreover:

45- He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave.
46- The house is new. Moreover, it isn't expensive.

They are different in that while the second proposition in example (45) functions as a conclusion from the first proposition, the second proposition in (46) has the function of providing more evidence for whatever the first proposition is evidence for. So the two propositions connected by an expression such as moreover are said to be two premises in an argument.

In fact, as Blakemore (1987: 91) points out, if two propositions (A) and (B), for example, are connected as premises it means that they are premises for the same conclusion (C). This assumption can be consistent with two types of relationship. First, (A) and (B) are premises in the same argument and are both necessary for the derivation of (C). In this case the function of moreover is to indicate that the conclusion (C) cannot be derived from either (A) or (B) alone. Second, (A) and (B) are two premises in different arguments. In this case, the function of moreover is to suggest that the
conclusion (C) can be derived either from (A) or (B). It is only in the second case that (B) will be construed as providing additional support for the conclusion derived from the first proposition.

Now, let us consider both possibilities by examining two examples. Concerning the first case (i.e. where moreover indicates that two premises are connected in the same argument) consider example (47):

47- Peter has arrived. Moreover, he has brought his own drink.

Moreover connects two premises in the same argument here because it guarantees the derivation of a certain conclusion that might not be possible to derive without the premise introduced by moreover.

Now, for the hearer to derive a conclusion from the two premises presented in example (47), he should provide a conditional premise like the one in (48):

48- If John arrives and he brings his own bottle, then we won't need any more drink.

When this conditional premise is combined with the two premises in (49) and (50) it enables the hearer to derive the conclusion in (51):

49- Peter has arrived.
50- He has brought his own bottle.
51- We won't need any more drink.

The conclusion in (51) can never be obtained without the premise introduced by moreover. So, moreover in this
use licenses the derivation of a conclusion which could not have been derived without it.

The second case where moreover can connect two premises is where it connects two premises in different arguments but for the same conclusion (i.e. where the second premise is regarded as providing more evidence for whatever fact is presented in the first proposition). In this case, the second premise will not be introduced to guarantee the derivation of a specific conclusion but to supply additional evidence for whatever conclusion is derived from the first proposition. That is, (A) (which is the first sentence of (52) and (B) (which is the second) are not cooperating for the derivation of a certain conclusion here but a certain conclusion may be derived from either of (A) or (B) alone. Consider (52):

52- John has bought a fiddle. Moreover, he has a musical ear.

If the second premise here is presenting additional evidence for the truth presented in the first proposition, then the hearer, as Blakemore (1987: 92) suggests, is assumed to form two arguments such as those in (53A) and (53B):

53A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>53B</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--- additional premise</td>
<td>--- additional premise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| ----- C | C | -----

80
This, of course, means that the conclusion (C) can be derived from either (A) or (B) alone. That is, there is no necessity for the combination of (A) and (B) to derive a certain conclusion because whatever conclusion is going to be derived can be obtained from either (A) or (B) alone. In such a situation, the context the hearer is accessing for the interpretation of the first proposition will yield the same conclusion as that which he accesses for the interpretation of the second. The hearer achieves this by accessing the contextual assumption in (54A) for the interpretation of (52A) and (54B) for the interpretation of (52B).

54- A- If John has bought a fiddle, then he likes music.

B- If John has a musical ear, then he likes music.

Now, when (54B) is combined with (52A) we will get the conclusion (55):

55- John likes music.

But the conclusion in (55) could also be obtained when (54A) is combined with (48B). This shows that moreover is different from other semantic constraints on relevance in that, as Blakemore (1987: 93) puts it "it constrains the hearer's choice of context not only for the interpretation of the proposition it introduces, but also for the interpretation of the proposition in the preceding sentence."

There are different conclusions which the hearer could derive from (52A) that cannot be obtained from (52B). For instance, there is no reason why the hearer
shouldn't have supplied the contextual assumption in (56) and then by combining it with the premise in (52A) derives (57):

56- If John has bought a fiddle, then he intends to play some music.

57- John intends to play some music.

Notice that the conclusion in (57), which is derived from the combination of (56) and (52A) cannot be derived from (52B). This suggests, as Blakemore (1987: 92) argues, that when moreover connects two premises in different arguments it indicates that the hearer may either process the first proposition in a different context or process it further where the context he accesses for the first proposition and that which he accesses for the second proposition must yield the same conclusion.

One question that may arise here is why should we provide a premise for an argument the conclusion of which can be obtained from a proposition already presented? To answer this, we have to know that the hearer's aim from processing information is not only to obtain more beliefs but also to get better evidence for his beliefs. When a certain conclusion is derived from the union of (A) and (B) it will inherit more strength than when it is derived from either (A) or (B) alone. So the aim of providing a premise for an argument the conclusion of which is already obtained is to increase the hearer's confidence in the factuality of that conclusion. We can
clarify this idea taking, for instance, the first proposition of (52) (repeated here as (58)):

58- John has bought a fiddle.

What guarantee does the hearer provide when he produces an utterance such as the one in (58)? The answer is that whatever guarantee he provides, it will not be more than guaranteeing the fact that he has made this utterance. He cannot guarantee, for example, what conclusion the hearer is likely to derive because, as we have seen before, there are all sorts of conclusions that the hearer could derive from this. However, while the speaker cannot guarantee, by uttering (58), the derivation of any proposition, an increase in the hearer's confidence in the factuality of the conclusion derived from the first proposition is provided by the premise introduced by moreover (repeated here as (59)):

59- Moreover, he has a musical ear.

As we have seen so far, the two propositions connected by therefore are related as a premise and a conclusion. By contrast, the propositions connected by moreover are related as two premises. The proposition which moreover introduces has two functions. First, giving the hearer more confidence in the factuality of the conclusion derived from the first proposition or; second, licensing the derivation of a specific conclusion that would not have been possible to derive without the proposition introduced by moreover. Notice that all I have said about moreover can be applied to furthermore.
There are other expressions as well such as *also* the meaning of which can have no contribution towards propositional content particularly when it is used in clause-initial position as in (60):

60- John has arrived. Also he has brought his own bottle.

In a sentence such as (60) it is quite acceptable for *also* to be replaced by *moreover*. But in certain other situations, particularly when *also* is not used in initial position, this is not possible because, as Blakemore (1987: 98) argues, when *also* is not used in initial position an extra element is added to the interpretation process and its effect differs according to the constituent interpreted as focus. Consider (61) and (62):

61- John took an aspirin and also a tablet.
62- John has a computer. Mary also has one.

The difference between the two uses of *also* in examples (61) and (62) is reflected in the fact that in (63A) but not (63 B or C) Mary is understood to have taken an aspirin.

63- A- John took an aspirin. Mary also took a tablet.
    B- John took an aspirin. Mary took a tablet.
    C- John took an aspirin. Also Mary took a tablet.

As mentioned before, the effect of a non-initial use of *also* differs according to what constituent is interpreted as focus. That is to say, an account of the function of
also as it is used in examples like (61) and (62), Blakemore (1987: 98) suggests, must be linked to an account of the way that focal structure affects interpretation. The extra element of meaning implied by non-initial also may also be implied by items like too and as well an analysis of which is to be presented in the next chapter.

Although in its focal use also seems to have the same meaning as and, this cannot be the case simply because its insertion in any conjoined utterance may result in change of meaning. The unacceptability of examples like (64) and (65) provide further support for this point:

64- ? John bought a ticket and also left.
65- ? The chair was sat on and also broke.

The oddity of these two examples is due to the presence of the word also. In (64) it cancels its temporal connotation and in (65) it cancels its causal connotation. What we notice is that there is no difference in terms of truth conditions between a conjoined utterance with also and a conjoined utterance without it. The relation of addition is not an element of its truth conditional content. This characteristic is what makes this word fall within the domain of semantic constraints on relevance.
3.4 **But**: Denial and Contrast

So far I have been concerned with the analysis of certain items which do not contribute towards the propositional content of the utterances that contain them, but which function as non-truth conditional constraint on the relevance of the utterances in which they occur. Similarly, in what follows I will be analysing, as a semantic constraint on relevance, the meaning of the word *but* which has been a focus of controversy among writers. This analysis will be based mainly on Blakemore's article (1989) which is a development of a section in her book (1987). This article has undergone a substantial amount of revision that resulted in the author departing from some of her claims stated in the book.

It is generally believed, Blakemore (1989: 15) argues, that part of the meaning of *but* is in common with *and*. That is, an utterance with *but* would not be true unless the facts of the two conjuncts it connects are true. For instance, (66) would not be true if Mary didn't actually come to the wedding and or didn't bring a bunch of flowers with her.

66- Mary has come to the wedding but she has brought a bunch of flowers.

On the other hand, it has also been recognised that utterances with *but* usually have contrastive connotations...
that are lacking in utterances with and. Compare examples (66) and (67):

67- Mary has come to the wedding and she has brought a bunch of flowers.

While the second conjunct has a sense of contrast with the first in (66), in (67) these contrastive connotations are missing. However, such assumptions have been taken to suggest that but means "and + something else". But despite all the efforts made, the analysis of the "something else" element, as Blakemore (1989: 15) argues, has been met with serious difficulties. This might be due to the fact that whereas the and aspect falls within the domain of truth conditional semantics, the suggestion of contrast conveyed by but is not a condition on its truth.

This account has urged some writers such as R., Lakoff (1971) to distinguish between two different uses of but: the so-called "denial-of-expectation" use, illustrated in (68), and the so-called "contrast" use as in (69):

68- John is a Republican, but he is honest.

(G. Lakoff, 1971: 67)

69- John is fat but Mary is thin.

R., Lakoff regarded the distinction between the two types of buts as good grounds for believing that there are two different meanings of but. This distinction may have been influenced to some extent by the fact that but corresponds in certain languages to two items (for
example, *lakinna* and *ball* in standard Arabic or *avai* and *ela* in Hebrew). But some writers, for example Kempson (1975) and Dascal and Katriel (1977), have found this distinction unsatisfactory.

Blakemore (1989), like Kempson (1975) and Dascal and Katriel (1977), rejects the idea of distinguishing between two different meanings of *but*. Her argument for the amalgamation of the two uses of *but* is due to that, *but*, for her, in its "denial-of-expectation" and the "contrast" use, is used to impose a constraint on the relevance of the utterance in which it occurs. But while in its "denial-of-expectation" use, *but* is said to constrain the relevance of the proposition it introduces, in its "contrast" use the constraint is one that involves both propositions.

### 3.4.1 *But* Denial of Expectation

An utterance, Blakemore (1989) points out, could be inconsistent with a previous one either in virtue of the fact that the explicit propositional content of the second is inconsistent with the first or the implicit propositional content of the second is inconsistent with the first. Thus, whereas (70B) is said to be a direct denial of (70A), (70C) is indirect denial.

70- A- Jane doesn't know how to drive a car.

B- Yes she does.
C- She has got a driving license.

We realise here that although it is possible for both (especially (70C)) to preface their utterances with but, none of them would necessarily need to use any linguistic clues as to the way his utterance is to be interpreted.

Blakemore (1987: 128) suggests that the term "denial" should be reserved for:

those utterances in which it is assumed that the speaker has grounds for thinking that the optimally relevant interpretation yields a proposition inconsistent with an assumption held by the hearer.

Thus, in example (68), mentioned before, the speaker uses but to indicate that the proposition it introduces is relevant as a "denial" of a proposition created by the utterance of the first clause. For instance, the proposition in (71) could be derived from the first conjunct of either (68) or (72).

71- John is not honest.

72- John is a Republican. He is honest.

However, there is a difference between (71) when it is derived from (68) and when it is derived from (72). This difference is that while there is no assumption on the part of the speaker that (71) would be denied when it is derived from the first conjunct of (72), when it is derived from the first conjunct of (68), the speaker
denies this proposition by the use of but which prefaces the second clause. While the second clause in (68) is understood to deny a proposition derived from the first clause, in (72) the second clause is perhaps not likely to be understood as a "denial-of-expectation" unless it is in the right context and with the appropriate intonation.

Dascal and Katriel (1977) point out that the use of but is not restricted to cases like (68). They argue that it could also be used to indicate that the proposition it introduces has a contextual implication which is inconsistent with a proposition the hearer is believed to have recovered from the first clause. Blakemore (1989: 27) notes that the reason why the hearer continues with the but clause is because he believes that the presentation of the first proposition has yielded a contextual implication that he wants to deny. Consider (73) (which is introduced by Dascal and Katriel (1977) as a counter-example to Lakoff's (1971)):

73- [A and B are discussing the economic situation and decide that they should consult an expert.]
   A- John is an economist.
   B- He is not an economist, but he is a businessman
   (Dascal and Katriel (1977: 143-144)

The hearer could presumably derive two conclusions here, one is negative and the other is positive. On the basis of the first clause in (73 B) and the contextual assumption in (74 A) he could derive the negative
conclusion in (74 B). On the other hand, on the basis of the second clause in (73 B) and the contextual assumption in (75 A) he could derive the positive conclusion in (75 B).

74- A- If John is not an economist, then we shouldn’t consult him.

B- We shouldn’t consult him.

75- A- If John is a businessman, then we should consult him.

B- We should consult him.

(Blakemore, 1989: 27)

The link performed here is not between two parts of a conjoined proposition but between the pragmatic interpretation of one proposition and that of the other.

There are some writers (for example Anscombe and Ducrot (1977)) who argue that but can be used to relate two different illocutionary acts (cited in Blakemore 1989: 27). In other words, it could be used by one speaker to respond to another speaker’s utterance as in the dialogue in (76):


B- John is not an economist.

C- But he is a businessman.

(Blakemore 1989:27)

Thus, we see that in all its denial uses but is considered to function as a semantic constraint on relevance.
3.4.2 "But' Contrast

According to the discussion in the previous section it can be concluded that but differs from and in terms of the proposition it forms. That is, while and forms a conjoined proposition, but does not and its function is purely non-truth conditional constraint on relevance. However, this is not true of all the uses of but. Thus, as we have seen in the previous section, while the suggestion conveyed implicitly by (68) could not be conveyed by the fullstop utterance in (72), the suggestion conveyed by but in (69) (repeated here as (77) is conveyed by the sequence in (78)):

77- John is fat but Mary is thin.
78- John is fat. Mary is thin.

Again, the suggestion of "contrast" conveyed by but is unlike the denial suggestion conveyed by the "denial-of-expectation" but. It can be conveyed by a conjoined utterance. Compare example (79) with (80):

79- John is a Republican and he is honest.
(Blakemore, 1989: 28)
80- John is fat and Mary is thin.

Thus, it seems that in its "contrast" use but forms a conjoined proposition. This conclusion can be further supported by the fact that in its "contrast" use but can
fall under the scope of logical operators as in (81):

81- If Mary is going to the party but John is not, then I shall not go.

In relation to this example, Blakemore makes two points. First, is that but as it is used in this example cannot be construed in its "denial-of-expectation" sense; second, is that the suggestion of contrast does not contribute to the truth conditions of (81).

We have seen that utterances like (78) and (80) could be interpreted as conveying a suggestion of contrast. But what I will be concerned with in the rest of this section is the fact that while utterances like (78) and (80) could be interpreted as conveying a suggestion of contrast, their interpretation is not always similar to the interpretation of the corresponding utterances with but. The meaning of but should be analysed in terms of an asymmetric connection. This connection is established in the context where the connection holds between two conjuncts of a conjoined proposition. In such a context but is understood in its contrastive sense.

However, if but is really used in the way outlined, this means that it should be possible to use it in any utterance that conveys a difference between two things. But there are at least two cases where but cannot be used to indicate a contrast. One could notice that the examples of contrast I have given so far involve one
speaker. This, however, does not necessarily mean that a suggestion of contrast cannot involve two speakers. As is clear in the dialogue in (82), it is possible for another speaker to produce an utterance which is understood to convey a contrast with the state of affairs described by the first. Here we can see that while (82 B) is an acceptable answer to (82 A), (82 C) is odd:

   B- Me: Mine vote Tory.
   C- Me: But mine vote Tory.

(Blakemore 1989: 31)

In situations like (82 C), Blakemore notes, but would be understood to be denying an assumption derived from the previous utterance. This point might be seen as further evidence for the view that there exists two types of but. But if there is a contrast but, then, there is no reason why (82 C) should not be interpreted in the same way as (82 B).

The second point is that but cannot be used to indicate a difference between more than two things. Compare (83) with (84):

83- Mary plays badminton, Anne plays squash, Jane plays basketball and John plays football.
84- Mary plays badminton, Anne plays squash, Jane plays basketball but John plays football.

There is a major difference between (83) and (84). This difference is that whereas the only interpretation of
(83) is one in which Mary, Anne, Jane and John all differ from each other in respect of the sort of sport each one plays, in (84) the only interpretation is one in which the sort of sport played by John seems to be different from all the sports played by Mary, Anne and Jane. This interpretation is due to the fact that whereas and could connect an indefinite number of propositions where each one seems to differ from the other, the maximum number of propositions connected by but is two, where the but-clause contrasts with all the rest taken together.

Another difference between (83) and (84) concerns the order of the conjuncts. That is, if the order of the conjuncts is changed in (83) it would still convey the same interpretation in which Mary, Anne, Jane and John differ in terms of the sort of sport they play. This cannot be true of (84). Compare, for example, (84) with (85):

85- John plays football, but Mary plays badminton, Anne plays squash and Jane plays basketball.

The oddity of (85) is because it draws the attention to the respect in which Mary, Anne and Jane are different from John where, in fact, as is indicated by (84) it is more relevant to know the property that John lacks than the one he has. So this indicates that when but is used to highlight a contrast, it can only be used to draw attention to a two-way contrast. But if but is used to indicate a contrast between two things, then there is no reason why it should not be used to draw attention to the
respect in which several things are different from each other.

In some cases, reversing the order of the conjuncts of a conjoined proposition would not affect the interpretation of the utterance. This is true of (83) where, as I have said earlier, its interpretation would remain the same in whatever order its conjuncts might be. This might be because the relevance of (83) lies in the fact that it is a list. In other cases this cannot be true. Consider (86):

86- The road was icy and she slipped.

(Blakemore, 1989: 34)

In this example reversing the order of the conjuncts would certainly be associated with a difference in interpretation. The order of the conjuncts is important here because the first conjunct modifies the context for the interpretation of the second. It indicates the cause of the event expressed in the second. That is, because of the order of the conjuncts, (86) would be interpreted as meaning that it is because the road was icy that she slipped. This interpretation would not be recovered from the same utterance if the conjuncts are reversed. Compare (86) with (87):

87- She slipped and the road was icy.

(Blakemore, 1987: 118)

Blakemore attempts to explain the asymmetry of example (84) in a similar way. This analysis would help
us realise two main points: first, in either the "contrast" or the "denial-of-expectation" case but instructs the hearer to derive a negative proposition. But instructs the hearer to derive such a proposition from the first clause. Thus from the first clause of (68) and (69) (repeated here as (88) and (89)), the hearer would derive the negative propositions in (90) and (91) respectively:

88- John is a Republican but he is honest.
89- John is fat but Mary is thin.
90- John is not dishonest.
91- Mary is not fat.

Second, Blakemore (1989: 34-35) argues that while the clause introduced by but in the "denial-of-expectation" use negates a proposition the speaker believes to have been derived by the hearer as a contextual implication from the first clause, in the "contrast" use the speaker does not intend to deny a contextual implication derived from the first clause. On the contrary, the first clause is said to be affecting the interpretation of the second by providing the hearer with a property whose ascription is understood to be negated by the second clause.

So, from all I have said it can be concluded that when the "denial-of-expectation" but is used the speaker presents two propositions each of which is consistent with the Principle of Relevance individually. In this case, the function of but is clearly a constraint on the
relevance of the proposition it introduces. On the other hand, when "contrast" but is used, the speaker is understood to have presented a single conjoined proposition the relevance of which depends on the way in which the first conjunct affects the context for the interpretation of the second. This way, Blakemore suggests, is linguistically constrained by the use of but.
Chapter Four

Further Semantic Constraints on Relevance

In the previous chapter I provided a review of the English semantic constraints on relevance discussed by Blakemore (1987) and a number of articles. In this chapter, however, I will extend this analysis to account for a number of other English expressions which have a semantic constraint on relevance function. The account of the expressions in this chapter is largely based on Blakemore's analysis of the semantic constraints on relevance reviewed in the previous chapter.

4.1 In addition, as well and too

In section 3.3 I argued, following Blakemore (1987), that although also can be substituted for moreover, there is an additional element of meaning expressed with also which seems to be missing in moreover. In other words, while moreover indicates that the associated proposition is an additional premise, also can be used to indicate that an extra meaning is implied. Henceforth when I talk about the use of also I mean its clause non-initial position use (i.e. the use in which it is implicating
extra meaning rather than the one in which its function is similar to moreover). In this section I will be concerned with the analysis of three items in addition, as well and too where as well and too seem to be ambiguous between these two functions.¹

When these items have a similar function to moreover, I will substitute them for moreover in examples used by Blakemore (1987). This may reveal the difference, if any, between the use of moreover and each of in addition, as well and too. According to the analysis I presented for moreover in section 3.3, it can be used in two different ways. First, it can indicate that the propositions it connects are related as premises in different arguments hence the conclusion derived from both propositions taken together may also be derived from any one of them alone. Second, it can be used to indicate that the propositions it connects are premises in the same argument where both propositions are necessary for the derivation of a specific conclusion. In this case, it indicates that the proposition in which it occurs enables the hearer to derive a conclusion which he may have not been able to obtain on the basis of the first proposition alone.

There are two respects in which in addition, as well and too seem to be similar to moreover. First, in respect to their position in the clause; second, in terms of their function. As for the first case the similarity is not absolute. While in addition replaces
moreover there are places in which moreover occurs where neither as well nor too can be used. There are two main places where moreover can be acceptably used in a clause: clause-initial and middle positions. It will be the same whether moreover is used in clause-initial position as in (1) (mentioned in section 3.3 as (47)) or in middle position as in (2):

1- Peter has arrived. Moreover, he has brought his own drink.

2- Peter has arrived. He has, moreover, brought his own drink.

When moreover is used in clause final position its use seems to be unacceptable as in (3):

3- ? Peter has arrived. He has brought his own drink moreover.

If we compare in addition to moreover in respect to the position in which they occur in the clause we notice a correlation between the two. Thus, the use of in addition, like that of moreover, can be acceptable in both clause-initial and middle but not final position as it is clear in the following examples:

4- Peter has arrived. In addition, he has brought his own drink.

5- Peter has arrived. He, in addition, has brought his own drink.

6- ? Peter has arrived. He has brought his own drink in addition.
Both *as well* and *too* may occur in the same place in the clause, that is in a clause non-initial position. But unlike *in addition*, these two items do not seem to be in total agreement with *moreover* in respect of the place in which they occur in the clause. Unlike *moreover* and *in addition*, the clause-initial use of *as well* and *too* is unacceptable as in (7):

7- ? Peter has arrived. *As well / Too* he has brought his own drink.

They can appear in clause-internal position but in this case their use is different from *moreover* or even *in addition* because they do not indicate that their clause is to be understood as an additional premise rather their function is to imply an additional meaning as we will see later in this section. It is only when they are used in clause final position that they will be similar in function to clause-initial or internal *moreover* or *in addition*. Even when they are used in this position, there seems to be a subtle difference in meaning, as is the case in (8) and (9):

8- Peter has arrived. *He has brought his own drink as well.*

9- Peter has arrived. *He has brought his own drink, too.*

These two sentences can be understood to convey the meaning in (10):

10- Someone else, you know who, has arrived and *brought his own drink.*

Note that (11) is another possible interpretation:
11- Peter has arrived (good). He has brought his own drink (even better).

Notice that sentences containing moreover or even in addition in clause-initial or non-initial positions do not receive interpretations like (10). Such interpretations are limited to as well and too when used in clause non-initial position only.

As far as function is concerned there seems to be a great deal of resemblance between moreover, on the one hand, and each of in addition, as well and too on the other. The resemblance is that in addition, as well and too can be used in the two ways I have referred to above for which moreover may be used. Let us consider example (12) and see how in addition is similar to moreover in fulfilling the first function:

12- Susan has bought a tracksuit. In addition, she had a salad for lunch.

For the first proposition of (12) I will be referring to as (12A) and for the second one as (12B). Now it seems that the hearer can derive a large number of conclusions from (12A) which he will probably never be able to obtain from (12B). Any conclusion he derives depends on the contextual assumption he accesses. For instance, accessing the contextual assumption in (13A) allows him to derive the conclusion in (13B):

13- A- If Susan has bought a tracksuit, she probably intends to go jogging.
B- Susan probably intends to go jogging.

(Blakemore, 1987: 92)

This suggests that in addition, like moreover, indicates that the hearer is expected to process the first proposition further. This means that the contextual assumption he accesses for the interpretation of (12A) will yield the same conclusion as that which he accesses for the interpretation of (12B). He might achieve this by accessing the contextual assumption in (14A) for the interpretation of (12A) and (14B) for the interpretation of (12B):

14- A- If Susan has bought a tracksuit, then she intends to lose weight.

(Blakemore, 1987: 92)

B- If Susan ate salad for lunch, then she intends to lose weight.

(Blakemore, 1987: 93)

Now combining with (12A) and (12B), (14A) and (14B) yield the conclusion in (15):

15- Susan intends to lose weight.

(Blakemore, 1987: 93)

Notice that (15) can be derived from the combination of (14A) with (12A) alone. Notice also that such a conclusion will have less stronger guarantee of factuality than any one derived from the combination of (14A) and (14B) with (12A) and (12B). In uttering the proposition in (12B) the speaker increases the hearer's confidence in the factuality of the conclusion in (15).
This is because, as I argued in section (3.3), conclusions derived by two separate arguments tend to have higher degrees of factuality than those derived on the basis of a single argument (see Blakemore 1987: 93).

I mentioned at the outset of this section that moreover according to Blakemore’s analysis (1987) can be used to connect propositions in two different ways. It can connect two propositions in different arguments or two propositions in the same argument. I have already shown how in addition can be substituted for moreover in the first case. Moreover can also be replaced by in addition in the second case. In other words, in addition, like moreover, can be used to connect two propositions in the same argument where the derivation of the conclusion (C) depends very much on the combination of both premises (P) and (Q). Consider (16) where the question mark means that the positioning of in addition in this specific example for some native speakers, but not for all, is unacceptable:

16- ? Tom’s here. In addition, he’s brought his guitar.

In addition here, like moreover, indicates that the proposition it introduces is a premise which has to be combined with the proposition in the first sentence. This combination licenses the derivation of a conclusion which is impossible for the hearer to obtain on the basis of the proposition in the first sentence alone. By uttering the second proposition the speaker indicates to
the hearer that he is expected to perform an inference which includes both propositions. The hearer will derive a conclusion from both propositions by accessing a conditional premise like (17):

17- If Tom is here and he has brought his guitar, then we can have some music.

(Blakemore, 1987: 95)

This conditional premise together with the two propositions of (16) enable the hearer to derive the conclusion in (18):

18- We can have some music.

Speakers aiming at optimal relevance do not expect the hearer of (16) to derive (18) from either the first or the second proposition alone. By uttering the second proposition the speaker of (16) indicates that his intention is to constrain the hearer's choice of context for the interpretation of the first proposition in a way that any context he selects should be influenced by the presence of the second proposition. Now, it seems that all I have said about in addition can be applied to both as well and too, except that in addition is used in clause-initial position and each of as well and too are used in clause-final position as in (19) and (20):

19- Susan has bought a tracksuit. She had a salad for lunch as well.

20- Tom's here. He has brought his guitar, too.

So far I have been considering examples that involve in addition, as well and too in a similar function to
moreover. In the remainder of this section I will concentrate on a second function expressed by *as well* and *too* which is missing in *in addition*. This function is similar to that of *also* in indicating that an additional meaning is implied. Thus, (23) can be implied either by (21) or (22). Recall that I mentioned in section 3.3 that when *also* implies an additional meaning it is used in a non-clause-initial position.

21- John has arrived. He also has brought his own bottle.
22- John has arrived. He brought his own bottle also.
23- Someone else, you know who, has arrived and brought his bottle.

As we have just noticed, *also* can occur in clause non-initial position. *As well* and *too*, like *also* when implying additional meaning, can be used in clause non-initial position as in the following examples:

24- John has arrived. He as well has brought his own bottle.
25- John has arrived. He has brought his own bottle as well.
26- John has arrived. He too has brought his own bottle.
27- John has arrived. He has brought his own bottle, too.

Notice that (he) in the case of (24) should be stressed and it should mean someone else. If (he) is not stressed, then *as well* means that (he) refers to the subject of the first clause (John). The same thing
applies to (he) in (26). Notice also that (23) above is not only implied by (21) or (22) but it can be equally implied by any one of the examples in (24-27).

A comparison of (24-27), shows that as well and too in clause-final position differ from those in clause-internal in that they are ambiguous between either implying an additional meaning or indicating that the clause in which they occur is to be understood as an additional premise. Thus, (25), for example, can be understood either like (23) above or like (28):

28- John has arrived. In addition, he has brought his own bottle.

Examples where as well and too are used in clause-internal position can not be ambiguous between these two interpretations. The only interpretation such examples receive is one similar to (23) above where an extra meaning is being implied. This extra meaning has to do with similarity. That is, it is an extra element of meaning showing, in the case of examples (24-27), for instance, that John is similar to someone else in that he arrived and brought his own bottle. In examples like (24-27) what is important is not only to know whether John has arrived and what he has brought with him. What is even more important is to know that the relevance of such examples lies in knowing that someone else in addition to John did arrive and brought his own bottle with him.
4.2 *too* and related items

I ended the previous section arguing that *as well* and *too* not only indicate that their clause can be understood as an additional premise but can also be used to indicate that an additional element of meaning is being implied. In this section I will show that in addition to these functions *too* can be used as a device for emphasizing a positive relation of equality between two properties. What I mean by a positive equality here is that what is true of the subject of the first clause can also be true of the subject of the second as in (29):

29- John bought a chicken and Bill bought one, too.

John and Bill are equal here in that each one has bought one chicken. Now, someone might argue that such a notion of equality exists even in sentences without *too* like (30):

30- John bought a chicken and Bill bought one.

Here I would say that although (30) exhibits a relation of equality, this relation is not emphasized as it is the case in (29). *Too* in (29) indicates that the conjoined elements are relevant to each other in respect of the fact that what is true of the subject of the first is also true of the subject of the second. It has to be pointed out here that the use of *too* is not limited to examples where we have two different subjects as it is the case in (22). It can also be used where we have the
same subject and a different predicate as in (31):
31- John likes Mary and he likes Sue, too.

However, emphasizing a positive equality is not limitable to the use of too. There are as well, also and items like like, and so and as + auxiliary which have exactly the same function as too in (29). Thus, each one of the following examples has quite the same meaning of (29):
32- John bought a chicken and Bill bought one as well.
33- John bought a chicken and Bill bought one also.
34- John bought a chicken like Bill.
35- John bought a chicken and so did Bill.
36- John bought a chicken as did Bill.

Although these examples have quite the same meaning expressed by the one in (29), there are two points to be mentioned: first, with (34) it seems to be assumed that the hearer knows that Bill bought a chicken. Second, (34) is ambiguous between two meanings: first, it can be interpreted to mean that "John bought a chicken and Bill bought one also"; second, it can be interpreted as "John bought a chicken which is similar to Bill." In most cases the first interpretation is the appropriate one. But in some extreme circumstances like when, for example, someone has a pet chicken called Bill, in these circumstances only the second interpretation will be the most appropriate. Ambiguity, however, does not always appear with the use of like. Its manifestation in example (34) is due apparently to the fact that the
example itself is misleading. In other examples like (37) there is no place for ambiguity:

37- John is a linguist like Bill.

In her study of the structure of sentences containing too and either, Georgia Green (1968: 22-39) draws the attention to the fact that although particles such as too and either have been mentioned in a number of articles, hardly anything is said about them apart from the fact that where either is used, there is in the preceding clause a negative preverb, and where too occurs, there is not. Since I am concerned in this section with the discussion of too and similar expressions, I will postpone my discussion of either to the next section. In the meantime I would like to draw the attention to the fact that too is not the only item which does not allow the presence of a negative particle in the preceding clause. In fact the peculiarity of (38) and (39) and the ungrammaticality of (40) shows that it is not only the use of too that rejects the presence of a negative particle in the preceding clause; but it applies also to the use of items like as well, also and so:

38-? John didn’t buy a chicken and Bill didn’t buy one as well.

39-? John didn’t buy a chicken and Bill didn’t buy one also.

40- * John didn’t buy a chicken and so didn’t Bill.
Like and as + auxiliary are similar to as well, also and and so in that their usage does not allow the presence of a negative particle. But they seem to differ from them in that they sometimes can be used in negated sentences like (41) and (42):

41- Like John, Bill didn’t buy a chicken.
42- John didn’t buy a chicken as Bill did.

These two examples are different in that while in (41) neither John nor Bill did buy a chicken, in (42) it is only Bill who bought a chicken. There are cases of negated sentences, with like where one person only will be understood to have bought a chicken like (43) where Bill but not John who bought a chicken.

43- John didn’t buy a chicken like Bill.

In the remainder of this section I will deal with three main points which indicate that further differences exist between these words. First, they differ in their indication of whether the subject of the first clause is being identified as equal to the one in the second, or vice versa. In this respect these words can be divided into two main groups. The first group consists of like and as + auxiliary. The second one contains all of too, as well, also and and so. While the use of the first group indicate that the subject of the first clause is being identified as equal to the one in the second, the second group indicate the opposite. In the first case the speaker is giving the hearer three things: something about "John", something about "Bill" and that they are
the same. Compare (44) from the first group and (45) from the second:
44- John passed his driving test like Bill.
45- John passed his driving test and so did Bill.
Although like and and so here indicate a relation of equality between John and Bill, nevertheless, (44) differs from (45) in two main points: first, while like in (44) takes Bill as the one to whom John is being identified as equal, and so in (45) indicates the opposite. Second, whereas in (44) there is an assumption that the speaker already knows that Bill has passed his driving test, (45) lacks such an assumption.

Second, they differ according to the type of sentence in which they occur. That is, some are used in elliptical sentences and others are used in either elliptical or non-elliptical sentences. Those that fall under the first category are like, as + auxiliary and and so and what belongs to the second type are too, as well and also. Let us consider the first group by comparing (46) with (47):
46- The mail workers rejected the offer like the farmers.
47- * The mail workers rejected the offer like the farmers rejected the offer.

From the second category compare (48) and (49):
48- John bought a chicken and Bill did, too.
49- John bought a chicken and Bill bought a chicken, too.
The difference between these two examples is very much
less than that which exists between (46) and (47). The existence of such a difference is a good evidence that words such as like, as + auxiliary and and so have to be used in elliptical sentences.

Third, they show some difference as to whether they are used in coordinated or full-stop sentences. In this respect they can be divided into three groups. There are those like and so which have always to be used in coordinated sentences because having and so means that we have got a coordinated sentence. However, we can have so + auxiliary + NP as an independent sentence. There are those which can be used neither in coordinated nor in full-stop sentences such as like and as + auxiliary and finally there are those such as too, as well and also which can be used either in coordinated or in full-stop sentences. Consider example (50) from the first category:

50- The mail workers rejected the offer, and so did the farmers.

Although and so are two items, they function as a single unit here. And so as it is used in (50) is more appropriate than that in 51):

51- ? The mail workers rejected the offer. And so did the farmers.

But, as I mentioned above, we can have so + auxiliary + NP as an independent sentence as in (52):

52- The mail workers rejected the offer. So did the farmers.
Items of the second group, as I mentioned above, differ from the ones in the first or third group because they seem to be used neither in coordinated nor in full-stop sentences. Thus the ungrammaticality of (53), (54) and the unacceptability of (55) and (56) shows that like and as + auxiliary are most appropriately used in sentences like (57) and (58):

53- * The mail workers rejected the offer and like the farmers.
54- * The mail workers rejected the offer and as the farmers did.
55- ? The mail workers rejected the offer. Like the farmers.
56- ? The mail workers rejected the offer. As did the farmers.
57- The mail workers rejected the offer like the farmers.
58- The mail workers rejected the offer as the farmers did.

Items of the third group differ from both those in the first and the second group because they can be appropriately used either in coordinated or full-stop sentences as it is clear in the following sentences:

59- The mail workers rejected the offer and the farmers rejected it, too.
60- The mail workers rejected the offer and the farmers rejected it as well.
The mail workers rejected the offer and the farmers rejected it also.

The mail workers rejected the offer. The farmers rejected the offer too.

The mail workers rejected the offer. The farmers rejected the offer as well.

The mail workers rejected the offer. The farmers rejected the offer also.

In addition to indicating a positive equality between two things, like has a further function of contributing to the higher-level-explicatures. As noted in the introduction, items which contribute to the higher-level-explicatures have internal structures which enable them to expand in various ways. In other words, they can be prolonged by inserting words like quite, just, rather etc. Let us consider the following example:

John, like Bill, admires Madonna.

(65) can also be expanded by adding the word quite as in (66):

John, quite like Bill, admires Madonna.

In this section I have presented a discussion of a number of items which all share the function of indicating a positive equality between two things. In this use they function as semantic constraints on relevance. In the coming section, I will discuss four words which are usually used to indicate the opposite.
4.3 *Either* and related items

In the previous section I analysed six items as indicating a positive equality between two things in two different clauses. In this section, however, I will be concerned with the analysis of three items *either*, *neither* and *nor* which have a contrasting function to the ones discussed in the previous section. That is, they are used to indicate that what is untrue of the subject of the first clause is also untrue of the subject of the second as in (67):

67- John didn’t buy a chicken and Bill didn’t buy one, *either*

*Either* here indicates that the two conjoined clauses are related to each other in that they share a common feature. This common feature is seen as what is untrue of John can not be true of Bill. That is, neither John nor Bill has bought a chicken.

*Either*, *neither* and *nor* may also be used to indicate that two different things are untrue of the same individual as in the following:

68- John doesn’t like Mary and he doesn’t like Sue, *either*.

69- John doesn’t like Mary and neither does he like Sue

70- John doesn’t like Mary and nor does he like Sue.

Notice that the meaning expressed by these sentences can also be conveyed by (71):

117
71- John likes neither Mary nor Sue.

Mary and Sue in this example as well as in examples (68), (69) and (70) seem to be similar in that John likes neither of them.

Concerning these items I will discuss first, the points in which they differ from indicators of a positive equality; second, the points in which they themselves seem to be similar. As far as the first point is concerned, they differ from the words discussed in the previous section in two main points. First, they are used to indicate that the two clauses are related to each other in respect to the negative rather than positive attitude they both carry. Second, they differ in that they require the presence of a negative particle in each one of the connected clauses. In fact, I have already clarified above the first difference. Concerning their second difference I will say that the fact that (72) is ungrammatical is a good proof that negativity expressed by the two conjoined clauses is a quite important condition for the correct use of these words.

72- * John bought a chicken and Bill bought one, either.

This sentence can be made grammatical in either of two ways: first, by inserting the negative particle not in each clause as it is the case in (67) above; second, substituting too for either as in (73) (mentioned in the previous section as (29)):

73- John bought a chicken and Bill bought one, too.

As far as similarities are concerned there are two
main respects in which *either*, *neither* and *nor* seem to be similar. First, they can be used either in elliptical or non-elliptical sentences. Consider (74) and (75):
74- John didn’t buy a chicken and nor did Bill.
75- John didn’t buy a chicken and nor did Bill buy a chicken.
Notice that (75) is less natural than (74). This shows that although these words might be used in either elliptical or non-elliptical sentences, their use is more natural when associated with ellipsis.

Second, they seem to be similar in that all may be used either in conjoined or full-stop sentences. Consider the following examples:
76- The mail workers didn’t accept the offer and the farmers didn’t accept it, either.
77- The mail workers didn’t accept the offer and nor did the farmers.
78- The mail workers didn’t accept the offer and neither did the farmers.
79- The mail workers didn’t accept the offer. The farmers didn’t accept it, either,
80- ? The mail workers didn’t accept the offer. Neither did the farmers.
81- ? The mail workers didn’t accept the offer. Nor did the farmers.
By comparing these examples two things can be realised. First, the use of these words in conjoined sentences is
quite acceptable. Second, *either* seems to be more acceptably used in full-stop sentences than *neither* or *nor*. This leads us to say that although these words may be used in both conjoined and full-stop sentences, the use of *neither* and *nor* tends to be more appropriately used in conjoined sentences. By contrast, the use of *either* is acceptable whether it is used in conjoined or full-stop sentences.

4.4 Further indicators of denial

In section 3.4.1, basing my discussion on Blakemore's analysis (1987, 1989), I argued that the lexical item *but* can have the role of indicating either a "denial-of-expectation" or a "contrast" sense. In the next three sections I will try to expand Blakemore's discussion of *but* by analysing a number of words and expressions which have one or other of the two functions of *but* or both. All the expressions I will discuss in the following two sections have a "denial-of-expectation" function apart from *while* which is ambiguous between both "denial-of-expectation" and "contrast". The reason for arranging the discussion of indicators of "denial-of-expectation" into two separate sections is because these words differ in terms of the element with which the "denial-of-expectation" sense is linked. That is, while the "denial-of-expectation" sense is associated with elements preceding the
expressions analysed in the first section, it is what follows the words in the second section that is associated with a "denial-of-expectation". This, of course, is a major difference but there are a number of dissimilarities that one can point out between the words discussed in both groups. Such dissimilarities will be specified in the course of discussion. In the third section, however, I will discuss the contrastive function of while, whereas and unlike, which is the second function of but.

4.4.1 Although, in spite of and while

Building on Blakemore’s analysis of but as a semantic constraint on relevance, I will discuss in this section a number of items which are similar to but in one of its functions, the "denial-of-expectation" function. In my discussion I will concentrate on the similarities and differences among these items. However, before considering that, it is important to mention that although these items are similar to but in its "denial" function, they seem to differ from it in two respects. First, while the "denial-of-expectation" sense is always associated with the clause following but, the "denial" sense in examples where these words are used is always associated with the main clause. Compare (82) and (83):

121
82- John broke the window but he refused to pay for it.

(Greenbaum, 1969: 246)

83- John refused to pay for the window although he broke it.

In example (82) the expectation is created by the first clause and denied by the clause introduced by but. In example (83) it is the clause introduced by although that acknowledges the expectation and the proposition expressed by the main clause is its denial.

Second, they differ in respect of their syntactic classification. But is a coordinating conjunction, while these items are subordinating conjunctions because they, together with their clause, can be shifted to initial position without change in meaning. Thus, there is no difference in meaning between (84) and (85) or (86) and (87):

84- Although he works hard, John hasn’t been given the job.

85- John hasn’t been given the job although he works hard.

86- While I was in London I came across an old friend of mine.

87- I came across an old friend of mine while I was in London.

However, in spite of is classified syntactically according to Quirk et al. (1985) section 9.11 as a complex preposition. It is only when this complex preposition is used to introduce a relative clause such
as the fact that or an ...ing phrase that it can be classified as subordinating conjunction. This difference is significant because it shows that the "denial" sense expressed by but is restricted to cases where the clause introduced by this word is used in sentence-final position. These items, except while, can function as indicators of "denial" whether the clause they introduce is used in sentence-initial or final position. Compare (88) and (89):

88- * But he refused to pay for it John broke the window.
89- Although he broke the window, John refused to pay for it.

While the use of but here is grammatically incorrect and unacceptable as an indicator of a "denial-of-expectation" sense, the use of although is acceptable both grammatically and as indicator of "denial" sense. However, what can be seen from comparing example (89) with (83) above is that while the "denial-of-expectation" sense is associated with the first clause in (83), in (89) the order of clauses is different because the "denial" sense is associated with the second clause. But in both cases, as I mentioned earlier, it is the main clause which involves a "denial" sense.

In this respect although and but seem to be similar because comparing the use of although in (89) with that of but in (82) above it can be noticed that in the case of (82) and (89) the "denial" sense involves the second
clause (which is the main clause in (89)). But, of course, they differ in respect to their position in the sentence. That is, in examples where the "denial" sense is understood to be linked to the second clause (which is always the case), but cannot be used in sentence-initial position as it is the case in example (88) above. The clause introduced by although, however, can be shifted to sentence initial position as in (89) above.

I mentioned earlier that although, in spite of the fact, in spite of being and while are similar in that they are classified syntactically as subordinating conjunctions. They fall under this category because their clause can be used either in sentence first or second position without any change in meaning as we have seen in examples (83) and (89) and as we can see in the following examples:

90- John doesn't understand Chomsky in spite of being a linguist.
91- John doesn't understand Chomsky in spite of the fact that he is a linguist.
92-? John doesn't understand Chomsky while he is a linguist.
93- In spite of being a linguist, John doesn't understand Chomsky.
94- In spite of the fact that he is a linguist, John doesn't understand Chomsky.
95- While he is a linguist, John doesn't understand
If we compare these examples we notice that on the syntactic level they are all acceptable. But concerning the "denial-of-expectation" sense they indicate, there is a dissimilarity between although, in spite of being and in spite of the fact that on the one hand and while on the other. The difference is that although although, in spite of being and in spite of the fact that can indicate a "denial-of-expectation" sense whether the clause they introduce occupies the initial or final position in a sentence, while can indicate such a sense only when its clause is used in sentence-initial position as in (95). As it is used in (92), while does not indicate a "denial" sense rather it contributes to the propositional content simply because the use of while here will be understood to express what Quirk, et al., (1985) call "temporal" relation where it means (at the same time as). Notice that although while in example (95) indicates a "denial-of-expectation" sense, this does not necessarily mean that the use of this word in sentence-initial position is pure indicator of a "denial" sense. There are cases where the use of while may have the function of indicating a "denial" sense on one interpretation but not the other as in (96):

96- While he is a Republican, John is honest.

Comparing while in this example with although in (89) above, we realise that while although in (89) has a pure
"denial-of-expectation" function, while in (96) is ambiguous between both "denial" and "temporal" functions. That is, while in (96) can be understood to deny an expectation created by the first clause and it can also be interpreted to mean either at the same time as or when he is not a Republican, John is not honest. The fact that while can be interpreted in these two ways shows that this word, unlike the other expressions, is ambiguous between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning.

If while indicates a "denial-of-expectation" sense just when it is used in sentence initial position, then there should be a further difference between while and the other expressions in respect of the clause with which the "denial-of-expectation" sense is associated. Basically, with all these items the "denial-of-expectation" sense is always associated, as mentioned before, with the main clause. But the difference lies in that the "denial-of-expectation" sense of although, in spite of the fact that and in spite of being can be indicated whether the clause they introduce is used in initial or final position in the sentence. The "denial-of-expectation" sense of while, however, is indicated only when its clause is used in sentence-initial position. Thus, when the clause introduced by these expressions is used in sentence-initial position the "denial-of-expectation" sense has to be associated with the main clause in sentence-final position and vice
versa. Compare the following examples:

97- John doesn't understand Chomsky in spite of the fact that he is a linguist.

98- ? John doesn't understand Chomsky while he is a linguist.

99- In spite of the fact that he is a linguist, John doesn't understand Chomsky.

100- While he is a linguist, John doesn't understand Chomsky.

While what is contrary to expectation is related to the second clause in examples (99) and (100), in (97) it is associated with the first clause. By contrast, in (98) a "denial" sense is not indicated because, as I mentioned earlier, when the subordinate clause of while is used in sentence-final position it cannot be understood to have a "denial-of-expectation" sense; the only way while will be understood in that position is as expressing a temporal meaning and so it contributes to the propositional content.

There are two points in which these expressions differ: first, to what degree the use of these expressions will be acceptable with the omission of the personal pronoun and auxiliary verb that follow them; second, whether these expressions are usually used to introduce a clause or a phrase. As far as the first point is concerned the use of in spite of being doesn't allow the personal pronoun and auxiliary verb to follow
simply because "be" does not take a clause.\textsuperscript{4} The use of these, however, is obligatory after \textit{in spite of the fact that} and optional after both \textit{although} and \textit{while}. Compare (A) with (B) in each of the following examples:

\begin{itemize}
  \item [101-] A- Although/While he is a politician, John is honest.
  \item [B-] Although/While a politician, John is honest.
\end{itemize}

(Adapted from G. Lakoff 1971: 67)

If we compare (A) and (B) in (101) we find that although both examples are normal, (A) is preferable to (B). This shows that the inclusion of the personal pronoun and auxiliary verb after \textit{although} and \textit{while} is more normal than their omission. By contrast, from what is shown in (A) and (B) in (102) one can realise that the omission of (he is) when \textit{in spite of the fact that} is used results in ungrammaticality.

The first difference I considered is important because of its significant influence on the second one. The second difference I will consider, as I mentioned above, is whether these expressions introduce a clause or a phrase. The first difference influences the second one in that there seems to be a correlation between those expressions allowing the use of the personal pronoun with the auxiliary verb and those which
introduce a clause and vice versa. The optionality of using these after although and while makes the elements introduced by these two expressions be either a clause or a phrase. Compare (103) and (104):

103-John, although/while he is a linguist, doesn’t understand Chomsky.

104-John, although/while a linguist, doesn’t understand Chomsky.

These two examples are acceptable both grammatically and in terms of the "denial" sense they indicate. But they are different in that while the proposition in (103) is expressed by a clause (he is a linguist), in (104) it is expressed by a phrase (although/while a linguist).

In spite of in general does not contribute to the propositional content. But in certain unusual examples it may fall within the scope of the conditional (if...then) and hence contribute to the propositional content. Consider, for example, (105):

105-If he is brave in spite of being an Englishman then I will have to revise my opinions about the English. Here the speaker is suggesting that Englishmen are generally brave. However, whether this proposition falls within the scope of (if) is not entirely clear. If it does, the following conditions must be met for (105) to be true:

106-A- He’s brave.

B- he’s an Englishman.
C- Englishmen are generally not brave.

If it does not fall within the scope of (if), (105) will still be true if (106 C) is false. Whether (105) can be true even if (106 C) is false is not at all clear. Therefore, it is not clear whether we have evidence here that *in spite of* can contribute to the propositional content.

There is, however, fairly strong evidence from negation that *in spite of* can contribute to the propositional content. Consider the following:

107- John isn't brave in spite of being an Englishman.

He is brave because he is an Englishman.

Here the speaker is rejecting the idea that bravery is unexpected in an Englishman and asserting that it is in fact to be expected. Thus (106 C) is within the scope of negation. Therefore, at least in one type of sentence, *in spite of* can contribute to the propositional content.

It is noticed from the examples given in this and the previous chapter that semantic constraints are generally associated with complete utterances. In examples (89), (93), (94) and (95) above the expressions *although*, *in spite of being*, *in spite of the fact that* and *while* respectively do not seem to be associated with complete utterances. Yet these cases may not pose any problem for the assumption that semantic constraints on relevance are associated with complete utterances because the fact that the two clauses are bracketed off
intonationally makes it a complete utterance in some sense. In this respect these subordinating conjunctions are similar to because which functions as a semantic constraint on relevance only when the two clauses it relates are bracketed off intonationally (see section (3.1)).

Semantic constraints on relevance may also be associated with non-restrictive relative clauses as is the case with after all in (108):

108- John, who is after all an Englishman, is brave.

(Tongerloo 1989)

Even sentences like this may not be regarded as counterexamples to the assumption that semantic constraints on relevance are associated with complete utterances. Since they are set off by intonation breaks, non-restrictive relative clauses can be viewed as complete utterances. Notice also that what I have said about in spite of being and in spite of the fact that can be also applied to despite being and despite the fact that respectively.

4.4.2 However, yet, and still

This section will be devoted to the discussion of three items however, yet and still. These items have a "denial-of- Expectation" sense like the ones discussed in the previous section. But, of course, there exist some differences between the two. The main bulk of this
section will be dedicated to specifying the differences between however, yet, and still on the one hand and the expressions discussed in the previous section on the other. However, similarities, whether they are among however, yet, and still or between these items and the ones in the previous section, are difficult to trace, apart from one apparent similarity perceived between the items of this section and although, in spite of and while. This similarity we will see later. Differences that can be perceived between however, yet, still and although, in spite of and while can be limited to three main points. First, as far as the "denial-of-expectation" sense is concerned, we saw that it is associated with the clause preceding the expressions discussed in the previous section or with the clause immediately following the one introduced by these expressions if the clause introduced by these expressions is preposed. But in either way the "denial-of-expectation" sense is associated with the main clause. By contrast, in sentences where however, yet, and still are used the "denial" sense is always related to their clause. Consider examples (109) and (110) (mentioned in the previous section as (91)):

109- John is a linguist. However, he doesn't understand Chomsky.

110- John doesn't understand Chomsky in spite of the fact that he is a linguist.
While the second clause in (109) is contrary to expectation, in (110) it is the first clause which involves a "denial-of-expectation".

Second, as I mentioned earlier, the expressions discussed in the previous section are syntactically considered as subordinating conjunctions because their clause can be shifted to sentence-initial position without any change in meaning. However, yet and still cannot be classified as subordinating conjunctions simply because they do not have such a flexibility. Compare (111) and (112) with (113) and (114):

111- John is a linguist. yet, he doesn't understand Chomsky.
112- * Yet he doesn't understand Chomsky John is a linguist.
113- John doesn't understand Chomsky although he is a linguist.
114- Although he is a linguist, John doesn't understand Chomsky.

The difference in the syntactic status leads to a difference in the flexibility of these expressions in their function as semantic constraints on relevance. Thus, while although (and all the other expressions discussed in the previous section) indicates a "denial-of-expectation" sense whether its clause is used in sentence-second position or preposed to initial position as in (113) and (114) respectively, yet (and all of however and still) does not have such flexibility. Its
"denial" sense is understood only when its clause is used in sentence-second position as in (111). When the clause of yet is preposed to sentence initial position the result is ungrammatical as in (112).

Third, we have seen that some of the expressions in the previous section like in spite of being can introduce a phrase, some like in spite of the fact that can introduce a clause and some others like although and while may introduce both. In this respect, however, yet and still seem to be similar to some of these expressions and different from others. They are like although, while and in spite of the fact that but differ from in spite of being because what they introduce has to be a clause. We saw in the previous section that the expressions which introduce a phrase can be separated together with their phrase from the main sentence by comma intonation with the sentence retaining its meaning. However, yet and still do not introduce subordinate clauses; therefore, they cannot have such parenthetical use. Compare (115) with (116):

115- * John, however an Englishman, is coward.
116- John, in spite of being an Englishman, is coward.

Blakemore (1987: 122-250) argues that dependent relevance is a relation that arises between two segments related by a semantic constraint on relevance like so, moreover, after all, etc., where the processing of the proposition conveyed by one is influenced by the
interpretation of the other and each segment is consistent with the principle of relevance individually.\(^7\)
If this is true it means that the relation of dependent relevance cannot be restricted to items like the ones mentioned above but extended to include other semantic constraints on relevance like however, yet and still. These items can give rise to the relation of dependent relevance between the propositions they connect because the way one proposition is processed is affected by the interpretation of the other. Consider (117):

117- John is a Republican. However, he is honest.

*However* imposes a constraint on the first segment by making the hearer access the contextual assumptions necessary for the derivation of (118):

118- John is dishonest.

We have to know here that it is not the speaker wants the hearer to access (118); it is just that he assumes he might. The hearer could have derived any proposition from the first segment of (117). But the fact that he has been constrained to derive this proposition shows how the second segment influences the interpretation of the first.\(^8\) In this respect, *however*, *yet*, *still* and the expressions discussed in the previous section are alike. That is, all the items I am discussing here and the ones I discussed in the previous section should give rise to a relation of dependent relevance.

Now, after I have considered the similarities and differences between *however*, *yet*, *still* and the others
discussed in the previous section, I will proceed in the remainder of this section to discuss the differences that exist among however, yet and still. The differences that one may perceive among these items can be summarised in two main points. First, while however can be used in clause-initial, medial or final position, yet and still are used in clause-initial position only. Thus, while the use of however in (119) and (120) is acceptable, the use of yet and still in (121) and (122) is not.

119- John is a linguist. He, however, doesn't understand Chomsky.
120- John is a linguist. He doesn't understand Chomsky however.
121- * John is a linguist. He, yet/still, doesn't understand Chomsky.
122- * John is a linguist. He doesn't understand Chomsky yet/still.

While the second segment in (119) and (120) is acceptable as an indicator of a "denial-of-expectation" sense, the second segment in (121) and (122) is not. Both (121) and (122) are ungrammatical. (122) is unacceptable grammatically but it is acceptable with yet in a temporal sense. This means that while the use of however as an indicator of a "denial-of-expectation" sense may be acceptable whether it is used in clause-initial, medial or final position, yet and still can indicate a "denial" sense only when they are used in clause initial position.
In their clause medial use yet and still contribute to the propositional content because the proposition of their clause will be understood to be true for some time. In other words, the proposition of their clause will not be understood to deny an expectation created by the first clause rather they indicate that something has been the same for some time. They function as semantic constraints on relevance when they are used in clause initial position as in (123):

(123) John is a linguist. Yet/Still, he doesn’t understand Chomsky.

However, the clause-final use of yet and still is ungrammatical but, as I said earlier, the use of yet in a temporal sense is acceptable in that position.

Second, there is a difference between however and yet on the one hand and still on the other. This difference is that although all these three items indicate a "denial-of-expectation" sense, still differs from however and yet in that in certain examples where these two items indicate a "denial-of-expectation" sense, still cannot be substituted for them. Consider (124), (125) and (126):

(124) John is a linguist. However, he hasn’t heard of Chomsky.

(125) John is a linguist. Yet, he hasn’t heard of Chomsky.

(126) ? John is a linguist. Still, he hasn’t heard of Chomsky.
Comparing the use of however, yet and still in these examples we realise that they are not interchangeable simply because they differ in function. That is, while the clause introduced by however and yet in (124) and (125) deny an expectation created by the first clause, the proposition introduced by still in (126) cannot be understood in that way. Still here contributes to the propositional content because it indicates that the proposition it introduces has been true for some time or, in other words, that something has been the same for some time.

Semantic constraints on relevance used to indicate a "denial-of-expectation" sense are not limited to the expressions I have discussed so far. The proposition introduced by nevertheless can be understood to indicate a "denial-of-expectation" sense in the same way as however. Compare (A) and (B) in example (127):

127- A- John is a linguist. However, he doesn’t understand Chomsky.

    B- John is a linguist. Nevertheless, he doesn’t understand Chomsky.

In both (A) and (B) however and nevertheless indicate that their proposition is to be understood as denying an expectation created by the first. Nevertheless, like however, may indicate a "denial" sense whether it is used in clause-initial position as in (127 B) above, clause-medial position as in (128 B) or clause-final position as
in (129 B), though this example is acceptable to speakers but not to others:

128- A- John is a linguist. He, however, doesn't understand Chomsky.

B- John is a linguist. He, nevertheless, doesn't understand Chomsky.

129- A- John is a linguist. He doesn't understand Chomsky however.

B- ? John is a linguist. He doesn't understand Chomsky nevertheless.

Notice that although however in (128 A) and (129 A) indicate a "denial" sense its use as in (128 A) is more common than (129 A). Notice also that apart from the dissimilarity between the use of nevertheless and however in (129 A,B) all I have said about however can be equally applied to nevertheless.

4.5 Further indicators of contrast

In the previous two sections my concern has been to provide a relevance-based analysis of a number of words and expressions which have the function of indicating a "denial-of-expectation" sense. "Denial", as it has been pointed out in the previous two sections, is one of two functions indicated by but (see sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. See also Blakemore (1987,1989)). The second function is "contrast". In this section I will present an analysis of three items: while, whereas and unlike.
which are similar to but in terms of the "contrast" sense they indicate. I mentioned earlier, section (4.4.1), that while is ambiguous between indicating "denial" and "contrast". This means that while whereas and unlike can be used to indicate a "contrast" relation only, while can be used to indicate both. Consider examples (130) and (131) where while indicates a "denial-of-expectation" and a "contrast" sense respectively:

130- While he is a politician, John is honest.
131- John is a doctor while Mary is a nurse.

If whereas is substituted for while in (131) the relation will still be the same where the second clause will be understood to contrast with the first as in (132):

132- John is a doctor whereas Mary is a nurse.

However, substituting whereas for while in (130) will not be acceptable to indicate a "denial" sense or a "contrast" relation as it can be shown in (133):

133- ? Whereas he is a politician, John is honest.

I should say here that whereas as it is used in (133) can be understood to indicate contrast provided that the two objects are understood to refer to different people.

The difference I pointed out above is only one of a number of differences existing among these items. My method in analysing the words in this section will be to a large extent similar to the one I adopted for analysing the items in sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. Now, what these words have in common is the indication of a
contrast as in the following examples:

134- John likes to drink English tea while Mary prefers Chinese.

135- John likes to drink English tea whereas Mary prefers Chinese.

136- John likes to drink English tea unlike Mary.

While, whereas and unlike in these examples indicate a contrast between "John" and "Mary" in respect to the sort of tea each one of them prefers to drink. But how would the proposition introduced by each one of these items be relevant. Here I would say that there is difference in respect to this point between the use of while, whereas and unlike in the above examples and the use of but in (137):

137- John likes to drink English tea but Mary prefers Chinese.

In examples like (137), Blakemore (1989: 34-35) argues, the speaker will be understood to be presenting a conjoined proposition the relevance of which depends on how the first segment affects the interpretation of the second. In other words, the first segment affects the interpretation of the second in that it gives the hearer access to a property whose attribution is believed to be negated by the second one. However, with while, whereas and unlike we are not dealing with a coordinated proposition. Although whereas and unlike have a pure contrastive function and while is ambiguous between both "contrast" and "denial", one fundamental function of all
these words is to indicate a relation of contrast. Indicating a "contrast" relation is the first of three features which these words seem to have in common.

The second feature which all these words seem to share is that in examples where the hearer is drawing attention to the respect in which several things are different from each other, the contrast indicated by *while, whereas* or *unlike* is not understood to be between all the propositions rather it will be construed to exist either between the last two propositions connected together or between the last proposition and the rest taken together as in the following:

138- Mary plays badminton, Anne plays squash, Jane plays basketball while John just watches TV.

139- Mary plays badminton, Anne plays squash, Jane plays basketball whereas John just watches TV.

140- Mary plays badminton, Anne plays squash, Jane plays basketball unlike John who just watches TV.

No hearer will understand the contrastive connection established by *while, whereas* or *unlike* here to be between "Mary", "Anne", "Jane" and "John". In this respect the use of these words is similar to that of *but* the contrast of which cannot involve more than two clauses. Thus the relevance of these examples will not lie in the fact that each of "Mary", "Anne", "Jane" and "John" does a different thing rather the relevance of the expression introduced by each one of these words will lie
in its suggestion of contrast with the rest of expressions.

The third similarity concerns the position in which they occur in the sentence when indicating a contrast. While in examples (135) and (136) above while and whereas are used to introduce a clause, unlike in (137) is used to introduce a phrase. Despite such a difference, they all seem to be capable of conveying a contrast when they are used in sentence-initial position as in the following: \(^{10}\)

141- While John likes to drink English tea, Mary prefers Chinese.
142- Whereas John likes to drink English tea, Mary prefers Chinese.
143- Unlike John, who likes to drink English tea, Mary prefers Chinese.

Now, after I have considered the similarities I will discuss the differences. The differences may be arranged into two groups: first, differences between while and whereas on the one hand and unlike on the other; second, differences between whereas and each of while and unlike. As far as the first group is concerned I will discuss two types of differences. First, as we noticed in examples (135) and (136) above, when while and whereas are used to indicate a contrast they introduce a clause. This is not true of unlike because what it introduces is a phrase as it can be seen in (137) above.
The examples of contrast I have provided so far involve one speaker only. However, as Blakemore (1989: 31) argues, there are cases where a second speaker in a dialogue may produce an utterance understood to convey a contrast with the state of affairs described by the first. While the response of the second speaker will be acceptable if prefaced by unlike it will be unacceptable to do that with while or whereas. This is the second difference between unlike and each of while and whereas. Consider the following example which is based on Blakemore's (1989: 31) where but is replaced by one of these words:

144- You: My parents are rich.
145- a- Me: While/Whereas mine are poor.
   b- Me: Unlike mine who are poor.

In the second group of differences I will draw attention to one minor dissimilarity between whereas and each of while and unlike. This dissimilarity is that while while and unlike are more appropriately used in examples where the contrast is between what Blakemore (1989: 29) calls "gradable antonyms" like "black" and "white" or "tall" and "short", whereas is more appropriately used in examples where the contrast is between two clauses of variable degrees on a continuous scale. Consider the following examples:

146- John is fat while Peter is slim.
147- John is fat unlike Peter.
148- John is fat whereas Peter is slim.

Substituting whereas for while and unlike in examples (146) and (147) or vice versa is not unacceptable but, as I mentioned, to use while and unlike where there are gradable antonyms is more appropriate than using them in examples where the contrast is between two clauses of variable degrees on a continuous scale as in the following:

149- John is fat whereas Peter is of medium build.

In examples like (149) it is less appropriate to substitute while or unlike for whereas because, as I mentioned, it will be less appropriate, but not unacceptable, to use while or unlike in examples where the contrast is between two clauses of variable degrees on continuous scale and vice versa.

unlike can also contribute to the higher-level-explicatures. As we saw at the end of section (4.2), constituents that contribute to the higher-level-explicatures are potentially quite complex and there are a number of ways in which they can be expanded. Consider (150):

150- John, unlike Bill, is a linguist.

This example can be more complex as in (151):

151- John, unlike Bill but quite like Fred, is a linguist.

While in (150) we assume that Bill is not a linguist, in (151) we assume that Bill is not a linguist but Fred is.
4.6 *Anyway, incidentally* and *by the way*

A number of items which I have discussed so far have been analysed as semantic constraints on relevance in virtue of the inferential connection they indicate between two propositions. Some words like *therefore* and *so* have the function of indicating that the proposition they introduce is to be understood as a conclusion derived on the basis of the first proposition and a premise supplied by the hearer from the context. The connection indicated by words like *moreover* and *furthermore* can be interpreted in two different ways: first, the propositions connected by these words are understood as two premises in different arguments and in this case the proposition introduced by any one of these words will be understood as additional evidence for the conclusion derived from the first proposition; second, the propositions connected by these words can be understood as two premises in the same argument and in this case the proposition introduced by these words will be understood to license the derivation of a conclusion the hearer will not have been able to obtain from the first proposition alone. There are also items like *but, however, yet*, etc., which can be considered as constraining relevance not in relation to the inferential connection they indicate rather to their indication that the proposition they introduce is to be understood to
deny an assumption derived on the basis of the first proposition.

However, there are some items which can be analysed as constraining relevance in other ways. That is, they can function as semantic constraints on relevance without having to establish inferential connections or indicating that the proposition they introduce has to be understood to deny an implication derived from the first proposition. In this section I will try to present a relevance-based analysis of three items anyway, incidentally and by the way.

Blakemore (1987: 122) points out that the view of discourse which emerges from the relevance-based framework is one where the interpretation of one utterance contributes towards the interpretation of subsequent utterances. However, this is not always true. Digressions do not usually contribute towards the interpretation of later utterances. She argues (1987: 141) that the relevance of the proposition introduced by anyway will be understood to lie in a context that does not include the immediately preceding remark. This is because the preceding remark is a digression. Notice that a digression can be a single utterance or a number of utterances. But whether it is one utterance or more than one, it cannot be viewed as contributing to the context for interpreting a subsequent utterance, as we can see in the following example where the relevance of the proposition introduced by anyway does not lie in the
immediately preceding proposition rather in (I have forgotten what it was) which is a little further back:

152- They changed over to a most peculiar kind of train which you don’t see now. I have forgotten what it was called. Was it called a "steam coach"? I can’t remember. Anyway, it was just one coach but it ran by steam and it made a funny noise.

(Halliday and Hassan 1976: 270)

Blakemore’s argument (1987: 141) that the relevance of the proposition introduced by anyway will have to lie in a context that does not include the immediately preceding one may leave us with the question of how far back one has to go for recovering this context? Here I would say that it is difficult for the hearer to know where a digression starts if the digression is left unmarked as in example (152) above; therefore, hearers usually need some clues to help them to identify where a digression begins. The speaker can make that clear first by using items like incidentally or by the way which are normally used to indicate the start of a digression. The way they are used is illustrated by the following real example:

153- There is a shortage of hotels in Florida. Prices generally in mid-season range from twenty-five to sixty-five dollars a night. The rooms are generally far bigger than in Europe; always air-conditioned and usually they will have a fridge.
Incidentally / By the way, if a room is advertised as having efficiencies, it means it has a kitchen. Pools are often smaller than Mediterranean ones. Hotels don’t have much in the way of facilities. Breakfast is not included in the room charge.

Notice that although both incidentally and by the way indicate the beginning of a digression, by the way is normally used to indicate digressions in informal situations. The use of incidentally and by the way in example (153) indicate that the proposition they introduce does not contribute to the context for the interpretation of what follows the digression rather they indicate that what precedes contributes to the context for the interpretation of a later proposition. Thus what contributes to the context for interpreting the utterance (Pools are often smaller than Mediterranean ones) cannot be the digression introduced by incidentally or by the way (if a room is advertised as having efficiencies it means it has a kitchen). The remark that contributes to the context for the interpretation of this utterance should be the last remark before the digression started which is (The rooms are generally far bigger than in Europe; always air-conditioned and usually they will have a fridge).

Second, the speaker can make the beginning of a digression clear, whether he made that clear or not, by taking the hearer back saying (Anyway, as I said, X) with X the last utterance before the digression as in the
Last weekend the Syrian Society suggested a trip to Manchester. Most members agreed to go to Manchester. However, a few didn’t agree on the place chosen. A friend of mine asked me to bring him some Indian spices which are not available in Bangor. Anyway, as I said, not all members did agree to go to Manchester. Some of them suggested Birmingham, others London.

In this way the speaker not only specifies the beginning of a digression but also indicates where it ends. Anyway marks the end of the digression and its proposition marks where that digression begins. Notice that the second way is more preferable in cases where the digression is quite a long one.

In relation to their function, incidentally and by the way seem to be the opposite of anyway. In other words, while incidentally and by the way are used to introduce a digression in discourse, anyway is used to indicate its termination. This relation may be represented in the diagram in (155):

(155): (Incidentally)
Main discourse --> digression -->
(By the way)
(Anyway) main discourse.

If I represent this diagram by an actual example it can
be like (156) which is a real-life example:

156- At self-service stations you pay before you fill up.

In America you have to switch on the pump first.

Incidentally/By the way, all hire cars use unleaded petrol. Anyway, the maximum speed limit is 65 miles an hour though 56 is more common.

As I mentioned earlier speakers may make the end of a digression clear by using anyway and leave the beginning of that digression unmarked as in (152) above. Some speakers, however, may do the opposite. They might mark the beginning of a digression and leave where it ends unspecified as in (153) above. The hearer may be confused in both cases. In the first case he may be confused because he does not know how far back he should go to recover the context in the light of which he will interpret the proposition introduced by anyway. In the second case the hearer may be confused because, as I mentioned earlier, a digression may be one sentence or more and he does not know where it ends. There is a difficulty for the hearer to recover the context for interpreting the proposition introduced by anyway if the beginning of the digression is not specified because the proposition conveyed by the digression does not contribute to the context for interpreting what follows the digression, whereas in the case where the beginning of a digression is specified it is more easier because what precedes incidentally and by the way provides the context for the interpretation of the digression. But
concerning the processing effort, I would say in both
cases the hearer is expected to face more processing
effort than in cases where the beginning as well as the
end of a digression are specified as in (156) above.
Chapter Five

**Ilnama and Bass: Denial and Contrast**

Chapters three and four were devoted to the Analysis of the English data. In chapter three I presented a review of the items analysed by Blakemore (1987) as semantic constraints on relevance. In chapter four I extended Blakemore's analysis to account for a number of English expressions like *although*, *while*, *however*, *still*, *yet*, etc., which have a semantic constraint on relevance function.

This part of the study will be mainly concerned with the analysis of the Syrian Arabic data. The Syrian expressions I will analyse in this part are almost the counterparts of the English expressions discussed in chapters three and four. The analysis of these Syrian expressions will consist of four chapters. Chapter six will discuss the counterparts of *therefore*, (*min shan heik, laheik, lahassabbab*, and *lahashshi*) and *so ma6natu*. Chapter seven will provide an account of the counterparts of *after all* (*bidhall, tab6ann* and *ba6d kil shi*), the counterparts of *you see* (*shaif* and *bta6ref*) and the counterparts of *moreover, furthermore* and *also* which are (*fou? hashshi, bil?idhafeh lahashshi* and *kaman*) respectively. Chapter eight will discuss the
counterpart of although and while ma6 inno, the counterparts of in spite of the fact that and in spite of being raghm inno and raghm kawno respectively and the counterpart of however, yet, nevertheless and still ma6 heik.

In this chapter, however, I will present an account of innama and bass which are the Syrian counterparts of the English but. This chapter consists of three sections. In 5.1 I will identify their syntactic category. Section 5.2 will be concerned with the analysis of innama and bass as indicating a "denial-of-expectation" sense. In section 5.3 an account of bass as indicator of both "contrast" and "exclusion" function will be presented.

5.1 The syntax of u, innama and bass

The items Blakemore (1987) refers to as semantic constraints on relevance, vary syntactically from coordinating conjunctions like but to subordinating conjunctions like because and to adverbs such as so and therefore. In this work I will be using the term "adverb" as a label for any semantic constraint on relevance which syntactically cannot be classified as a subordinating or a coordinating conjunction. In other words, it is a class that is really defined in negative terms. The adverbs may well differ from each other in
various ways and they may well differ from ordinary adverbs in various ways.

My concern in this section is to consider the three Syrian items *u*, *innama* and *bass* to see if they could be classified under one of the three syntactic categories I have mentioned. *U*, *innama* and *bass* correspond in one way or another to the English *and* and *but* where *u* is similar to *and* and *innama* and *bass* to *but*. Notice that I want to establish the syntactic identity of *u* here because I will use this item in the process of establishing the syntactic identity of other Syrian semantic constraints on relevance.

The term "conjunction" in English is usually used to refer to a large number of connectives. These connectives are classified into two main types: "subordinating conjunctions" like (because, when, unless, etc.) and "coordinating conjunctions" which are the three words (and, or and but). One of the distinguishing features of subordinating conjunctions in English is that they can be preposed to sentence-initial position, together with their clause, with no change in meaning. Consider (1):

1- John will not come unless he is invited.

This sentence is grammatical and it will still be grammatical when the clause introduced by *unless* is shifted to sentence-initial position as in (2):

2- Unless he is invited, John will not come.

Coordinating conjunctions, however, are usually
distinguished from subordinating conjunctions by the fact that the clause they introduce cannot be preposed. Compare the grammatical sentence in (3) with the ungrammatical one in (4):

3- John likes beer and Bill likes wine.
4- * And Bill likes wine John likes beer.

Coordinating conjunctions are distinguished from adverbs by two points: first, no two of them can be used in succession. Thus, for instance, While (5) is grammatical, (6) is not:

5- I read the book and returned it to the library.
6- * I read the book and but returned it to the library.

The ungrammaticality of (6) is due to the successive use of the two coordinating conjunctions and and but. Adverbs, however, can follow and thus we can have and so as in (7):

7- I can see that you look upset and so can Nick.

Second, in coordinated sentences "coordinating conjunctions" are used in initial position of the second clause. That is, to indicate a coordination of two clauses they have to occur between the two coordinated clauses but not inside the second clause. Compare (8) and (9):

8- John went by car and Mary came by train.
9- * John went by car Mary and came by train.

The ungrammaticality of (9) is attributed to the misplacement of the coordinating conjunction and.
Now, if \( u \), \textit{innama} and \textit{bass} are subordinating conjunctions it means that, like \textit{unless} in (2) above, they can be preposed, together with their clause, to sentence-initial position without change in meaning. Consider (10), (11) and (12):

10- \textit{Hweh diktour} \( u \) \textit{martu mumaridha}.
He doctor and wife-3SGM nurse-3SGF.
He is a doctor and his wife is a nurse.

11- \textit{Hweh 6alem lugha \textit{bass} mano sam6ann}
He scholar-3SGM language but not-3SGM hear-3SGM bitshomski.
in-Chomsky.
He is a linguist but he hasn’t heard of Chomsky.

12- \textit{Ma kan il?akl ktiir \textit{innama hinneh ma akklu ktiir}}.
Not was the-food much but they not ate-3PL much.

The food wasn’t too much but they ate very little.

The fact that preposing the clause of \( u \), \textit{innama} and \textit{bass} is ungrammatical as in (13), (14) and (15) below shows that these items cannot be subordinating conjunctions.

13- \textit{* \( u \) martu mumaridha hweh diktour}.
And wife-3SGM nurse-3SGF he doctor-3SGM.

14- \textit{* Bass mano sam6ann bitshomski hweh}
But not-3SGM hear-3SGM in-Chomsky he
\textit{6alem lugha}.
scholar-3SGM language.
15- * **Innana** hinneh ma akklu ktiir ma kan il?akl
   But they not ate-3PL much not was the-food ktiir.
   much.

   If they cannot be subordinating conjunctions, we can see if they can be classified as coordinating conjunctions. Two coordinating conjunctions, as we saw earlier, cannot be used in juxtaposition. Thus, the ungrammatical result of juxtaposing any two of these items as in (16), (17) and (18) shows that they are coordinating conjunctions.

16- * Ahmad wilwladd ijju bil?itarr u
   Ahmad and-the-children came-3PL in-the-train and
   bass zawjtu ijjet bissayarra.
   but wife-3SGM came-3SGF in-the-car.
   * Ahmad and the children came by train and but his wife came by car.

17- * Hweh fallah u **Innana** m?addab.
   He farmer-3SGM and but polite-3SGM.
   * He is a farmer and but has sophisticated manners.

18- * Kan ju6ann ktiir **bass Innana** ma akall.
   Was hungry-3SGM very but but not ate-3SGM.
   * He was very hungry but but didn’t eat.

   I should add here that although **bass** and **innana** cannot occur with another coordinating conjunction, as it is the case in (16), (17) and (18) there are certain instances where in Syrian Arabic **bass** could occur with u
and in the standard language innama could occur with wa, which is the formal equivalent of u in the Syrian dialect of Arabic as in (19) and (20):

19- Ištini gallayit ishshai u bass.
    Give-2SG-1SG kettle the-tea and but.
    Give me only the kettle.

20- Lam yaqom Zaidun wa innama qama
    Didn’t stand-3SGM Zaid and but stood-3SGM 6amrun.
    Amr.
    Amr stood but Zaid didn’t.

Such cases would not be my concern here because, on the one hand, I am not analysing standard Arabic, on the other, bass does not concern me if it can be used next to a coordinating conjunction such as u as in (19) because it does not function as a semantic constraint on relevance.

These items may occur in succession with adverbs like ma6 hashshi, which is similar to yet in English. This, of course does not show that they are not coordinating conjunctions because we can have in English an adverb following a coordinating conjunction like but nevertheless. Consider (21) and (22):

21- Kanet ilhafleh baykha ktiir bass ma6 hashshi
    Was the-party boring very but yet
dhallu lal?akhiir.
    stayed-3PL to-the-end.
    The party was very boring but yet they stayed to the
He has lost a lot of money but yet he is still rich. Here we notice that these examples are both grammatical and meaningful. That is, the "denial-of-expectation" sense conveyed by bassa in (21) and innama in (22) is not ended by the insertion of the adverb ma6 hashshi.

Other adverbs may also occur in juxtaposition with innama and bassa with no ungrammatical or meaningless result at all. One of these adverbs is gala kil hall, which corresponds to nevertheless in English as in (23) and (24):

23- wisel innama gala kil hall kan mit?akher.
Arrived-3SGM but nevertheless was late-3SGM.
He arrived but, nevertheless, he was late.

24- Hweh fallah bass gala kil hall m?addab.
He farmer-3SGM but nevertheless polite-3SGM.
He is a farmer but, nevertheless, he has sophisticated manners.

Finally, depending on the discussion and the examples presented, it may be concluded that these Syrian items cannot be subordinating conjunctions. As we have seen earlier subordinating conjunctions allow their clause to be preposed to sentence-initial position.
without change in meaning, a movement which cannot be performed by \( u \), \( innama \) or \( bass \). The clause introduced by these Syrian items is usually sequentially fixed. My conclusion is that since it is not possible to use any two of these items in juxtaposition, as is the case in (16), (17) and (18) above, then I suggest that \( u \), \( innama \) and \( bass \) cannot be classified syntactically but under the term "coordinating conjunctions".

5.2 \textit{Innama} and \textit{bass}: denial of expectation

I will argue that the meaning of \textit{innama} and \textit{bass} does not contribute towards the propositional content of the utterance in which they occur. Rather their function is to constrain the pragmatic interpretations of the utterances in which they are contained. Thus, I will follow Blakemore's footsteps in her analysis of the meaning of \textit{but} (1987, 1989) in English as a semantic constraint on relevance.

\textit{But} in English, as we have seen in chapter three, has two main uses: first, it has the function of indicating a "denial-of-expectation" sense; second, it is used to indicate a relation of "contrast" between two clauses. If \textit{but} has only these two uses, then it is possible to claim that it can account for all the uses of \textit{innama} but not for all the uses of \textit{bass}. Whereas \textit{innama} is used to indicate only a "denial-of-expectation" sense, \textit{bass} can have three different uses: first, it could be

161
used to indicate a "denial-of-expectation" sense; second, it is used to indicate a relation of "contrast"; and third, it is used to denote what I will call a relation of "exclusion" where its use is similar to that of the word only in English. By "exclusion" I mean a certain type of contrast where one element is being excluded from several elements. In this use bass does not function as a semantic constraint on relevance. Rather it contribute to the propositional content.

The account for the meaning of these items will be divided into two sections. In this section the discussion will be devoted mainly to the analysis of innama and bass as they are used to express a "denial-of-expectation" sense. In the next section, however, I will concentrate on the analysis of bass as indicating a relation of both "contrast" and "exclusion". But before I start the analysis of innama and bass as indicating a "denial-of-expectation" sense I would like to make a clear distinction between the two types of contrast, "contrast" and "exclusion" that may be achieved by bass.

There are certain features which distinguish the "exclusion" use of bass from that of "contrast". The discussion of these features will be postponed here. In the meantime I will mention "stress" which is one of the most prominent features of the "exclusion" use of bass. This stress will be indicated by the sign (/) at the beginning of bass. Compare the "contrast" use in (25)
with the "exclusion" use in (26):

25- Sarah naasha **bass** Maria dh6iifeh.
    Sara fat-3SGF but Maria slim-3SGF.
    Sara is fat but Maria is slim.

26- Khaliil muganni / **bass** abuh .
    Khaliil singer-3SGM only father-3SGM
    6azef 6a16uud.
    lutanist-3SGM.

Khaliil is a singer, only his father is a lutanist.

Here we realise that there is a difference in meaning between the two uses of **bass**. In (25) **bass** is used to indicate a contrast between the fatness of Sara and the slimness of Maria. In (26) **bass** is used to exclude Khaliil's father from all the members of the family as the only one who plays the lute. In this way, we have got a contrast between Khaliil's father and the rest of the family.

Following Blakemore (1987: 128), I would argue that a "denial-of-expectation" is a term reserved for those utterances in which it is assumed that the speaker has grounds for thinking that the optimally relevant interpretation yields a proposition inconsistent with an assumption held by the hearer.

To illustrate this consider example (27):

163
Anyone who hears the first proposition of (27) would immediately, from the context, supply the contextual assumption in (28) because it is expected that anyone who is a linguist to have heard of Chomsky. This assumption is related as a premise with the newly provided assumption in (29) to yield the conclusion in (30):

28- ?ai wahed 6alem lugha lazem
   Any one scholar-3SGM language must
   ikuun sam6ann bitshomski.
   be-3SGM hear-3SGM in-Chomsky.
   Anyone who is a linguist must have heard of Chomsky.

29- Hweh 6alem lugha.
   He scholar-3SGM language.
   He is a linguist.

30- Lazem ikuun sam6ann bitshomski.
   Must be-3SGM hear-3SGM in-Chomsky.
   He must have heard of Comsky.

The suggestion in (30), which is usually derived on the basis of the contextual assumption (28) and the newly presented information (29), is denied by the assumption conveyed by the second proposition of (27) which is (31):
31- Mano sam6ann bitshomski.
   Not-3SGM hear-3SGM in-Chomsky.

I mentioned that the optimally relevant interpretation of (27) should be one which is inconsistent with the assumption held by the hearer of (30). Here we notice that the only optimally relevant interpretation is one that yields the proposition in (31) because this proposition is regarded the only proposition seen to be inconsistent with the assumption in (30).

According to the discussion in chapter three, the "denial-of-expectation" sense associated with but in English is of two types: direct and indirect denial. Similarly, in Syrian, both types can be achieved by bass and innama. A direct denial is usually reserved for utterances articulated by a single speaker. Consider (32):

32- Mahmoud bahhaarr bass ma bie6ref
   Mahmoud sailor-3SGM but not know-3SGM
   yisbah.
   swim-3SGM.

Mahmoud is a sailor but he doesn’t know how to swim. In such a situation (i.e. in a direct denial) either bass or innama could be used. I mentioned that the optimally relevant interpretation of denial utterances would be one which yields a proposition inconsistent with an assumption held by the hearer. The assumption that could be derived from (32) is (33):
Mahmoud knows how to swim.
The optimally relevant interpretation of the second conjunct of (32) should yield the proposition in (34):

He doesn’t know how to swim.

An optimally relevant interpretation should yield this proposition because it is inconsistent with the assumption held by the hearer of (33).

The indirect denial, on the other hand, is different in that it is not reserved for utterances articulated by a single speaker. They are usually produced by two speakers where the second speaker produces the denial. In this case the proposition introduced by bass or innama, like that of but, has a contextual implication which is inconsistent with a proposition the hearer is believed to have recovered from the preceding clause.

Consider (35) (which is a Syrian translation of Dascal and Katriel’s example 1977: 143-44):

[A and B are discussing the economic situation and decide that they should consult a specialist in economics]

A: John Salem iqtisaadh.

John Scholar-3SGM economics.

John is an economist.
B: Hweh mano 6alem iqtisadh innama
He not-3SGM scholar-3SGM economics but
hweh rajoul a6mall.
he man businesses.
He is not an economist but he is a businessman.
The reasoning of (35) is more complicated than the direct
denial in (32). In (35) the hearer would probably
derive two conclusions, one is negative and the other is
positive. On the basis of the first clause of (35B) and
the contextual assumption in (36A) he derives the
negative conclusion in (36B). On the other hand, on the
basis of the second clause and the contextual assumption
in (37A) he could derive the positive conclusion in
(37B). The proposition in (36B) here is inconsistent
not with the proposition expressed by the clause
introduced by innama but with the proposition in (37B)
which the hearer has probably derived on the account of
the contextual assumption in (36A).

36- A- Iza kan John mano 6alem iqtisadh
If was John not-3SGM scholar-3SGM economics
ma6natu ma lazem nakhud ra?iyo.
this-mean not should take-3PL opinion-3SGM.
If John is not an economist, then we shouldn't seek
his opinion.

B- Ma lazem nakhud ra?i John.
Not should take-3PL opinion John.
We shouldn't seek John’s opinion.
In both direct and indirect uses, bass and innama function as semantic constraints on the relevance of the proposition they introduce. The use of both bass and innama is usually attributed to the fact that the speaker has grounds for thinking that his presentation of the first clause has provided the hearer with a contextual implication which he prefers to deny.

According to the discussion so far, we have seen that direct and indirect denial could be indicated either by bass or by innama. This cannot be true of an utterance which is believed to be relevant as a counter-objection to an objection. In this case there is a slight difference. This difference is that while bass is used to preface an utterance functioning as a counter-objection to an objection, innama cannot be used in this way. Consider example (38) (which is a Syrian translation of Blakemore’s example (1989: 27):
   Let-1PL ask-1PL John.
   Let's ask John.
B- John mano 6alem iqraisadh.
   John not-3SGM scholar-3SGM economics.
   John is not an economist.
C- Bass hweh rajoul a6mall.
   But he man businesses.
   But he is a businessman.

(38B) is an objection to (38A). (38C), on the other hand, is a counter-objection to the objection in (38B). In (38C) bass is used to respond to another speaker's utterance. Comparing the objection in (38B) with the counter-objection in (38C), it could be noticed that while (38B) indicates that the knowledge of the problems of economy is restricted to economists, (38C) indicates the possibility of businessmen to have some experience in economics.

As I have mentioned before, counter-objections are usually restricted to utterances introduced by bass rather than by innama. Thus, (39) would not be acceptable as a counter-objection to the objection in (38B).

39- * Innama hweh rajoul a6mall.
   But he man businesses.

This, I would assume, is because innama is restricted to examples that consist of two clauses that are said by a single speaker as is the case in (32) and (35B) above and
not by two.

5.3 **Bass**: Contrast and exclusion

Unlike English, in certain situations Syrian does not allow the establishment of a relation of contrast without the use of a connective even if the words used have semantic properties of contrast. For instance, although the words used in example (25) in the previous section have contrasting semantic properties, still the contrastive sense indicated is mainly due to the presence of **bass**. The removal of this item would destroy the contrastive sense expressed. Let us consider, for instance, two different examples the conjuncts of which contain words which have contrasting semantic properties but in one the word **bass** is used while in the other it is removed as in (40) and (41) respectively:

40- Salwa ghanieh / **bass** Maria fa?iira.
   Salwa rich-3SGF but Maria poor-3SGF.
   Salwa is rich but Maria is poor.

41- Salwa ghanieh. Maria fa?iira.
   Salwa rich-3SGF Maria poor-3SGF.
   Salwa is rich. Maria is poor.

Comparing these two examples it could be realised that while (40) has a sense of contrast, (41) does not. The contrast sense expressed by (40) is due to the word **bass** which triggers this sense. If the contrastive sense
conveyed by (40) is not due to the presence of bass, then
(41) should convey the same contrastive sense expressed
by (40), which cannot be true. Anyone who articulates
(41) would be understood to have presented two abrupt
statements rather than highlighting a contrast between
Salwa and Maria.

It is usually claimed by Arab grammarians that in
the standard Arabic lakinna, which is similar to bass in
the Syrian dialect of Arabic can be used to interpose
between two clauses with different polarities. But if
we examine this claim carefully, we can see that what
they have said can be true neither of the colloquial
Arabic we are dealing with here nor of the standard
Arabic which they have written about. For instance, Al-
Hassan Ibn Qassem Al-Muradi says in his book (1973: 616)
that:

وَالرَّيْعَ "لَكِنَّ" ...الدِّينِيَاتِ تَتْبَعُونَهَا نَجْعَلُ رَأْيَنَا
كَانُ مَا أَقْبَلَْا تَتْبَعُونَهَا بِبَعْضٌٍ أَقْبَلٌُ تَتْبَعُونَهَا
لِيَقُومَ، أوْ ضَفَعًا مَا [نُقِصُهَا] أَمْرُ لَكٍَّ كَمْفُورًا. فَإِنْ تَذَكَّرُ، وَإِنْ كَانَ خَافَٰرًاٌ، تَأْقُرُّ مَا أَحْكَمَ لَكٍَّ مَّلِيِّٰٓ، مَّلِيِّٰٓ،
فَاحْنُفَطُ، وَالظَّافِرُ أَمْهَارًاٌ فَإِنْ كَانَ وَفَاقَ، مَّلِيِّٰٓ،
ٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍ_
negative and followed by a positive as in: (Zaid stood but Amr didn't) or if what precedes it opposes what follows as in: (this is not red but it is yellow), then most grammarians do tend to agree that it could be used. But when what precedes lakinna is in contradiction with what follows it as in: (he didn't eat but he drank) this creates a controversy among grammarians but, however, most of them tend to agree. Most grammarians tend to agree that lakinna cannot occur between two positives.

Al-Muradi, then, argues that lakinna interposes between two clauses with two opposing properties such as (42), which is an example of the standard Arabic, where the first clause is positive and the second one is negative:

42- Qama Zaidun lakinna Amran lam
  Stood-3SGM Zaid but Amr didn't
  yaqom.
  stand-3SGM.
  Zaid stood but Amr didn't.

He also adds that although some grammarians reject the idea that lakinna could be used to relate two clauses with different polarities, where the first clause is negative and the second is positive, it is possible to find some examples which show that it could be used. Consider the standard Arabic example in (43):
I do not agree with Al-Muradi's argument because *lakinna* in standard Arabic cannot be restricted to establishing a connection between two clauses with different polarities. There is a clear evidence that it could be used to relate two positive clauses as well. Consider (44):

44- Ašattu thalathata kutuben ila lmaktabati

Returned-1SG three books to the-library

*lakinnani* abqaitu kitaabaini fi lbaiti.

but-1SG kept-1SG two-books in the-home.

I have returned three books to the library but kept two at home.

Although standard Arabic is not the field of my interest here, there seems to be some similarities between the type of clauses connected by each one of *lakinna* in the standard language and *bass* in the Syrian dialect of Arabic. One of such similarities is the possibility of *bass* to connect also two positive clauses. Consider (44) (repeated here in the Syrian dialect as (45)):

45- Rajja6t tlatt kittub lalmaktabbeh *bass*

Returned-1SG three books to-the-library but

khallet kitaabeen bilbeit.

kept-1SG two-books at-home.
One fundamental characteristic of bass is that, like but in English, it is used to connect a maximum of two clauses as in (46):

46- Amr lahhamm bass ?akhuh halla?.

Amr butcher but brother-3GM barber-3SGM.

Amr is a butcher but his brother is a barber.

Bass here is connecting the two conjuncts in a contrastive relation where (Amr) is contrasting with ?akhuh (his brother). What about situations where more than two elements are said to be contrasting in examples such as (47)?

47- Sarah btidrus lughawiiatt u Maria btidrus

Sara study-3SGF linguistics and Maria study-3SGF

?addad bass Sammar btidrus riadhiatt.

literature but Sammar study-3SGF mathematics.

Sara studies linguistics and Maria literature but Sammar studies mathematics.

I would still argue that even in sentences like (47) where more than two elements are contrasting, bass is used to indicate a relation of contrast between two conjuncts. The contrast in this example is not between (Sarah), (Maria) and (Sammar). It is between (Sarah) and (Maria) on the one hand and (Sammar) on the other. This contrast is not a contrast of persons rather it is a contrast of subjects where linguistics and literature, which are studied by (Sarah) and (Maria) respectively and seem to be to a certain extent similar, contrast with mathematics the subject studied by (Sammar).
Confirmation of the assumption that bass in examples such as (47) convey only a contrast between two conjuncts could be brought about by comparing the contrast established by bass in (47) with that of u which is similar to and in examples like (48):

48- Sarah akhdet ilmidallieh libronzieh u Maria
Sara took-3SGF the-medal the-bronze and Maria
ilfidhieh u Sammar iddahabieh.
the-silver and Sammar the-gold.
Sara took the bronze medal, Maria the silver and
Sammar the gold.

What we can notice is that the contrast established here is unlike the one established in example (47). In (47) it is between two conjuncts. In (48), however, it is not confined to two conjuncts. It involves all of (Sarah), (Maria) and (Sammar) in a relation of contrast. All this contributes to the conclusion that whereas u could be used to connect an indefinite number of conjuncts, bass is restricted to the connection of two conjuncts.

When the contrast established by bass is between two single conjuncts, the order of the conjuncts is usually sequentially fixed. Consider example (49):

49- * Bass Maria dh6iifeh, Sarah naasha.
But Maria slim-3SGF Sara fat-3SGF.
This example does not indicate any sense of contrast. All this, I assume, is due to the change in the order of
the conjuncts. This also serves to show, as I argued in section (5.1), that bass cannot be a subordinating conjunction.

The same fixed sequence of conjuncts imposed on examples where two single conjuncts are said to be contrasting could also be true of examples where a combined conjunct is in a relation of contrast with a single conjunct. In such cases bass together with the clause it introduces is confined to final position. Thus neither (50) nor (51) would convey any sense of contrast.

50- * Bass Ahmad rah 6assinama, Jamiil
But Ahmad went-3SGM on-the-cinema Jamiil
rah iyjiib ilkhibbiz u Anwar
went-3SGM bring-3SGM the-bread and Anwar
rah iyjiib ilkhidhra.
went-3SGM bring-3SGM the-vegetable.
* But Ahmad went to the cinema, Jamiil went to bring
the bread and Anwar the vegetables.

51- * Sarah akhdet ilmidallieh libronzieh
Sara took-3SGF the-medal the-bronze
bass Maria ilfittieh u Sammar iddahabieh.
but Maria the-silver and Sammar the-gold.

I claimed at the beginning of this section that Syrian differs from English in that there are situations where a relation of contrast cannot be established without the use of a connective. One of the cases where a relation of contrast seems to be established without
the use of a connective is in conversations. Consider, for instance, the following conversation between (Sarah) and (Maria):

52- A- Sarah: Juzi bieshtighel bimazr6t abbuh.
   Husband-1SG work-3SGM in-farm father-3SGM.
   My husband works on his father’s farm.

   B- Maria: Juzi ana bieshtighel bilmarfa?.
   Husband-1SG I work-3SGM in-the-port.
   My husband works in the port.

   C- Maria: * Bass juzi bieshtighel bilmarfa?.
   But husband-1SG work-3SGM in-the-port.
   But my husband works in the port.

Here we realize that there is a sense of contrast between the job of Sarah’s husband who works bimazr6t abbuh (on his father’s farm) and that of Maria’s husband who works bilmarfa? (in the port). While Maria’s answer in (52B) would make this contrast manifest, her answer in (52C) would cancel it. This cancellation of contrast is attributed to the fact that in Syrian bass usually does not convey a sense of contrast if the clause it introduces is said by a second speaker as it is the case in (25C). One of the rules controlling the manifestation of the contrast use of bass is the fact that both of the contrasting conjuncts have to be provided by one single speaker.

However, if Maria’s use of bass in (52C) is not
acceptable as indicating a sense of contrast in this situation, this does not mean that her utterance is completely unacceptable. There are situations where this utterance would be quite normal. Consider (53):

53- A- Sarah: Tlateh min 6eilitna bieshtighlu
Three from family-1PL work-3PL
bilbahhir.
in-the-sea.

Three members of my family work in the sea.

B- Maria: /Bass juzi bieshtighel bilmarfa?.
Only husband-1SG work-3SGM in-the-port.

Only my husband works in the port.

C- Maria: * Juzi ana bieshtighel bilmarfa?.
Husband-1SG I work-3SGM in-the-port.

My husband works in the port.

This example leads us to the discussion of the second use of bass which I refered to as an "exclusion" use. In this use bass is used to indicate the exclusion of one person from the rest of a group. Notice that bass in its "exclusion" use contributes to the propositional content. In this use bass is similar to only in English (for the use of only in English see Horn, 1969: 97-107). In examples like (54) only contributes to the propositional content:

54- Only I haven’t got the time.

Only in English may also have a "denial-of-expectation" function in examples like (55):
55- I would like to come to the party only I haven't got the time.

The "exclusion" use of bass is like that of only in example (54). Thus we find that bass in Syrian may correspond to two different lexical items in English, one is but and the other is only. Bass, with the stress, in (53B) above correspond to only and not to but and this is the reason that made its use here acceptable. The unacceptability of (53C) is due to the fact that as it is used here (53C) is intended to establish a relation of contrast rather than of exclusion. And since the relation between (53A) and (53C) has to be an exclusive-contrastive one, (53C) would not be acceptable.

I mentioned earlier that bass together with the clause it introduces in its contrast use is sequentially fixed. This means that the clause introduced by bass has always to be in the second position. Here we can realise that in its "exclusion" use bass differs from the "contrast" use in two main respects: first, the clause it introduces can be provided by a second speaker; second, the clause it introduces has less restricted movement. Thus, while bass in its "contrast" use has to be, together with its clause, in final position, in its "exclusion" use it could be in more than one order. For instance, it could be in sentence-initial position as in (56):
Only Sammar studies mathematics, Sara studies linguistics and Maria studies literature.

It could also be in sentence-final position as it is the case in example (57) but the distinguishing factor here, as I have said earlier, is stress. That is to say, bass in (47) above indicates a contrast but since a stress is used in (57) the contrast function of bass has been altered to an "exclusion" one.

There could be a third way of conveying the same meaning conveyed by (56) and (57). This case differs from that in (56) and (57) in that while in (56) and (57) bass is used before an initial noun-phrase, in (58) it is used after an initial noun-phrase.

Now if we compare these three examples (56), (57) and
we notice that although all of them differentiate between (Sarah) and (Maria) on the one hand and (Sammar) on the other by indicating that (Sammar) is the only person who studies mathematics, (58) seems to have more emphasis on the exclusion relation than (56) or (57).

The same phenomenon could be realised also when bass is provided by a second speaker. In (53B) above, for instance, Maria could have answered in two more different ways as in (59A) and (59B):

59- A- Maria: Ana \[bass\] juzi bieshtighel
   I only husband-1SG work-3SGM
   bilmarfa?.
in-the-port.

B- Maria: Ana \[juzi \ bass\] bieshtighel
   I husband-1SG only work-3SGM
   bilmarfa?.
in-the-port.

Again, here we realise that both of (59A) and (59B) indicate that from among all Maria's family members her husband is the only one who works in the sea, and he works in the port. We realise also that while in (59A) the word bass is stressed, what is also stressed in (59B) is juzi (my husband).

In my discussion of the "exclusion" use of bass we saw that the clause it introduces could occur in sentence-initial position under two main conditions: first, when it is introduced by a second speaker as was
the case in (53B); second, when it is used in a compound sentence which contains a two-conjunct coordination, coordinated by *bass* as in (56) above. While this observation cannot be applied to "contrast" *bass* in coordinated utterances, it is true of "exclusion" *bass*. Compare example (49) with (60):

60- \_ Bass abbu^h\_ 6azef 6al6uud, Khaliil

Only father-3SGM lutanist-3SGM Khaliil

mughanni.

singer-3SGM.

Although (49) and (60) are similar in structure but semantically they differ enormously. Thus, while (60) is semantically acceptable, (49) is rejected. What makes all this difference is stress, because without it (60) would be semantically rejected like (49). The rejection of (49) is due to the fact that *bass* as it is used here cannot indicate a contrast and it will certainly not indicate a sense of "exclusion" without a stress; this, consequently, makes it ungrammatical.
Chapter Six

Premises and Conclusions

In this chapter I will deal with the Syrian counterparts of two English items, therefore and so. The counterparts of therefore are (min shan heik, laheik, lahassabbab, and lahashshi) and the counterpart of so is ma6natu. La?inno is the counterpart of because. The status of la?inno will be identified syntactically but I will not consider its function because it is a marginal semantic constraint on relevance. The chapter will be divided into three sections. In section 6.1 I will determine under which syntactic category these items may be classified. Section 6.2 will present an account of the function of the Syrian min shan heik, laheik, lahassabbab and lahashshi and section 6.3 will be concerned with the analysis of ma6natu.

6.1 The syntax of min shan heik, laheik, lizalek, lahassabbab, lahashshi, ma6natu, and la?inno

It has been indicated previously in section 5.1 that semantic constraints on relevance in English could be classified syntactically under one of three categories: subordinating conjunctions, coordinating
conjunctions or adverbs. It has also been established that in the process of identifying the syntax of the Syrian semantic constraints on relevance three criteria are to be used. In this section the same criteria will be applied to identify the syntactic status of certain expressions that have a similar function to the two English words *therefore* and *so*.

Although these Syrian expressions may consist of more than one morpheme, in fact each one functions as a single word. For example, each one starts with a preposition except *ma6natu*. Most of these prepositions are the letter *l* which means (for). There is another preposition *min* with which the expression *min shan heik* starts. The other sort of words that these expressions contain vary from demonstrative pronouns such as *heik* and *hassabbab* as in *min shan heik, laheik* and *lahassabbab* to prepositions and pronouns combined together such as *?inno* as in *la?inno*.

In section 5.1 I have indicated that one distinguishing feature of subordinating conjunctions is their flexibility to be preposed, together with the clause they introduce, to sentence-initial position without change in meaning. Of all the Syrian expressions I am analysing in this section only *la?inno* can be said to have such flexibility. Consider (1):

1- Maria aqna6et Ahmad *la?inno* bishuleh

Maria convinced-3SGF Ahmad because-3SGM in-ease
Maria convinced Ahmad because he can be easily convinced.

This example is grammatically acceptable either in the way it is used in (1) or as in (2) where the clause introduced by la?inno is preposed to sentence-initial position.

2- la?inno bishuleh bieqtine6 Maria
   Because-3SGm in-ease convince-3SGM Maria
   aqna6et Ahmad.
   convinced-3SGF Ahmad.
   Because he can be easily convinced, Maria convinced Ahmad.

The main difference between (1) and (2) is one that concerns the elements emphasised. That is, while (1) emphasises the idea of aqna6et (convincing), in (2) the emphasis falls on the idea of bishuleh (easiness). The fact that the clause introduced by la?inno can be preposed to sentence-initial position allows us to conclude that it belongs to the category of subordinating conjunctions.

As far as the remaining expressions are concerned they cannot be labelled as subordinating conjunctions because they do not allow this kind of possibility. Consider, for instance, (3) and (4):

3- Salwa 6almet lughawiatt min shan heik lazem
   Salwa scholar-3SGF linguistics so should
Salwa is a linguist so she must know the answer.

4- Ahmad Kuwaiti laheik hweh ghani.
   Ahmad Kuwaiti-3SGM therefore he rich-3SGM.

Ahmad is a Kuwaiti; he is, therefore, rich.

Preposing the clauses introduced by min shan heik and laheik in (3) and (4) is impossible as (5) and (6) show:

5- * Min shan heik lazem ta6ref ijjawaabb Salwa
   So should know-3SGF the-answer Salwa
   6almet lughawiatt.
   scholar-3SGF linguistics.

6- * Laheik hweh ghani Ahmad Kuwiti.
   Therefore he rich-3SGM Ahmad Kuwaiti-3SGM.

What is said about min shan heik and laheik is true of all the remaining expressions. Thus the ungrammatical outcome of preposing the clause introduced by min shan heik and laheik excludes all these expressions from the possibility of being identified as subordinating conjunctions.

Recall that coordinating conjunctions are characterised by: first, the ungrammatical outcome of the use of any two of them in succession; second, the fact that none of them will be used to indicate a relation of coordination if used inside the second clause of a coordinated sentence. It is uncommon to have the coordinating conjunction y used in succession with any of
these expressions but as the following data show it is possible:

7- Salwa 6almet lughawiatt u min shan heik
    Salwa scholar-3SGF linguistics and so
    lazem ta6ref ijjawaabb.
    should know-3SGF the-answer.

8- Salwa 6almet lughawiatt u laheik lazem
    Salwa scholar-3SGF linguistics and so should
    ta6ref ijjawaabb.
    know-3SGF the-answer.

9- Salwa 6almet lughawiatt u lizalek lazem
    Salwa scholar-3SGF linguistics and so should
    ta6ref ijjawaabb.
    know-3SGF the-answer.

10- Salwa 6almet lughawiatt u lahassabbab lazem
    Salwa scholar-3SGF linguistics and so should
    ta6ref ijjawaabb.
    know-3SGF the-answer.

11- Salwa 6almet lughawiatt u lahashshi lazem
    Salwa scholar-3SGF linguistics and so should
    ta6ref ijjawaabb.
    know-3SGF the-answer.

Notice that each one of min shan heik, laheik, lizalek, lahassabbab and lahashshi as they are used in examples (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11) respectively can be translated either as so or therefore. As it can be seen from the English word-by-word translation of these examples and so occur in juxtaposition. The same is
true of Syrian where the coordinating conjunction u is used in succession with each one of these expressions. This occurrence suggests that these expressions cannot be syntactically similar to the coordinating conjunction u hence they cannot be coordinating conjunctions.

More evidence for the suggestion that they cannot be coordinating conjunctions comes from the fact that they can be used in clause-internal position. This is the second criteria for testing coordinating conjunctions. Consider the following examples:

12- Ahmad Kuwaiti hweh laheik ghani.
   Ahmad Kuwaiti-3SGM he therefore rich-3SGM.
13- Ahmad Kuwaiti hweh min shan heik ghani.
   Ahmad Kuwaiti-3SGM he therefore rich-3SGM.
14- Ahmad Kuwaiti hweh lizalek ghani.
   Ahmad Kuwaiti-3SGM he therefore rich-3SGM.
15- Ahmad Kuwaiti hweh lahassabbab ghani.
   Ahmad Kuwaiti-3SGM he therefore rich-3SGM.
16- Ahmad Kuwaiti hweh lahashshi ghani.
   Ahmad Kuwaiti-3SGM he therefore rich-3SGM.

As they cannot be subordinating conjunctions I assume that they cannot be coordinating conjunctions either.

If they can be neither subordinating conjunctions nor coordinating conjunctions, then they have to be adverbs. What usually distinguishes adverbs from subordinating and coordinating conjunctions is that they do not allow the successive use of another adverb in the
same sentence. This, of course, is not always possible. Hence, the fact that two items cannot appear in succession does not show that they are not adverbs. In English, for example, we could get so and therefore used in succession as can be shown in example (17):

17- John was late and so therefore Mary was angry with him.

Interestingly you cannot have therefore and then so. Consider (18):

18- * John was late and therefore so Mary was angry with him.

Thus, the fact that no two of these Syrian expressions can be used in succession, as in the examples below, does not show that they are not adverbs.¹

18- * Salwa 6almet lughawiatt

Salwa scholar-3SGF linguistics

min shan heik / laheik lazem ta6ref therefore / so should know-3SGF

ijjawaabb.

the-answer.

19- * Salwa 6almet lughawiatt

Salwa scholar-3SGF linguistics

min shan heik/ lahashshi lazem ta6ref therefore/so should know-3SGF

ijjawaabb.

the-answer.
20- * Salwa 6almet  lughawiatt
Salwa scholar-3SGF linguistics
min shan heik/ lizalek lazem ta6ref
therefore/so should know-3SGF
ijjawaabb.
the-answer.

21- * Salwa 6almet  lughawiatt
Salwa scholar-3SGF linguistics
min shan heik/ lahassabbab lazem ta6ref
therefore/so should know-3SGF
ijjawaabb.
the-answer.

22- * Salwa 6almet  lughawiatt
Salwa scholar-3SGF linguistics
laheik/ lahashshi lazem ta6ref
therefore/so should know
ijjawaabb.
the-answer.

23- * Salwa 6almet  lughawiatt
Salwa scholar-3SGF linguistics
laheik/ lizalek lazem ta6ref
therefore/so should know-3SGF
ijjawaabb.
the-answer.

24- * Salwa 6almet  lughawiatt
Salwa scholar-3SGF linguistics
laheik/ lahassabbab lazem ta6ref
therefore/so should know-3SGF
ijjawaabb.
the answer.

25- * Salwa 6almet lughawiatt lahasshibi/ lizalek
Salwa scholar-3SGF linguistics therefore/so
lazem ta6ref ijjawaabb.
should know-3SGF the answer.

26- * Salwa 6almet lughawiatt
Salwa scholar-3SGF linguistics
lahashshib/ lahassabbab lazem ta6ref
therefore/so should know-3SGF
ijjawaabb.
the answer.

27- * Salwa 6almet lughawiatt
Salwa scholar-3SGF linguistics
lizalek/ lahassabbab lazem ta6ref
therefore/so should know-3SGF
ijjawaabb.
the answer.

Although these expressions seem not to be flexible
enough to be use in succession with one another, as is
clear from the previous examples, they can occur in
succession with other types of adverbs particularly with
the Syrian counterparts of those ending with -ly such as
mumken and bishuleh that correspond to probably and
easily respectively. Consider (28), (29), (30) and
(31):

28- Salwa 6almet lughawiatt min shan heik
Salwa scholar-3SGF linguistics so
mumken ta6ref ijjawaab.  
probably know-3SGF the-answer.  
Salwa is a linguist, so probably she knows the answer.

29- Salwa 6almet lughawiatt laheik bishuleh  
Salwa scholar-3SGF linguistics so easily  
lazem ta6ref ijjawaab.  
should know-3SGF the-answer.  
Salwa is a linguist so she should easily know the answer.

30- Salwa 6almet lughawiatt lizalek mumken  
Salwa scholar-3SGF linguistics so probably  
bishuleh ta6ref ijjawaab.  
easily know-3SGF the-answer.  
Salwa is a linguist so she would probably know the answer easily.

31- A- Salwa 6almet lughawiatt.  
Salwa scholar-3SGF linguistics.  
B- Ma6natu mumken bishuleh ta6ref ijjawaab.  
So probably easily know-3SGF the-answer.

From all I have said it can be concluded that la?inno is the only expression that can be labelled as a subordinating conjunction. As far as the remaining expressions are concerned they can be labelled neither as subordinating nor as coordinating conjunctions. "Adverbs" seems to be the only syntactic category under which these expressions can be included. Unlike their
English counterparts these Syrian expressions seem to have restrictions on the type of adverbs with which they can occur. Words similar to those ending with -ly in English are the type of adverbs with which these expressions may occur.

6.2 min shan heik, laheik, lizalek, lahassabbab and lahashshi

In the following two sections my main concern will be the analysis of six Syrian expressions: min shan heik, laheik, lizalek, lahassabbab, lahashshi and ma6natu. The meaning of these expressions is similar to that of therefore and so. That is to say, in many cases either translation will do. Apart from lizalek and ma6natu, all these expressions can also be similar to because, although this interpretation is of minor interest here. The reason for dividing the discussion of these items into two sections is due to the fact that some of them such as min shan heik, laheik, lahassabbab, lahashshi and lizalek show some similarities to both therefore and so. Ma6natu will be discussed in a separate section because it differs from the other items in that while it exhibits some similarity to therefore, it is really more like so.

In chapter three I argued that the meaning of therefore in example (1) (repeated here as (32)) is ambiguous between indicating a causal relation between states of affairs and indicating an inferential relation
between propositions.

32- He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave.

It has also been noted that it is only in the first interpretation that therefore contributes towards the truth conditions of utterances. In the second interpretation it has no contribution towards the propositional content but functions as a semantic constraint on relevance.

Such an ambiguity is a common feature of all the Syrian expressions I am analysing in this section. Min shan heik in (33), for example, can be interpreted in two ways: first, it can be understood to mean, though this is a fairly unlikely interpretation, that his richness was caused by his being a Kuwaiti. Second, it can have the interpretation of indicating that the fact that he is a Kuwaiti is evidence for the belief that he is rich.

33- Hweh Kuwaiti min shan heik hweh ghani.

He Kuwaiti-3SGM therefore/so he rich-3SGM.

He is a Kuwaiti; he is, therefore, rich.

Any one of the four Syrian expressions: min shan heik, laheik, lahashshi and lahassabbab covers all the meanings assigned to because, therefore and so. This means that these four Syrian expressions could be substituted for one another. Thus, example (33) would still convey the same meaning even if the expression min shan heik is replaced by laheik or lahashshi. This is true of English despite the fact that in certain
situations it is not possible to substitute so for therefore. Compare the Syrian (34) and (35) with the English (32), (36) and (37):

34- Hweh Kuwaiti laheik hweh ghani.
   He Kuwaiti-3SGM therefore/so he rich-3GM.
35- Hweh Kuwaiti lahashshi hweh ghani.
   He Kuwaiti-3SGM therefore/so he rich-3SGM.
36- He is an Englishman, so he is brave.
37- He is brave because he is an Englishman.

Such phenomena provide adequate justification for two main assumptions: first is the assumption that all these Syrian expressions share the same function where they indicate that the clause they introduce is understood as a conclusion derived on the basis of the proposition expressed in the first clause and the assumption supplied by the hearer from the context as is the case in examples (34) and (35) above. This is true of therefore and so as they are used in (32) and (36) respectively. Second, the meaning expressed by because in English may be more appropriately conveyed by min shan heik, laheik, lizalek lahassabbab or lahashshi in Syrian. That is to say, while (38A) would be acceptable in English, in Syrian (38B) is more appropriate. This is because these Syrian expressions are not subordinating conjunctions. Hence they are more like therefore than because.

38- A- Y because X (English)
   B- X therefore Y (Syrian)

If (38A) and (B) are represented by causal examples,
it means that, to describe the same event, the sort of example in (39) is more naturally used in Syrian than (40). Notice that this does not mean that Syrian does not have a word similar to because. There is the word la?inno I mentioned in the previous section which is similar to because both in terms of syntax and function.

39- kan fi zahmet siarat lahashshi Ahmad
   Was in crowd cars therefore Ahmad
   it?akhar.
   was-late-3SGM.

There was a traffic jam therefore Ahmad was late.

40- Ahmad was late because there was a traffic jam.

Min shan heik, laheik and lahashshi, are similar to the English therefore and so in two respects. First, to establish the relation between the two propositions connected by each one of them a further assumption has to be supplied from the context. Second, it is always the second of two propositions connected by these expressions that is marked as a conclusion. To establish the connection between the two propositions in (33), for example, the hearer has to supply the assumption in (41):

41- Kil likuwaiteen aghnia.

   All Kuwaitis rich-3PL.

   All Kuwaitis are rich.

This assumption is important for the establishment of the connection between the two propositions in (33). It functions as one of two premises. The second premise is
the one in (42), which is the first clause of (33):

42- Hweh Kuwaiti.

He Kuwaiti-3SGM.

The combination of these premises leads to the deduction of the conclusion introduced by the expression min shan heik in (43):

43- Min shan heik hweh ghani.

Therefore he rich-3SGM.

The fact that the hearer has been constrained to supply a specific assumption like (41) shows how the expression min shan heik in (33) constrains the hearer's choice of context for the interpretation of its utterance.

Not one of these Syrian expressions can be used to introduce a proposition with no linguistic antecedent. In this respect min shan heik, laheik and lahashshi may seem less similar to so than to therefore. For, as we have seen in section (3.1), while so can be used to introduce a proposition with no linguistic antecedent, therefore has no such use. In this respect min shan heik, laheik and lahashshi are like therefore.

Imagine a situation where two friends, Ahmad and Sameer, are invited by Jamal to a party. Both Ahmad and Sameer accept the invitation but Sameer seems to be somehow reluctant. Ahmad goes to the party and there he finds his friend Sameer. While in such a situation, in English, Ahmad is probably inclined to produce the utterance in (44), in Syrian no speaker would produce the utterance in (45) in such a situation. The
unacceptability of (45) in Syrian is due to the fact that propositions with no linguistic antecedents can be introduced neither by \text{min shan heik} nor \text{laheik} or \text{lahashshi}. Compare the use of \text{so} in (44) with that of \text{min shan heik} in (45):

44- So you decided to come in the end.

45- \text{Min shan heik} qarrart tigi akhiiran.

\begin{quote}
Therefore decided-2SGM come-2SGM eventually.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\text{? Therefore} you have decided to come eventually.
\end{quote}

\text{Min shan heik} in examples like (45) can only be translated as \text{therefore}. Its use in this example is unacceptable because, like \text{therefore} and unlike \text{so}, it requires a linguistic antecedent.

So far I have been using \text{min shan heik}, \text{laheik} and \text{lahashshi} in non-conjoined utterances. The focus on the use of these expressions in non-conjoined utterances is attributed to the fact that it is only in non-conjoined utterances that these expressions are used to express an inferential relation between propositions. Compare the use of \text{min shan heik} in example (33) above with that in (46):

46- \text{? Hweh Kuwaiti u min shan heik hweh}

\begin{quote}
He Kuwaiti-3SGM and therefore/so he ghani.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
rich-3SGM.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\text{? He is a Kuwaiti and therefore/so he is rich.}
\end{quote}

Although (33) and (46) contain the same lexical items,
there is an important difference between the two. The difference is that while the use of min shan heik in (33) relates the two propositions in an evidence-and-conclusion relation, its use in (46) is unacceptable. It is unacceptable simply because the inferential connections conveyed by conjoined utterances do not include the ones expressed by min shan heik, laheik or lahashshi.

It has been stated in section 3.1 that arguments are not necessarily always presented by one speaker. There are cases where the premise is presented by one speaker and the conclusion by another. Recall that I have mentioned that these Syrian expressions are more similar to therefore than to so in terms of the requirement of an immediate preceding of a linguistic antecedent. A second respect in which min shan heik, laheik and lahashshi show more resemblance to therefore is in cases where arguments are presented by two speakers. Whereas so can be used to introduce a proposition presented by a second speaker, therefore can only in certain cases do so. This is the reason why these Syrian expressions have more similarity to therefore in this respect than to so. Consider example (47) (which is a translation of Blakemore’s (1987: 58) example (33)):

47- A- Btakhud awwal laffeh 6alyasaar.

Take-2SGM first turn on-the-left.

You take the first turn on the left.
Therefore I don’t go past the hospital.

When, in English, so is used to introduce (B’s) utterance the relevance of such an utterance would be to confirm that the proposition expressed by such utterance is relevant as a contextual implication of the one in (A). As for the utterance in (47B), this is not the case for the simple reason that the expressions *min shan heik*, *laheik* and *lahashshi* are like *therefore* cannot be used to introduce a proposition presented by a second speaker the relevance of which is to confirm that the relevance of the proposition it expresses is a contextual implication of (A’s) utterance.

Just as they cannot be used to indicate that the clause they introduce is relevant in terms of checking the relevance of a remark, they cannot be used to indicate that the clause they introduce is relevant in the course of drawing the attention to an implication of a preceding utterance. Consider example (48) (which is a translation of Blakemore’s (1987: 86) example (34)):
akhiran.
eventually.

? Therefore he decided not to come after all.
The unacceptability of using one of these expressions to introduce a proposition which is relevant as a contextual implication or as drawing the attention to an implication of a previous utterance is not a sufficient reason to conclude that these expressions cannot be used to introduce a proposition introduced by a second speaker.

As we have seen before, the argument in example (34) above has been presented by a single speaker. The same argument can be presented by two speakers where one presents the premise and the other the conclusion. Consider (49):

He Kuwaiti-3SGM.
He is a Kuwaiti.

B- Laheik hweh ghani.
Therefore he rich-3SGM.
? Therefore he is rich.

As Blakemore (1987: 85) points out, in such cases the second speaker will be understood to be continuing the first speaker’s utterance rather than responding to it.

In the Syrian dialect of Arabic the intonation of the utterance determines to a large extent its relevance. Imagine, for instance, that you have an American neighbour who quite frequently visits Egypt. In such a
case you might just assume or guess what might be the reason for these frequent visits but you do not know for sure what it is. Suppose one day a friend produces the utterance in (50):

50- Jarak immu masrieh.

Neighbour-2SGM mother-3SGM Egyptian-3SGF.

Your neighbour’s mother is an Egyptian. This utterance would strengthen your assumption that there should be a reason behind your neighbour’s visits to Egypt and so you would probably produce in this situation the exclamatory utterance in (51):

51- Min shan heik da?imman bieruh 6amasser !

That is why always go-3SGM on-Egypt.

That is why he always goes to Egypt !

This utterance would be relevant in two ways: first it would be relevant as a conclusion derived on the basis of the existing assumption held by the hearer and the new information in (50). Second, it would be relevant as drawing attention to the implication of the utterance presented by the other speaker in (50). Both types of relevance are due to the exclamatory tone in which this utterance is presented. Such conclusions are obtained only when two speakers share the presentation of an argument. Notice that although min shan heik can be translated here as so, its most appropriate translation will be the phrase (that is why). It cannot be translated as therefore. The reason for this is due to
the exclamatory intonation associating the presentation of its clause. If *min shan heik* is translated as *so* the exclamatory intonation will end and with it the two types of relevance mentioned above will also go. This exclamatory intonation, as I said, is the main reason for understanding the utterance in (51) in these two ways.

The proposition introduced by these expressions should not always be relevant as a conclusion. As Blakemore (personal correspondence) notes, in certain cases the speaker may use the word *so* to indicate that the relevance of the utterance it introduces lies in the fact that it specifies a conclusion that can be derived from the first proposition - or, in other words it makes the relevance of the first proposition explicit. As far as *min shan heik, laheik* and *lahashshi* are concerned none of them can be used to indicate such a relation. Compare example (52) and its Syrian translation in (53):

52- There's $5 in my wallet. So I didn't spend all the money then.

(Blakemore, 1987:86)

53-? fi khams dularat bjezdani *min shan heik*

In five dollars in-wallet-1SG therefore

*ma sraft kil ilmasari izann.*

not spent-1SG all the-money then.

? There are $5 in my wallet therefore I didn't spend all the money then.

The reason for the unacceptability of (53) is due to the
fact that min shan heik in this example, like therefore, can in no way indicate that the relevance of the second proposition of the second sequence lies in that it specifies a conclusion that can be derived from the first proposition.

There are situations where none of these expressions can be used. Imagine a situation where you couldn’t see the importance of what someone has said to you. In such a situation, as Blakemore (1987: 85) suggests, it would be more likely that you would respond with so? or so what? but not therefore what?. Similarly, in Syrian Arabic no speaker would perhaps respond with any of these expressions because it would not be appropriate to use any of them in this situation. Syrian Arabic in such cases seems to be more explicit than English because in a similar situation a Syrian speaker would respond with questions such as ilmahna? or shu? asdak? which both can be translated into the English question "what do you mean?" Notice that although all the examples cited in this section were restricted to the use of min shan heik, lakuik and lahasshshi, all I have said about the use of these three expressions can also be said about lahassabbab and lizalek.

6.3 Ma6natu

The previous section was concerned entirely with the analysis of five expressions the meaning of which, though
overlaps between therefore and so, seems to be more like therefore. The following section is devoted to the discussion of a single expression whose meaning is similar to that of so. Some of what is said about the expressions discussed in the previous section is also true of ma₆natu. Therefore, to avoid repetition, in the following section, the discussion will be devoted to the respects in which this expression differs from the ones discussed in the preceding section.

Although in certain uses this expression appears to be indicating a causal relation, I will argue that in all cases its meaning is purely inferential. If ma₆natu indicated a causal connection then it would make no difference to substitute for it the expression natijeh lahashshi, which is similar to as a result of that. There are cases where the substitution of natijeh lahashshi for ma₆natu would produce an unacceptable result. Compare (54) and (55) (which are translations of Blakemore's (1987: 88) examples (40) and (41) with because of that and so replaced by natijeh lahashsh and ma₆natu respectively):

54- Akal Tom illahim ilkharbaan
   Ate-3SGM Tom the-meant the-condemned
   natijeh lahashshi miredh tlataash sa6a
   as a result of that fell-ill-3SGM thirteen hour
   ba6dein.
   later.
   Tom ate the condemned meat. As a result he fell ill
thirteen hours later.

55- A- Akal Tom illahim ilkharbaan.
    Ate-3SGM Tom the-meat the-condemned.

B- Ma6natu miredh tlataash sa6a ba6dein.
    So fell-ill-3SGM thirteen hour later.

While the causal connection between the propositions of (54) is part of the propositional content, in (55), as with so, it is a contextual assumption which is to be provided by the hearer for establishing the inferential connection expressed by ma6natu.4

Ma6natu is used to introduce a conclusion in a synthetic inference rule. But unlike the conclusions introduced by the expressions of the previous section, the conclusion introduced by this expression has to be (except in one case which we will see next) presented by a second speaker. Compare, for instance, example (56) with (57):

56- ? Hweh 6alem lugawiatt ma6natu lazem
    He scholar-3SGM linguistics so should ya6ref ijjawab
    know-3SGM the-answer

He is a linguist so he should know the answer.

57- A- Hweh 6alem lugawiatt.
    He scholar-3SGM linguistics.
    He is a linguist.

B- Ma6natu lazem ya6reff ijjawabb.
    So should know-3SGM the-answer.
So he should know the answer.

While the English use of so is acceptable in both (56) and (57), in Syrian it is only in (57) that the use of ma6natu is acceptable.

I mentioned earlier that there is only one case where both propositions related by the expression ma6natu are presented by a single speaker. Such a possibility arises when the speaker is musing on the implications of his previous remark. In this respect, unlike all the expressions discussed in the previous section, ma6natu can be used in such a situation. Compare the acceptable use of ma6natu in (58) with the unacceptable use of min shan heik, for instance, in (59) (which is mentioned in the previous section as (53)):

58- Fi khams dularat bjezdani ma6natu ma sraft
   In five dollars in-wallet-1SG so not spent-1SG
   kil ilmasari izann.
   all the-money then.
   There’s $5 in my wallet. So I didn’t spend all the money then.

59- ? Fi khams dularat bjezdani min shan heik ma
   In five dollars in-wallet-1SG therefore not
   sraft kil ilmasari izann.
   spent-1SG all the-money then.
   There are $5 in my wallet therefore I didn’t spend all the money then.

The acceptable use of ma6natu in (58) rather than that of min shan heik in (59) can be attributed to the same
reason for which the use of so but not therefore is acceptable in (58). That is, While min shan heik, like therefore, is always associated with the presentation of a conclusion or a justification, maṣnatu, like so, is not necessarily always related to the presentation of conclusions or justifications. This is what makes the use of maṣnatu in (58) acceptable and that of min shan heik in (59) unacceptable (see Blakemore (1989: 188)).

Another area that reflects the difference between the acceptable use of maṣnatu rather than any of the expressions discussed in section 6.2 is when the listener seems to have grasped the importance of a remark but is not sure about the implied intention of the speaker. That is, when the relevance of the proposition introduced by maṣnatu is understood to be relevant as a confirmation of the relevance of a previous utterance. Such a relation would be indicated only by a sentence introduced by maṣnatu. Compare the acceptable use of maṣnatu in (60) with the unacceptable use of min shan heik in (47) repeated here as (61):

60- A- Btakhud awwal laffeh 6alyasaar.
    Take-2SGM first turn on-the-left.
    You take the first turn on the left.
B- Maṣnatu ma biʔta66 ilmistashfa.
    So not go-1SG-past the-hospital.
    So I don’t go past the hospital.
A - Btakhud awwal laffeh 6alyasaar.

Take-2SGM first turn on-the-left.

B - ? Min shan heik ma bi?ta6 ilmistashfa.

Therefore not go-1SG-past the-hospital.

? Therefore I don't go past the hospital.

Although ma6natu shows some negative similarities with those expressions discussed in section 6.2 but in general the differences are more. One of such prominent differences is that while the meaning of the expressions discussed in the previous section is ambiguous between causal and inferential, the meaning of ma6natu is purely inferential.
Chapter Seven

Evidence, Explanation and Addition

In this chapter an account of the Syrian counterparts of five English expressions after all, you see, moreover, furthermore and also will be presented. In addition to my account of the function of these Syrian counterparts I will try to identify their syntactic category. The chapter will be divided into six sections. Sections 7.1, 7.3 and 7.5 will deal with the syntax of these expressions and sections 7.2, 7.4 and 7.6 will present an analysis of their function.

7.1 The syntax of bidhall, tab6ann and ba6d kil shi

Bidhall, tab6ann and ba6d kil shi are three Syrian items. These items are the counterparts of the English after all. While both tab6ann and bidhall are composed of a single morpheme and function as one unit, ba6d kil shi operates as a single unit but is composed of three separate morphemes. Each morpheme has its independent meaning. Ba6d means (after), kil (every) and shi (thing). These three morphemes constitute the expression ba6d kil shi the function of which is similar to after all.
In this section, as I have done with the analysis of the syntax of other Syrian semantic constraints on relevance, I will examine if these items can be classified as subordinating conjunctions, coordinating conjunctions, or adverbs.

Before considering the first possibility I will make a distinction between what I will call sentences indicating how the world is and sentences indicating how the world should be as in (1) and (2) respectively:

1- Ahmad gani tab6ann hweh Kuwaiti.
   Ahmad rich-3SGM after all he kuwaiti-3SGM.
   Ahmad is rich. After all, he is a Kuwaiti.

2- Lazem tihtam fiya aktar min heik
   Should take-care-2SGM in her-3SGF more from that
   bidhall immak.
   after all mother-2SGM.
   You should take more care of her. After all, she’s your mother.

Such a distinction is quite important for the discussion because as we will see, while it is unfamiliar, though grammatical, to have a clause introduced by tab6ann preposed in sentences indicating how the world is, it is quite possible to have a clause introduced by bidhall or ba6d kil shi preposed in sentences indicating how the world should be. Compare (3) and (4) with (1) and (2):

3- ? Tab6ann hweh Kuwaiti Ahmad gani.
   After all he Kuwaiti-3SGM Ahmad rich-3SGM.
   * After all he is a Kuwaiti, Ahmad is rich.
4- **Bidhall** immak lazem tihtam fiya
   After all mother-2SGM should take-care-2SGM in-3SGF
   aktar min heik.
   more from that.
   After all she is your mother you should take more care
   of her.

   Preposing a clause introduced by **tab6ann** in
   sentences indicating how the world should be will result
   in uncommonly used examples in the same way as preposing
   a clause introduced by **bidhall** or **ba6d kil shi** in
   sentences indicating how the world is. Compare (5) and
   (6) with (7) and (8) respectively:

5- Ahmad gani **bidhall** hweh Kuwaiti.
   Ahmad rich-3SGM after all he kuwaiti-3SGM.
   Ahmad is rich. After all, he is a Kuwaiti.

6- Lazem tihtam fiya aktar min heik **tab6ann**
   Should take-care-2SGM in-3SGF more from that after all
   heih immak.
   she mother-2SGM.
   You should take more care of her. After all, she is
   your mother.

7- ? **Bidhall** hweh kuwaiti Ahmad gani.
   After all he kuwaiti-3SGM Ahmad rich-3SGM.
   * After all he is a Kuwaiti, Ahmad is rich.

8- ? **Tab6ann** heih immak lazem tihtam
   After all she mother-2SGM should take-care-2SGM
fiya aktar min heik.
in-3SGF more from that.
After all she is your mother you should take more care of her.

This does not mean that preposing a clause introduced by bidhall or ba6d kil shi in sentences indicating how the world should be will always yield acceptable examples. Compare (9) and (10) with (11) and (12):

9- Suud janoub Afri?ia lazem ikwwnn ilon ilha?
   Blacks South Africa should be for-3PL the-right bittaswiit ba6d kil shi hinneh il?aktarieh.
in-voting after all they the-majority.
Blacks in South Africa should have the right to vote.
After all, they are the majority.

10- Suud janoub Afri?ia lazem ikwwn ilon ilha?
   Blacks South Africa should be for-3PL the-right bittaswiit bidhall hinneh il?aktarieh.
in-voting after all they the-majority.
Blacks in South Africa should have the right to vote.
After all, they are the majority.

11- ba6d kil shi hinneh il?aktarieh suud janoub
   After all they the-majority blacks South Afri?ia lazem ikwwnn ilon ilha?
   Africa should be for-3PL the-right bittaswiit.
   for-voting.
* After all they are the majority, blacks in South
Africa should have the right to vote.

12- * Bidhall hinneh il?aktarieh, suud janoub
   After all they the-majority blacks South
   Afri?ia lazem ikwwn ilon ilha? bittaswiit.
   Africa should be for-3PL the-right for-voting.

* After all they are the majority, blacks in South
   Africa should have the right to vote.

Although preposing the clause introduced by tab6ann, bidhall and ba6d kil shi may be unfamiliar phenomenon, still it is grammatically acceptable; therefore, I assume that these items may be labelled as subordinating conjunctions.

Recall that testing a word as a coordinating conjunction may be performed in a negative way (see section (5.1)). That is, a word can be classified as a coordinating conjunction as long as it does not occur in succession with another coordinating conjunction. As far as tab6ann, bidhall and ba6d kil shi are concerned there seems to be no consistency in their occurrence with coordinating conjunctions. Thus, while none can be preceded by the coordinator u, all seem to be able to be preceded by the coordinator bass particularly in examples indicating a contrast.¹ Compare their grammatical use with bass with the ungrammatical result of their use with u in the following examples:

13- * Biehki inglizi btala?a u tab6ann hweh
   Speak-3SGM English fluently and after all he
He speaks English fluently. And he is, after all, an Englishman.

14- * Biehki inglizi btala?a u bidhall hweh
Speak-3SGM English fluently and after all he

Englishman.

15- * Biehki inglizi btala?a u ba6d kil shi hweh
Speak-3SGM English fluently and after all he

Englishman.

16- Ahmad mano sarii6 bass tab6ann assra6
Ahmad not-3SGM fast-3SGM but after all faster
min Anwar.

from Anwar.

Ahmad is not fast but he is, after all, faster than
Anwar.

17- Ahmad mano sarii6 bass bidhall assra6
Ahmad not-3SGM fast-3SGM but after all faster
min Anwar.

from Anwar.

18- Ahmad mano sarii6 bass ba6d kil shi assra6
Ahmad not-3SGM fast-3SGM but after all faster
min Anwar.

from Anwar.

While tab6ann bidhall and ba6d kil shi cannot be preceded
by the coordinator \( u \), as we can see in (13), (14) and (15), they can be preceded by the coordinator \( \text{bass} \). The fact that \text{bidhall}, \text{tab6ann} and \text{ba6d kil shi} can be preceded by \( \text{bass} \) shows that these items are not coordinating conjunctions. When these words are preceded by \( \text{bass} \) certain differences may appear. These differences can be represented in two points: first, where the occurrence of \( \text{bass/ tab6ann} \) and \( \text{bass/ bidhall} \) as in (16) and (17) is more common, the successive use of \( \text{bass/ba6d kil shi} \) as in (18) is less common. Second, while it is more common to hear \( \text{bass/tab6ann} \) and \( \text{bass/bidhall} \) used in succession in utterances produced by a single speaker, \( \text{bass/ba6d kil shi} \) is more naturally used in dialogues where the clause in which they occur is presented by a second speaker as in (19):

   Ahmad not-3SGM fast-3SGM.
   B- Bass/ba6d kil shi assra6 min Anwar.
   But after all faster from Anwar.

\text{Bidhall, tab6ann} and \text{ba6d kil shi} cannot always be preceded by \( \text{bass} \). The fact the they are preceded by \( \text{bass} \) in examples (16), (17) and (18) is because these examples indicate contrast. In examples where this contrast is absent it seems that these items cannot be preceded by \( \text{bass} \) as in (20), (21) and (22) below:

20- * Lazem tihtam fiya aktar min heik bass
    Should take-care-2SGM in-3SGF more from that but
bidhall immak.
after all mother-2SGM.

* You should take more care of her but after all she is your mother.

21- * Suud janoub Afri?ia lazem ikwwnn ilon
Blacks South Africa should be for-3PL
ilha? bitaswiit bass ba6d kil shi hinneh the-right in-voting but after all they il?aktarieh.
the-majority.

* Blacks in South Africa should have the right to vote. But after all they are the majority.

22- * Lazem tihtam fiya aktar min
Should take-care-2SGM in-3SGF more from heik bass tab6ann immak.
that but after all mother-2SGM.

* You should take more care of her but after all she is your mother.

More evidence for the suggestion that these items cannot be coordinating conjunctions comes from the fact that they can be used in clause-internal position as in the following:

23- Suud janoub Afri?ia lazem ikwwn ilon ilha?
Blacks South Africa should be for-3PL the-right bitaswiit hinneh bidhall il?aktarieh.
in-voting they after all the-majority.
Blacks in South Africa should have the right to vote
they, after all, are the majority.

24- Suud janoub Afri?ia lazem ikwwn ilon
Blacks South Africa should be for-3PL
ilha? bitaswiit hinneh tab6ann il?aktarieh.
the-right in-voting they after all the-majority.

25- Suud janoub Afri?ia lazem ikwwn ilon
Blacks South Africa should be for-3PL
ilha? bitaswiit hinneh ba6d kil shi il?aktarieh.
the-right in-voting they after all the-majority.

The grammatical result of using these items in clause-
internal position shows that they are adverbs.

Finally, according to the discussion I have
presented of the syntax of bidhall, tab6ann and ba6d kil
shi I suggest that these items cannot be regarded as
coordinating conjunctions. They seem to be classified
under more than one syntactic category. On the one
hand, they can be classified as subordinating
conjunctions because their clause can be preposed to
sentence-initial position. On the other hand, they can
be classified as adverbs because they can be used in
clause-internal position.

7.2 Bidhall, tab6ann and ba6d kil shi

In chapter six a relevance-based analysis was
applied to six Syrian words which are similar to
therefore and so. The meaning of most of these words, I
argued, is ambiguous between indicating a causal relation
between two states of affairs or an inferential relation
between two propositions. However, the relevance of the
proposition introduced by these words when they are
interpreted as expressing an inferential relation is
understood as a conclusion.

Bidhall, tab6ann and ba6d kil shi differ from some
of those discussed in the previous chapter in two
respects: first, their meaning is not ambiguous between
indicating a causal and an inferential relations. Thus
no one will understand (26) to mean (27):

26- Ma ribbeh Peter issbaa? bidhall ka6bu
   Not win-3SGM Peter the-race after all ankle-3SGM
   madhruub.
injured.
Peter didn't win the race. After all, he has an
injured ankle.

27- Ma ribbeh Peter issbaa? la?inno ka6bu
   Not win-3SGM Peter the-race because-3SGM ankle-3SGM
   madhruub.
injured.
Peter didn't win the race because he has an injured
ankle.

Second, the relevance of the proposition they introduce
is understood as an evidence for whatever proposition is
expressed by the previous utterance.

Blakemore (1987:90) argues that presenting the
evidence introduced by after all is a necessity created
by the fact that the speaker has presented a proposition that requires this evidence. What is said about *after all* in chapter three is true of both *ba6d kil shi*, and *bidhall* but not of *tab6ann*. *Tab6ann* can be associated either with the proposition which provides the evidence or with the proposition for which evidence is required. Thus, the fact that there is a general belief that all Arabs are generous that we will understand the proposition *hweh kariim* (he is generous) in (29) as evidence for the previous one. Consider (28) and (29):

28- *Hweh kariim* tab6ann hweh 6arabi.

He generous-3SGM after all he Arab-3SGM.

He is generous. He is, after all, an Arab.

29- *Hweh 6arabi* tab6ann hweh kariim.

He Arab-3SGM after all he generous-3SGM.

Notice that *tab6ann* as it is used in (29) can be substituted neither by *ba6d kil shi* nor by *bidhall*. This is simply because *bidhall* and *ba6d kil shi* impose a certain order on the propositions they relate when the proposition they introduce is to be understood as evidence for the previous one. That is, to understand the proposition introduced by one of these words as evidence, this proposition has to be preceded by another proposition which creates the need for that evidence.

Compare (30) and (31):

30- *Hweh kariim* bidhall hweh 6arabi.

He generous-3SGM after all he Arab-3SGM.

He is generous. He is, after all, an Arab.
31- ? Hweh 6arabi \textbf{bidhall} hweh kariim.

He Arab-3SGM after all he generous-3SGM.

? He is an Arab. He is, after all, generous.

While the proposition introduced by \textbf{bidhall} in (30) functions as evidence for the preceding one, the proposition introduced by \textbf{bidhall} in (31) does not because of the shift in the order of the propositions. Thus, unlike the proposition introduced by \textbf{tab6ann}, the one introduced by \textbf{bidhall} and \textbf{ba6d kil shi} can be relevant as evidence only in cases where the proposition creating the need for the presentation of the evidence is placed in first position. This shows that \textbf{tab6ann} is not only similar to \textit{after all} in function but has this additional distinguishing characteristic that neither \textbf{bidhall} nor \textbf{ba6a kil shi} has.

Although \textbf{tab6ann}, \textbf{ba6d kil shi} and \textbf{bidhall} have the flexibility to allow the proposition they introduce to be presented by a second speaker, \textbf{ba6d kil shi} is more commonly used in arguments presented by two speakers. Thus while \textbf{ba6d kil shi} is more often used in examples like (32), \textbf{bidhall} and \textbf{tab6ann} are used in examples of the sort in (26) above.

32- A- Ahmad kariim.

Ahmad generous-3SGM.

Ahmad is generous.

B- \textbf{Ba6d kil shi} hweh 6arabi.

After all he Arab-3SGM.
He is, after all, an Arab.

To derive the conclusion in (32A) the listener has to supply from the context the additional premise in (33) which will be related to (32B) as two premises. Thus, tab6ann, bidhall and ba6d kil shi can be said to introduce a premise in a synthetic inference rule.

33- Kil il6arabb kariimiin.

All Arab-3L generous-3PL.

All Arabs are generous.

Notice that the speaker of (32B) could have responded without using ba6d kil shi but in this case his utterance will not be understood as evidence. It will be understood as explanation for (32A) as in (34):

34- A- Ahmad kariim.

Ahmad generous-3SGM.

B- / Hweh 6arabi.

He Arab-3SGM.

The element determining the relevance of such a proposition as an explanation is the high intonation associated with its articulation. Thus, we see that intonation pattern can function as a semantic constraint on relevance in the same way as tab6ann, bidhall and ba6d kil shi. The sign [/] is used to indicate the high intonation pattern.

(32B) functions as evidence for (32A) and a reminder. It reminds the hearer of an assumption for justifying the proposition he has presented. It is only bidhall and ba6d kil shi that can be used to indicate
that the proposition they introduce can be relevant both as evidence and a reminder. The one introduced by tab6ann can only be relevant as evidence. Thus, while the proposition introduced by bidhall and ba6d kil shi in (35) and (36) respectively functions as both evidence and a reminder, the proposition introduced by tab6ann in (37) functions as evidence. The following examples are Syrian translation of example (32) mentioned in section 3.2:

35- Ma ribeh Peter isba? bidhall ka6bu
   Not won-3SGM Peter the-race after all ankle-3SGM
   madhrub.
   injured.
   Peter didn’t win the race. After all, he has an injured ankle.

36- Ma ribeh Peter isba? ba6d kil shi ka6bu
   Not won-3SGM Peter the-race after all ankle-3SGM
   madhrub.
   injured.

37- Ma ribeh Peter isba? tab6ann ka6bu
   Not won-3SGM Peter the-race after all ankle-3SGM
   madhrub.
   injured.

Recall that in chapter three, following Blakemore (1987), I argued that you see differs from after all in that it does not indicate that the proposition it introduces functions as a reminder. If this is true and if tab6ann
differs from bidhall and ba6d kil shi in that the proposition it introduces does not function as a reminder, then, I suggest that in this respect tab6ann is more like you see than after all.

The use of bidhall and ba6d kil shi can be optional in cases where the proposition they introduce is understood to be relevant as evidence. However, in cases where the speaker articulates an utterance which he intends to be understood as both evidence and reminder, the use of bidhall and ba6d kil shi is necessary because although the proposition will be understood as evidence, it will not be understood as a reminder if they are omitted. Compare (38) and (39):

38- Bnitsawa? min illiuw bidhall arkhass
    Shop-1PL from theleo’s after all cheaper
    min issafway.
    from the-Safeway.
    We do our shopping from Leo’s. It is, after all, cheaper than Safeway.

39- Bnitsawa? min illiuw arkhass
    Shop-1PL from the-Leo’s cheaper
    min issafway.
    from the-Safeway.
    We do our shopping from Leo’s. It is cheaper than Safeway.

In examples like (39) a short pause is needed before the evidence. This pause is important because it replaces bidhall and ba6d kil shi in indicating that what follows
is evidence for what precedes it. This shows that Syrian Arabic differs from English in that while in English *after all* is used to indicate that the proposition it introduces is understood to be relevant both as evidence and a reminder, in Syrian we have these two functions separated. That is, while their use is optional with a proposition relevant as evidence, their use is quite important for the speaker who intends that the proposition of his utterance is to be understood as a reminder.

Remember that inference rules can be of two types: analytic taking one premise and synthetic which require two premises as input. We saw above that the propositions introduced by *bidhall*, *tab6ann* and *ba6d kil shi* are associated with the presentation of a premise in a synthetic inference rule. Like *after all*, the propositions introduced by these words are not necessarily always associated with the presentation of a premise in a synthetic inference rule. The proposition they introduce can also function as a premise in an analytic inference rule. In cases like these, as Blakemore (1987: 83) argues, the hearer does not need to set up an argument. In (40), for instance, what the hearer needs is to understand the concept of a triangle which will give him its logical entry and hence the proposition in the first clause.
40- Ilu tlatt zawaya tab6ann hweh musallas. Has-3SGM three angles after all he triangle. It has three angles. After all, it is a triangle. Notice that in examples like (40) bidhall and ba6d kil shi are less commonly used.

We saw in chapter three that certain items function as semantic constraints on relevance but can also contribute towards the propositional content. One of these items is so which in examples like (41) does not function as a semantic constraint on relevance rather it contributes towards the propositional content.

41- John is a linguist and so he understands Chomsky. As far as tab6ann, bidhall and ba6d kil shi are concerned this is not possible. That is, their only function is as semantic constraints on relevance. This is shown by the fact that they cannot be used next to the coordinator u. Consider example (42):

42- * Bnitsawa? min illiuz u bidhall arhass Shop-1PL from the-Leo's and after all cheaper min issafway. from the-Safeway. We do our shopping from Leo's and after all it is cheaper than Safeway. The ungrammatical result of juxtaposing bidhall with the coordinator u shows that the inferential connections expressed by conjoined utterances does not include the connections expressed by bidhall, tab6ann and ba6d kil shi. This is simply because these items do not allow
the preceding of the coordinator \(u\) and if they do not allow that, their meaning cannot be said to contribute towards the propositional content; therefore, the constraint they impose on the interpretation of the utterances they preface is their sole function.

7.3 The syntax of \textit{shaif} and \textit{bta6ref}

\textit{Shaif} and \textit{bta6ref} are two Syrian expressions which are similar to the English \textit{you see}. \textit{Tab6ann}, as we saw in the previous section, is also similar to \textit{you see} but here I will be concerned with \textit{shaif} and \textit{bta6ref}. \textit{Shaif} can literally be translated either as \textit{I'm seeing} or as \textit{you see}. In this study I will not be concerned with it when it means \textit{I'm seeing} because when it expresses this meaning it always contributes towards the propositional content. I will concentrate on \textit{shaif} when it means \textit{you see} although when it is translated as \textit{you see} it does not always function as a semantic constraint on relevance. The factor determining whether or not this word is functioning as a semantic constraint on relevance when it is translated as \textit{you see} is the tone pitch usually associated with its articulation. \textit{Shaif} can function as a semantic constraint on relevance only when it is produced with a low tone pitch. When it is said with a high tone pitch its meaning contributes towards the propositional content. Hence it is not a semantic
constraint on relevance. However, I will not touch on this point because this will be fully discussed in the next section where we will see that the meaning of shaif is ambiguous between a truth-conditional and a non-truth-conditional one.

Bta6ref, on the other hand, differs from shaif in that its meaning is not ambiguous between truth-conditional or non-truth-conditional. Rather it can always be analysed in non-truth-conditional terms. Notice that although bta6ref can literally be translated as you know, in fact, its function is similar to you see.

The discussion of the syntax of these two items will be divided into two stages. In the first stage I will concentrate on the possibility of classifying them as conjunctions (i.e. subordinating or coordinating conjunctions). If they can be classified neither as subordinating conjunctions nor as coordinating conjunctions, then we can conclude that they are adverbs.

Conjunctions usually have two features distinguishing them from other parts of speech. First, they have to appear in clause-initial position. Second, they cannot be preceded by another conjunction such as the coordinating conjunction u. As far as shaif and bta6ref are concerned it can be realised that they meet both conditions. That is, they can occur in clause-initial position and at the same time they cannot be preceded by another conjunction. Consider the following examples:
43- Wara? ishshajar 6ambihir shaif ishshitta
Leaves the-trees falling-3SGM see-2SGM the-Winter
?arrabb.
came-nearer-3SGM.
Leaves are falling. You see, Winter is approaching.

44- Ma ribeh issba? bta6ref kan ka6bu
Not won-3SGM the-race know-2SGM was ankle-3SGM
madhruub.
injured.
He didn’t win the race. You see, he had an injured ankle.

45- * Wara? ishshajar 6ambihir u shaif
Leaves the-trees falling-3SGM and see-2SGM
ishshitta ?arrabb.
the-Winter came-nearer-3SGM.
? Leaves are falling and you see Winter is approaching.

46- * Issu? imsakker u bta6ref illum
The-market closed and know-2SGM the-day
6etleh.
holiday.
? The market is closed and you see today is a holiday.

The grammaticality of examples (43) and (44) and the ungrammaticality of those in (45) and (46) suggest that both shaif and bta6ref might be labelled as conjunctions. However, I believe that this cannot be
possible because these words, like you see and after all, seem to occur within or in final-position of a coordinated sentence as well. This occurrence excludes them from the possibility of being classified as conjunctions hence they can be neither subordinating nor coordinating conjunctions because subordinating and coordinating conjunctions do not occur in these positions. Consider the following examples:

47- Wara? ishshajar 6ambihir ishshitta shaif
Leaves the-trees falling-3SGM the-Winter see-2SGM
?arrabb.
came-nearer-3SGM.

48- Wara? ishshajar 6am bihir ishshita bta6ref
Leaves the-tees falling the-Winter know-2SGM
?arrabb.
came-nearer-3SGM.

49- Wara? ishshajar 6am bihir ishshitta
Leaves the-trees falling-3SGM the-Winter
?arrabb shaif.
came-nearer-2SGM see-2SGM.

50- Wara? ishshajar 6ambihir ishshitta
Leaves the-trees falling-3SGM the-Winter
?arrabb bta6ref.
came-nearer-3SGM know-2SGM.

There is no difference in meaning between shaif or bta6ref when used in middle or final position as they are used in the above examples.

As they cannot be classified as subordinating or
coordinating conjunctions I assume they can be labelled as adverbs. As we know, an adverb allows the successive use with another adverb but this is only true to a limited extent. For instance, the fact that *frequently* and *reluctantly* cannot be used in succession as in (51) or (52) does not mean that they are not adverbs,

51- ? He frequently reluctantly arrived late.
52- ? He reluctantly frequently arrived late.

Nor does it mean that *shaif* and *bta6ref* are not adverbs if they cannot be used in succession with each other as in (53) and (54):

53- *Wara? ishshajar 6ambihir shaif bta6ref*
Leaves the-trees falling-3SGM see-2SGM know-2SGM
ishshitta ?arrabb.
the-Winter came-nearer-3SGM.
? Leaves are falling. You see you see Winter is approaching.

54- *Wara? ishshajar 6ambihir bta6ref shaif*
Leaves the-trees falling-3SGM know-2SGM see-2SGM
ishshitta ?arrabb.
the-Winter came-nearer-3SGM.
? Leaves are falling. You see you see Winter is approaching.

Both *shaif* and *bta6ref* can be used in succession with other adverbs such as *min shan heik* (that is why) as in (55) and (56):

231
55- Kanet 6amleh 6amaleih bta6ref
Was-3SGF doing-3SGF operation know-2SGM
min shan heik ma ijjet 6alfahss.
that is why not came-3SGF on-the-exam.
She had an operation. You see that is why she didn’t
come to the exam.

56- Ishshitta ?arrabb shaif min shan heik
The-Winter came-nearer-3SGM see-2SGM that is why
wara? ishshajar 6ambihir.
leaves the-trees falling-3SGM.
Winter is approaching. You see, that is why leaves
are falling.

Grammatically, examples (55) and (56) are acceptable, but
bta6ref and shaif, as they are used here, cannot be said
to function as semantic constraints on relevance because
for these two words to have such a function they have to be used in sentences where the proposition of the clause they introduce functions as an explanation for a proposition expressed by a preceding clause. What we have in examples (55) and (56) is the opposite. The order of the clauses in these two examples does not reflect the function of both shaif and bta6ref as semantic constraints on relevance. The order of the clauses has to be in the same order as in (57) and (58). Notice that although the order of the clauses in these two examples is the right one for both shaif and bta6ref to function as semantic constraints on relevance, still none of them can be said to have such a function here.
This is due to the presence of the adverb min shan heik which indicates that what follows it is a conclusion rather than an explanation.

57- Wara? ishshajar 6am bihir shaif
Leaves the-trees falling-3SGM see-2SGM
min shan heik ishshitta ?arrabb.
that is why the-winter came-nearer-3SGM.
? Leaves are falling. You see, that is why Winter is approaching.

58- Wara? ishshajar 6am bihir bta6ref
leaves the-trees falling-3SGM know-2SGM
min shan heik ishshitta ?arrabb.
that is why the-Winter came-nearer-3SGM.

Finally, as we saw, these words can be labelled neither as subordinating conjunctions nor as coordinating conjunctions. The fact that they can occur in succession with other adverbs suggests that they are adverbs although the different endings they have suggest that, strictly speaking, they are verbs.

7.4 shaif and bta6ref

The fact that shaif and bta6ref correspond to you see does not mean that these two words are alike. As we saw in the previous section they are different in that while the meaning of bta6ref is always analysed in non-truth-conditional terms, shaif is ambiguous between truth
and non-truth-conditional meaning. The sign [/] will be used to indicate a high tone pitch. Compare (59) with (60):

Slipped-3SGF see-2SGM the-road was frozen.
She slipped. You see, the road was icy.

Leaves the-trees falling-3SGM see-2SGM the-Winter came-nearer-3SGM.

Leaves are falling. You see, Winter is approaching.

While in (59) shaif contributes towards the propositional content, in (60) it has to be analysed in non-truth-conditional terms. This, I will argue, is due to the fact that shaif in (59) is said with a high intonation. While the use of shaif in (59) implies that a sort of betting has taken place prior to its articulation, shaif as used in (60) does not have such implication. In other words, the meaning of shaif can never be analysed in non-truth-conditional terms in utterances which imply that a sort of betting has taken place prior to the articulation of the utterance in which it is used. In such examples the speaker will be understood to be saying that he is right.

The element that indicates whether or not an argument has taken place prior to the articulation of the utterance of shaif is indeed the tone pitch associated with the articulation of this word. That
is, when this word is said with a low tone pitch its meaning is analysed in non-truth-conditional terms. On the other hand, when it is articulated with a high tone pitch, its meaning contributes towards the propositional content hence it does not function as a semantic constraint on relevance.

Thus, the use of examples like (59) is restricted to certain situations. The right situation for it will be one where two persons are arguing and betting about the possibility of slipping if she walks on the road they have in mind. For instance, one person believes somehow that if she walks on that road she will not slip. Another person, however, argues that if she walks on that road she will slip because the road, he believes, is icy. If she walks and slips, then the person who bet that she will slip is inclined to articulate this utterance which in this case means that "you shouldn't have let her walk on that road because I told you it is icy and if she walks on it she will slip". In this case the meaning of shaif contributes to the propositional content.

On the other hand, the use of shaif in (60) does not suggest that a discussion between two speakers has taken place prior to the presentation of this utterance because it is a fact that when Winter comes, leaves will start to fall. That is, no one will bet that if Winter comes leaves will start to fall because no two persons can disagree about the fact that leaves are doomed to fall
when Winter comes. I used these two examples to show that it is not easy to differentiate between *shaif* when used as a semantic constraint on relevance and when it is not. The best clue here is to use one’s intuition for differentiating between *shaif* in cases when it is said with a low tone pitch and those when it is said with a high one. Thus, it is only when it is possible to distinguish between the two types of tones that one will be able to differentiate between cases in which *shaif* is used to presuppose that a certain argument has taken place and those in which it does not have such a presupposition.

The proposition introduced both by *shaif* when functioning as a semantic constraint on relevance and *bta6ref* is always understood to be relevant as an explanation for the proposition introduced by the first clause. Oddity arises in utterances where *shaif* and *bta6ref* have preceded the explanation and the proposition creating the need for that explanation as in (61) and (62):

61- ? *Shaif* ishshitta ?arrabb wara?

See-2SGM the-Winter came-nearer-3SGM leaves

ishshajar 6ambihir.

the-trees falling-3SGM.

? You see Winter is approaching. Leaves are falling.

62- ? *Bta6ref* ishshitta ?arrabb wara?

See-2SGM the-Winter came-nearer-3SGM leaves
ishshajar 6ambihir.
the-trees falling-3SGM.

? You see Winter is approaching. Leaves are falling.

Bta6ref and shaif exhibit a certain similarity to bidhall and ba6d kil shi which are similar to English after all (see section 7.2 above) in respect to the order they impose on the clauses they connect when functioning as semantic constraints on relevance. In other words, for the proposition introduced by both shaif and bta6ref to be understood as an explanation, the proposition functioning as an explanation has to be in second position and the proposition creating the need for that explanation has always to be in first position. Thus while the propositions introduced by shaif and bta6ref in (60) above and (63) are understood to be relevant as explanations, the propositions shaif and bta6ref introduce in (64) and (65) are not understood in the same way.

63- Wara? ishshajar 6am bihir  bta6ref  ishshitta
Leaves the-trees falling-3SGM know-2SGM the-Winter
?arrabb.
came-nearer-3SGM.

64- ? Ishshitta  ?arrabb  shaif  wara?
The-Winter came-nearer-3SGM see-2SGM leaves
ishshajar 6am bihir.
the-trees falling-3SGM.

? Winter is approaching. You see leaves are falling.
Winter is approaching. You see, leaves are falling. This is simply because when the proposition creating the need for an explanation is placed in second position that proposition cannot be a plausible explanation. This is one of the reasons why the propositions introduced by shaif and bta6ref in (64) and (65) cannot be understood as explanations. The fact that these propositions are introduced by elements which introduce explanations is a further problem.

Notice that shaif and bta6ref in (64) and (65) can be replaced by the Syrian counterparts of therefore and so discussed in sections 6.2 and 6.3 respectively as we would expect given the function of these elements. As I have mentioned, the propositions introduced by shaif in (60) and bta6ref in (63) are relevant as explanations due to the fact that the proposition expressed by the first clause creates the need for such an explanation. What confirms this is that when the order of the segments connected by both shaif and bta6ref is changed then the propositions these words introduce can no more be understood as plausible explanations as (64) and (65) show.

The propositions introduced by shaif and bta6ref in examples (64) and (65) cannot be relevant as
explanations. This is simply because the proposition introduced by these words can only be understood to be relevant as a conclusion. That is why I mentioned that shaif and bta6ref in these two examples can be replaced by the Syrian counterparts of therefore and so. This conclusion can be derived on the basis of the contextual assumption provided by the hearer in (66) and the premise presented by the first clause repeated here in (67):

66- Izza ishshitta ?arrabb wara? ishshajar
   If the-Winter came-nearer-3SGM leaves the-trees
   bihir.
   fall-3SGM.
   If Winter comes, leaves start falling.

67- Ishshitta ?arrabb.
   The-Winter came-nearer-3SGM.
   Winter has come.

The inferential connections conveyed by conjoined utterances may include the inferential connections expressed by some semantic constraints on relevance such as fou? hashshi and bil?idhafeh lahashshi similar to moreover and furthermore which we will see in the next section. However, the inferential connections conveyed by conjoined utterances do not include the connections expressed by shaif or bta6ref. The inferential connections expressed by these words have indeed to be conveyed in terms of dependent relevance where the relevance of one proposition depends on the presentation
of another and each one is consistent with the Principle of Relevance individually. Thus, the utterance in (68) is unacceptable and the second conjunct in (69) cannot be interpreted as an explanation for the proposition in the first.

68- * Zahtet u bta6ref ittarri? kan
Slipped-3SGF and know-2SGM the-road was
imttallej.

frozen.

She slipped and you see the road was icy.

69- Zahtet u ittarri? kan imttallej.
Slipped-3SGF and the-road was frozen.

She slipped and the road was icy.

There is no way in which the second conjunct in (69) will be understood as an explanation for the first. This example will be best understood to be relevant as indicating a list of two separate events. The way to establish a connection between these two events is by reversing the order of the conjuncts. In this case a causal connection may exist where the icy state of the road is understood to what made her slip as in (70):

70- Ittarii? kan imttallej u zahtet.
The-road was frozen and slipped-3SGF.

The road was icy and she slipped.

Causal connections do not appear only in conjoined utterances. Blakemore (1987: 88) argues that they can figure in explanations. The same sort of causal connections that figure in explanations introduced by the
English you see can also appear in explanations introduced by its Syrian counterpart bta6ref.\textsuperscript{2} Thus, the proposition introduced by bta6ref in (71), for example, cannot be understood as an explanation for the first unless an assumption is made that there is a causal connection between ice and slipping:

\textit{71- Zahtet bta6ref ittarii? kan imttallej.}

\begin{center}
Slipped-3SGF know-2SGM the-road was frozen.
\end{center}

She slipped. You see, the road was icy.

However, not all explanations require such causal connections. In example (72), for instance, no one will assume that there is a causal connection between Sunday and the absence of the porter. Sunday does not cause the porter’s absence rather it implies it.

\textit{72- Ilhares mano haun bta6ref illum}

\begin{center}
The-porter not-3SGM here know-2SGM the-day il?ahadd.
\end{center}

the-Sunday.

The porter is away. You see, it’s Sunday.

Notice that although the propositions that both shaif and bta6ref introduce function as explanations, only the proposition introduced by bta6ref is suggested to be an assumption already held by the hearer. That is, it is a proposition which has in addition to its relevance as an explanation a further function as a reminder where the speaker reminds the hearer of an assumption in order to justify a proposition he has
presented. In this way, bta6ref is similar to after all. Thus, bta6ref exhibits a similarity not only to you see but also to after all. It is similar to you see in that the proposition it introduces is understood to be relevant as an explanation and to after all in the fact that the proposition it introduces functions as a reminder. Compare (73) with (71) above:

73- Zahtet shaif ittarii? kan imttallej.
Slipped-3SGF see-2SGM the-road was frozen.

While the proposition introduced by shaif in (73) indicates that it is only the speaker who knew that the road was icy, the proposition introduced by bta6ref in (71) suggests that both speaker and hearer knew that it was icy.

7.5 The syntax of fou? hashshi, bil?idafeh lahashshi and kaman

The three Syrian expressions fou? hashshi, bil?idafeh lahashshi and kaman correspond to the three English words moreover, furthermore and also respectively. In this section I will try to specify under what syntactic category these Syrian expressions may be classified. But before that I will say something about the elements which constitute these expressions. Unlike kaman, fou? hashshi and bil?idafeh lahashshi are composed of more than one morpheme. Fou? hashshi is constituted of three morphemes: the
preposition fou? (on), the demonstrative pronoun ha (this) and the noun shshi (thing). Bil?idafeh lahashshi, on the other hand, is composed of five morphemes: the preposition bi (in), the noun l?idafeh (addition), the preposition la (for), the demonstrative pronoun ha (this) and the noun shshi (thing). So although the elements constituting these two expressions are different, both seem to end with the noun shshi (thing) and both involve the demonstrative pronoun ha (this).

Returning now to the description of their syntactic identity consider (A) and (B) in each of the following examples:

74- A- weslet Salwa 6almhatta mit?akhra
    Arrived-3SGF Salwa on-the-station late-3SGF
    fou? hashshi/ bil?idafeh lahashshi nisset
    moreover/ furthermore forgot-3SGF
    shantayta bilbeit.
    suitcase-3SGF in-the-house.
    Salwa arrived at the station late.
    Moreover/Furthermore, she’s forgotten her suitcase at home.

B- * Fou? hashshi/ bil?idafeh lahashshi nisset
    Moreover / Furthermore forgot-3SGF
    shantayta bilbeit weslet Salwa
    suitcase-3SGF in-the-house arrived-3SGF Salwa
Moreover/Furthermore, she’s forgotten her suitcase at home Salwa arrived at the station late.

75- A- Weslet Salwa 6almhatta mit?akhra kaman
Arrived-3SGF Salwa on-the-station late-3SGF also
nisset shantayta bilbeit.
forgot-3SGF suitcase-3SGF in-the-house.
Salwa arrived at the station late. Also she’s forgotten her suitcase at home.

B- * Kaman nisset shantayta bilbeit
Also forgot-3SGF suitcase-3SGF in-the-house
weslet Salwa 6almhatta mit?akhra.
arrived-3SGF Salwa on-the-station late-3SGF.
? Also she’s forgotten her suitcase at home, Salwa
arrived at the station late.

Fou? hashshi, bil?idafeh lahashshi and kaman do not seem to fulfill the criterion of subordinating conjunctions. because the result of preposing the clause introduced by these expressions is ungrammatical as we can see in (74B) and (75B) above; therefore, these expressions cannot be classified as subordinating conjunctions.

One can see also that a common feature of these expressions is their use next to the coordinating conjunction u as in the following examples:

76- Weslet Salwa 6almhatta mit?akhra u
Arrived-3SGF Salwa on-the-station late-3SGF and
fou? hashshi nisset shantayta bilbeit.
moreover forgot-3SGF suitcase-3SGF in-the-house.
Salwa arrived at the station late. Moreover, she’s forgotten her suitcase at home.

Salwa arrived at the station late. Furthermore, she’s forgotten her suitcase at home.

Recall that one of the distinguishing features of coordinating conjunctions is that they do not allow the possibility of any two of them to be used next to each other. Therefore, the fact that the result of using these expressions next to a coordinating conjunction like u is grammatical shows that these expressions are not coordinating conjunctions.

Another reason for not classifying these expressions as coordinating conjunctions is that they allow the
possibility of being used in clause non-initial position. 
Consider the following examples where fou? hashshi, 
bil?idafeh lahashshi and kaman are used in clause-
internal position:
79- Weslet Salwa 6almhatta mit?akhra u
Arrived-3SGF Salwa on-the-station late-3SGF and
nisset fou? hashshi shantayta bilbeit.
forgot-3SGF moreover suitcase-3SGF in-the-house.
Salwa arrived at the station late. She’s
forgotten, moreover, her suitcase at home.
80- Weslet Salwa 6almhatta mit?akhra u
Arrived-3SGF Salwa on-the-station late-3SGF and
nisset bil?idhafeh lahashshi shantayta
forgot-3SGF furthermore suitcase-3SGF
bilbeit.
in-the-house.
Salwa arrived at the station late. She’s,
furthermore, forgotten her suitcase at home.
81- Weslet Salwa 6almhatta mit?akhra u
Arrived-3SGF Salwa on-the-station late-3SGF and
nisset kaman shantayta bilbeit.
forgot-3SGF also suitcase-3SGF in-the-house.
Salwa arrived at the station late. She also has
forgotten her suitcase at home.
As we know if an item is said to allow the possibility of
being used in clause non-initial position this means that
it is likely that such an item will be used in clause-
final position too as in the following examples:

82- Weslet Salwa 6almhatta mit?akhra u
Arrived-3SGF Salwa on-the-station late-3SGF and
nisset shantayta bilbeit fou? hashshi.
forgot-3SGF suitcase-3SGF in-the-house moreover.
Salwa arrived at the station late. She's forgotten
her suit case at home moreover.

83- Weslet Salwa 6almhatta mit?akhra u
Arrived Salwa on-the-station late-3SGF and
nisset shantayta bilbeit
forgot-3SGF suitcase-3SGF in-the-house
bil?idhafeh lahashshi.
furthermore.
Salwa arrived at the station late. She's forgotten
her suitcase at home furthermore.

84- Weslet Salwa 6almhatta mit?akhra u
Arrived-3SGF Salwa on-the-station late-3SGF and
nisset shantayta bilbeit kaman.
forgot-3SGF suitcase-3SGF in-the-house also.
Salwa arrived at the station late. She's forgotten
her suitcase at home also.

Fou? hashshi, bil?idafeh lahashshi and kaman cannot be
subordinating conjunctions because the result of
preposing their clause is ungrammatical. Clause-initial
position is the position of coordinating conjunctions.
However, the fact that fou? hashshi, bil?idafeh
lahashshi and kaman can be used, as we can see in the
examples above, in clause non-initial position shows that these expressions cannot be classified as coordinating conjunctions either. It shows, furthermore, that they can be classified as adverbs because, as we saw in section (5.1), one of the distinguishing features of adverbs is their ability to be used in clause non-initial position.

7.6 Fou? hashshi, bil?idhafah lahashshi and kaman

In this section I will present an account of the function of fou? hashshi, bil?idhafah lahashshi and kaman. Recall that in section 3.3 I argued, following Blakemore (1987), that the propositions connected by words like moreover, furthermore and also are not connected as input and output to an inference rule rather they are connected as two premises. Such premises can be understood either as two premises in the same argument where both premises are necessary for the derivation of the conclusion (C) or as two premises for the same conclusion where in this case the conclusion (C) can be derived either from (P) or (Q) alone together with an appropriate context. (Q) in this case will be understood to be an additional support for the factuality of whatever conclusion derived from the first proposition (P).

Like propositions connected by their English counterparts, the propositions connected by fou? hashshi,
bil?idhafeh lahashshi and kaman are related as two premises and can be understood in two different ways. They can be understood either as two premises in the same argument or two premises in separate arguments with the same conclusion (C). Let us illustrate the first case by considering the following examples:

85- Jamal ijja. Fou? hashshi jaab ma6u
Jamal came-3SGM moreover brought-3SGM with-3SGM ilbikaab.
the-lorry.
Jamal came. Moreover, he brought the lorry with him.

86- Jamal ijja. Bil?idhafeh lahashshi jaab
Jamal came-3SGM furthermore brought-3SGM ma6u ilbikaab.
with-3SGM the-lorry.
Jamal came. Furthermore, he brought the lorry with him.

87- Jamal ijja. Jaab ma6u ilbikaab
Jamal came-3SGM brought-3SGM with-3SGM the-lorry kaman.
also.
Jamal came. Also he brought the lorry with him.

In terms of function the three items in (85), (86) and (87) are the same. That is, they indicate that the proposition associated with them has to be interpreted as a premise for the derivation of a conclusion which the hearer may not be able to obtain from the first
proposition alone. I will try to illustrate how the proposition associated with these items can be understood as a premise in the same argument by concentrating on the analysis of the proposition introduced by fou? hashshi in example (85). Remember that if two propositions are connected as two premises in the same argument this means that the hearer is expected to perform, as Blakemore (1987: 95) points out, an inference that includes both propositions. Now, imagine yourself in a situation where you have packed everything and ready to move from your old house to a new one. What you are waiting for is your friend Jamal to bring the lorry to remove your luggage. In this case you may derive a conclusion from the premises in (85) by accessing a conditional premise like (88):

88- Iza ijja Jamal u jaab ma6u
If came-3SGM Jamal and brought-3SGM with-3SGM
ilbikaab ma6natu fini inti?el illum.
the-lorry so can-1SG move-1SG the-today.
If Jamal came and brought the lorry with him, then I can move today.

Given a conditional premise of the sort in (88) and the premises in (85) (repeated below as (89) and (90), the hearer will derive the conclusion in (91):

89- Jamal ijja.
Jamal came-3SGM.
Jamal came.
Combining the first proposition in (85) with the conditional assumption in (88) alone does not yield the conclusion in (91). The derivation of the conclusion in (91) is made possible only by the speaker presenting the second proposition introduced by fou7 hashshi; therefore, this premise has licensed the hearer to derive a conclusion which he might have never been expected to derive on the basis of the first proposition in (85) and the conditional premise in (88) alone.

Notice that by accessing the conditional premise in (88) the hearer can derive the conclusion in (91) from the premises connected by bil?idhafeh lahshshi and kaman in (86) or (87) as well. This shows, as I mentioned earlier, that the propositions associated with bil?idhafeh lahshshi and kaman, like that of fou7 hashshi, license the derivation of a conclusion the hearer is not expected to obtain without the proposition associated with them.

However, like propositions connected by their English counterparts, the propositions connected by fou7 hashshi, bil?idhafeh lahshshi and kaman can also be
understood to be related as two premises for the same conclusion (C). In this case the conclusion derived from the first proposition can also be derived from the second one. As Blakemore (1987: 91) argues, the second premise in this case will be understood as additional support for the factuality of the conclusion derived from the first proposition. Consider example (92):

92- Weslet Salwa 6almhatta mit?akhra.
Arrived-3SGF Salwa on-the-station late-3SGF

bil?idhafeh lahashshi nisset ilbita?at
Furthermore forgot-3SGF the-tickets bilbeit.
in-the-house.

Salwa arrived at the station late. Furthermore, she's left the tickets at home.

Accessing the conditional assumption in (93) and combining it with the first proposition in (92) the hearer could derive the conclusion in (94):

93- Iza weslet Salwa 6almhatta mit?akhra
If sarrived-3SGF Salwa on-the-station late-3SGF
ma6natu ma rah tilha? ittrain.
so not will follow-3SGF the-train.
If Salwa had arrived at the station late, then she would miss the train.

94- Ma lih?et Salwa ittrain.
Not followed-3SGF Salwa the-train.
Salwa missed the train.

Now the hearer may also derive the conclusion in (94) by
combining the contextual assumption in (95) with the second proposition in (92):

95- Iza nisset Salwa ilbita?at bilbeit
If forgot-3SGF Salwa the-tickets in-the-house
ma6natu ma rah tilha? ittrain.
so not will follow-3SGF the-train.

If Salwa had left the tickets at home, then she would miss the train.

By uttering the second proposition in (92), as Blakemore (1987: 93) argues, the speaker indicates to the hearer that he is presenting the second proposition as a guarantee for the factuality of the conclusion (C) derived from the first proposition.

Notice that whether the propositions connected by these words are understood as two premises in the same argument or two premises for the same conclusion it is the addition of the proposition associated with these words that makes the hearer process the proposition in the first clause in the way he processes it.

Blakemore (1987: 119-20) argues that moreover and furthermore can be used to express a connection between the conjuncts of a conjoined utterance. Let us consider her example in (96):

96- Susan voted for the strike and, furthermore, she's a member of the Socialist Workers Party.

(1987: 119)

For (96) to be true both the first proposition and the
second proposition should be true. Furthermore here does not impose a logical relation on the two conjuncts it connects. That is, it does not indicate that the second conjunct follows from the first. This shows that furthermore does not contribute to the propositional content in conjoined utterances rather it functions as a semantic constraint on relevance. This, however, is not only true of English. It is also applied to the Syrian counterparts. Consider the following:

97- Weslet Salwa 6almhatta mit?akhra u
Arrived-3SGF Salwa on-the-station late-3SGF and
fou? hashshi nisset ilbita?at bilbeit.
moreover forgot-3SGF the-tickets in-the-house.
Salwa arrived at the station late and, moreover,
she’s left the tickets at home.

98- Weslet Salwa 6almhatta mit?akhra u
Arrived-3SGF Salwa on-the-station late-3SGF and
bil?idhafeh lahhashshi nisset ilbita?at
furthermore forgot-3SGF the-tickets bilbeit.
in-the-house.
Salwa arrived at the station late and, furthermore,
she’s left the tickets at home.

99- Weslet Salwa 6almhatta mit?akhra u
Arrived-3SGF Salwa on-the-station late-3SGF and
nisset ilbita?att bilbeit kaman.
forgot-3SGF the-tickets in-the-house also.
Salwa arrived at the station late and also she's left the tickets at home.

Fou? hashshi, bil{idhafeh lahashshi and kaman in these examples do not contribute to the propositional content because these words do not indicate that the second conjunct follows from the first. Notice that the use of also in conjoined utterances in English is less acceptable than that of its Syrian counterpart kaman. Also as it appears in the translation of example (99) is unacceptable because it seems to cancel the temporal connotations of the sentence. By contrast, the use of kaman in (99) is acceptable and the three sentences in (97), (98) and (99) have exactly the same meaning.

However, bil{idhafeh lahashshi and kaman may be the Syrian translation of other expressions like in addition, as well and too where bil{idhafeh lahashshi is the translation of in addition and kaman is the translation of both as well and too. As well and too can have this translation either when they are used to connect two propositions as premises or indicating that an additional meaning is being implied.
8.1 Further Indicators of Denial of Expectation

In chapter four I have discussed at some length a number of English expressions. In this chapter I will look in detail at the Syrian counterparts of some of those expressions discussed in chapter four, mainly, those which indicate a "denial-of-expectation" sense, a "contrast" and those which specify the beginning of a digression and its end, like incidentally, by the way and anyway. The syntactic category under which these expressions may be classified will also be considered.

8.1.1 The syntax of further Syrian indicators of

denial-of-expectation ma6 inno, raghm inno,
raghm kawno and ma6 heik

Ma6 inno, raghm inno, raghm kawno and ma6 heik are four Syrian expressions. Some of these expressions correspond to a single expression in English, for example raghm inno and raghm kawno which correspond to in spite of the fact that and in spite of being respectively. Others, however, correspond to more than one word, for
example **ma6 inno** which corresponds to two words **although** and **while** and **ma6 heik** to four words **however**, **yet**, **nevertheless** and **still**. 

Three of these expressions **ma6 inno**, **raghm inno** and **raghm kawno** are composed of three words each. **Ma6 heik**, by contrast, is composed of two words only. **Ma6** the first word in **ma6 inno** and **ma6 heik** is a preposition meaning (**with**). **Raghm** the first word in **raghm inno** and **raghm kawno** is also a preposition meaning (**despite**). **Inn** the second word in **ma6 inno** and **raghm inno** is a conjunction meaning (**that**). The element **o** in which the three words **ma6 inno**, **raghm inno** and **raghm kawno** end is a third person singular marker.

Syntactically speaking, **ma6 inno**, **raghm inno** and **raghm kawno** do not allow the use of a coordinating conjunction next to them. **Ma6 heik**, by contrast, allows this possibility. Notice that the ungrammatical result of using the coordinating conjunction **u** next to each of **ma6 inno**, **raghm inno** and **raghm kawno** does not mean that these words can be syntactically classified as coordinating conjunctions. We will see later that these expressions tend to allow what they introduce to be preposed to sentence initial position, a possibility permitted by subordinating conjunctions. Consider the following:

1- * Ma ridhi Jon yidfa6 ha? ishshibbak

Not accepted-3SGM John pay-3SGM price the-window
John refused to pay for the window although he broke it.

2- * Ma ridhi Jon yidfa6 ha? ishshibbak
Not accepted-3SGM John pay-3SGM price the-window
u raghm inno hweh illi
and in spite of the fact that he the-one broke-3SGM.

3- * Ma ridhi Jon yidfa6 ha? ishshibbak
Not accepted-3SGM John pay-3SGM price the-window
u raghm kawno hweh illi kassaro.
and in spite of being he the-one broke-3SGM.

4- Jon kassar ishshibbak u ma6 heik ma
John broke-3SGM the-window and however not
ridhi yidfa6 ha?o.
accepted-3SGM pay-3SGM price-3SGM.
John broke the window and yet he refused to pay for it.

The fact that the use of the coordinator u next to ma6 heik is grammatical means that ma6 heik cannot be syntactically classified as a coordinating conjunction. Nor can it be classified as a subordinating conjunction because its clause cannot be preposed to initial position. Compare the grammatical (5) with the ungrammatical (6):
5- Jon 6alem lugha ma6 heik ma
John scholar-3SGM language yet not
biefham Tshomski.
understand-3SGM Chomsky.
John is a linguist. Yet, he doesn’t understand Chomsky.

6- * Ma6 heik ma biefham Tshomski Jon
Yet not understand-3SGM Chomsky John
6alem lugha.
scholar-3SGM language.
* Yet he doesn’t understand Chomsky John is a linguist.

(These two examples are Syrian translations of (109) and (112) mentioned in section 4.4.2.)

The ungrammatical result of preposing the clause of ma6 heik shows that this expression cannot be classified as a subordinating conjunction. It may, however, be classified as an adverb. There are three reasons to believe this. First, as we have noticed earlier, this expression allows a coordinating conjunction to precede it and as we know two coordinators cannot be used next to each other. Therefore, it cannot be a coordinating conjunction. Second, its clause, as we have just seen, cannot be preposed to initial position therefore, it cannot be classified as a subordinating conjunction. Third, it can be used in clause non-initial position, a place which is usually occupied by adverbs as is illustrated in (7) and (8) (which are Syrian translations
of (120) and (128A) mentioned in section 4.4.2):

7- Jon 6alem lugha ma biefham
John scholar-3SGM language not understand-3SGM
ma6 heik Tshomski.
however Chomsky.
John is a linguist. He, however, doesn’t understand
Chomsky.

8- Jon 6alem lugha ma biefham
John scholar-3SGM language not understand-3SGM
Tshomski ma6 heik.
Chomsky however.
John is a linguist. He doesn’t understand Chomsky
however.

Ma6 inno, raghm inno and raghm kawno, by contrast,
cannot be used in clause non-initial position;
therefore, they cannot be classified as adverbs.
Consider (9) and (10):

9- * Jon ma biefham Tshomski 6alem
John not understand-3SGM Chomsky scholar-3SGM
ma6 inno/ raghm inno/
although/ while in spite of the fact that
raghm kawno lugha.
in spite of being language.
* John doesn’t understand Chomsky he is although a
linguist.

10- * Jon ma biefham Tshomski 6alem
John not understand-3SGM Chomsky scholar-3SGM
 lugha  ma6 inno/  raghm inno  
language although/while in spite of the fact that  
raghm kawno.  
in spite of being.  

* John doesn’t understand Chomsky he is a linguist  
although.

Ma6 inno, raghm inno and raghm kawno fulfill the  
condition of subordinating conjunctions because their  
clause can be preposed without change in meaning.

Compare (11) and (12):

11- Jon ma biefham Tshomski  
John not understand-3SGM Chomsky  
ma6 inno/  raghm inno/  
although/ while in spite of the fact that  
raghm kawno 6alem lugha.  
in spite of being scholar-3SGM language.  
John doesn’t understand Chomsky although he is a  
linguist.

12- Ma6 inno/  raghm inno/  
Although/ While in spite of the fact that  
raghm kawno 6alem lugha Jon ma  
in spit of being scholar-3SGM language John not  
biefham Tshomski.  
Although he is a linguist, John doesn’t understand  
Chomsky.

I suggest that the four expressions ma6 inno, raghm  
inno, raghm kawno and ma6 heik belong to two different
syntactic categories.  

\textit{Ma6} inno, \textit{raghm} inno and \textit{raghm kawn\textsubscript{o}} can be classified as subordinating conjunctions because they do not fulfill the conditions of coordinating conjunctions or adverbs. \textit{Ma6} heik, by contrast, can be labelled as an adverb because it has the characteristics of adverbs but not those of subordinating or coordinating conjunctions.

8.1.2 \textit{Ma6} inno, \textit{raghm} inno, \textit{raghm kawn\textsubscript{o}} and \textit{ma6} heik

In chapter four sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2, I analysed several words and expressions and argued that some of those items have non-truth-conditional function especially \textit{although}, \textit{in spite of the fact that}, \textit{in spite of being}, \textit{however}, \textit{nevertheless} and \textit{yet}. Others like \textit{while} and \textit{still} are ambiguous between a truth-conditional and a non-truth-conditional function. In the present section the Syrian counterparts of these items will be analysed. Unlike some of their English counterparts, these Syrian expressions have purely non-truth-conditional meanings.

Although all these Syrian expressions are marked by a general feature of indicating a "denial-of-expectation", certain differences exist among them and between some of them and some of their English counterparts particularly \textit{while}, \textit{still} and \textit{yet}. First, the differences that exist among these expressions are
confined to differences between \textit{ma6 heik} and each of \textit{ma6 inno}, \textit{raghm inno} and \textit{raghm kawno} and restricted to three main points.

First, while the "denial-of-expectation" sense is always associated with the clause that \textit{ma6 heik} introduces, it is always associated with what precedes \textit{ma6 inno}, \textit{raghm inno} and \textit{raghm kawno} as is illustrated in the following:\textsuperscript{3}

\begin{verbatim}
13- Jon 6alem lugha ma6heik ma
John scholar-3SGM language however not
biefham Tshomski.
understand-3SGM Chomsky.
John is a linguist. However, he doesn’t understand Chomsky.
14- Jon ma biefham Tshomski ma6 inno
John not understand-3SGM Chomsky although
6alem lugha.
scholar-3SGM language.
John doesn’t understand Chomsky although he is a linguist.
15- Jon ma biefham Tshomski
John not understand-3SGM Chomsky
raghm inno 6alem lugha.
in spite of the fact that scholar-3SGM language.
John doesn’t understand Chomsky in spite of the fact that he is a linguist.
16- Jon ma biefham Tshomski
John not understand-3SGM Chomsky
\end{verbatim}
raghm kawno  6alem  lugha.
in spite of being  scholar-3SGM language.
John doesn’t understand Chomsky in spite of being a
linguist.

While the second clause in example (13) is contrary to
expectation, it is the first one in each of (14), (15)
and (16). In this respect there seems to be a great
similarity between these Syrian expressions and their
English counterparts (see the discussion of the English
counterparts in chapter four sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2.)

Second, I argued in section 8.1.1 above that
syntactically these expressions belong to two different
categories. That is, while ma6 heik is an adverb, ma6
inno, raghm inno and raghm kawno are subordinating
conjunctions. This difference underlies the greater
flexibility of ma6 inno, raghm inno and raghm kawno in
their indication of a "denial" sense than ma6 heik. In
other words, while the "denial" sense of ma6 inno, raghm
inno and raghm kawno can be indicated whether their
clause is in sentence first or second position, the
"denial" sense of ma6 heik can be indicated only when its
clause is in sentence second position. Here also a
similarity can be noticed between these Syrian
expressions and their English counterparts. Compare
(17), (18), (19) and (20) with (13), (14), (15) and (16)
above:
17- * Ma₆ heik ma biefham Tshomski Jon
      However not understand-3SGM Chomsky John
      6alem lugha.
      scholar-3SGM language.
* However he doesn't understand Chomsky John is a
  linguist.
18- Ma₆ inno 6alem lugha Jon ma
      Although scholar-3SGM language John not
      biefham Tshomski.
      understand-3SGM Chomsky.
      Although he is a linguist, John doesn't understand
      Chomsky.
19- Raghm inno 6alem lugha
      In spite of the fact that scholar-3SGM language
      Jon ma biefham Tshomski.
      John not understand-3SGM Chomsky.
      In spite of the fact that he is a linguist, John
      doesn't understand Chomsky.
20- Raghm kawno 6alem lugha Jon ma
      In spite of being scholar-3SGM language John not
      biefham Tshomski.
      understand-3SGM Chomsky.
      In spite of being a linguist, John doesn't understand
      Chomsky.
Ma₆ heik in (17) is not only unacceptable as an indicator
of a "denial" sense but also ungrammatical; therefore,
if this expression is to be understood as indicating a
"denial-of-expectation" sense, its clause has always to
be placed in sentence second position as in (13) above. This also applies to English because the English translation of example (17) is both ungrammatical and cannot be understood to be denying anything.

By contrast, ma6 inno, raghm inno and raghm kawnô indicate a "denial" sense whether their clause follows the main clause as in (14), (15) and (16) or precedes it as in (18), (19) and (20). That is, like their English counterparts (except while) the "denial" sense of ma6 inno, raghm inno and raghm kawnô is manifest whether their clause precedes or follows the main clause. All this, of course, is because these expressions are subordinating conjunctions.

Third, these expressions differ in whether they introduce a clause or a phrase. Ma6 inno, raghm inno and raghm kawnô differ from ma6 heik in that they either introduce a clause or a phrase; ma6 heik introduces a clause only. Here there can be noticed similarities as well as differences between these expressions and their English counterparts. Both ma6 inno and ma6 heik are similar to their counterparts because ma6 inno like although and while has the flexibility of being used to introduce either a clause or a phrase and ma6 heik is similar to however, nevertheless, etc., because its use can be associated with clauses only. However, raghm inno and raghm kawnô are unlike in spite of the fact that and in spite of being because as we saw in chapter four
section 4.4.1 *in spite of the fact that* can be used to introduce a clause only and *in spite of being* can be used to introduce a phrase. Compare (21), (22), (23) and (24) with (25), (26), (27) and (28) respectively:

21- Jon jimhuri ma6 heik hweh shareef.
   John Republican-3SGM however he honest-3SGM.
   John is a Republican. However, he’s honest.

22- Jon shareef ma6 inno hweh jimhuri.
   John honest-3SGM although he Republican-3SGM.
   John is honest although he is a Republican.

23- Jon shareef raghm inno hweh
   John honest-3SGM in spite of the fact that he jimhuri.
   Republican-3SGM.
   John is honest in spite of the fact that he is a Republican.

24- Jon shareef raghm kawno hweh
   John honest-3SGM in spite of being he jimhuri.
   Republican-3SGM.
   John is honest in spite of being a Republican.

25- * Jon jimhuri ma6 heik shareef.
    John Republican-3SGM however, honest-3SGM.
    * John is a Republican. However, honest.

26- Jon shareef ma6 inno jimhuri.
    John honest-3SGM although Republican-3SGM.

27- Jon shareef raghm inno
    John honest-3SGM in spite of the fact that
John honest-3SGM in spite of being Republican-3SGM.

The fact that *ma6 heik* in (25) is ungrammatical shows that this expression has to be associated with a clause as in (21). *Ma6 heik* in this respect is similar to its English counterparts. *Ma6 inno, raghm inno* and *raghm kawno*, by contrast, can be associated either with a clause or with a phrase. Here we can realise that while *ma6 inno* is similar to its English counterparts, *raghm inno* and *raghm kawno* are different. They are different because, as I said, while these expressions can be related either to a clause or to a phrase, *in spite of the fact that*, the counterpart of *raghm inno*, can be related only to clauses and *in spite of being*, the counterpart of *raghm kawno*, to, phrases.

I argued in chapter four section 4.4.1 that semantic constraints on relevance are not necessarily always associated with complete utterances. The fact that *ma6 inno, raghm inno* and *raghm kawno* function as semantic constraints on relevance when they introduce a subordinate clause as in (14), (15) and (16) above provide further support for that assumption. Notice that the use of *ma6 inno, raghm inno* and *raghm kawno* is associated with complete utterances only when their clause is either preposed as in (18), (19) and (20) above or used
parenthetically as in (29), (30) and (31) because their clause in such examples is marked off by comma intonation; therefore, this suggests that they are complete utterances.

29- Jon, ma6 inno 6alem lugha, ma
    John although scholar-3SGM language not
    biefham Tshomski.
    understand-3SGM Chomsky.
    John, although a linguist, doesn’t understand Chomsky.

30- Jon, raghm inno 6alem lugha,
    John in spite of the fact that scholar-3SGM language
    ma biefham Tshomski.
    not understand-3SGM Chomsky.
    John, in spite of the fact that he is a linguist, doesn’t understand Chomsky.

31- Jon, raghm kawno 6alem lugha, ma
    John in spite of being scholar-3SGM language not
    biefham Tshomski.
    understand-3SGM Chomsky.
    John, in spite of being a linguist, doesn’t understand Chomsky.

Now having considered what differences exist between ma6 heik and each of ma6 inno, raghm inno and raghm kawno I will try to look at two differences between these items and their English counterparts. First, the difference between ma6 inno and while. In chapter four section 4.4.1 it was argued that the clause of while can be
shifted to sentence initial position. However, the "denial-of-expectation" sense of the clause of while is revealed only in cases where this subordinate clause precedes the main one. Consider example (32):

32- John is honest while he is a Republican.

The clause introduced by while here does not deny an expectation created by the proposition of the first clause rather while here means that "John is honest as long as he is a Republican", a use in which while contributes to the propositional content. By contrast, the "denial-of-expectation" sense of ma6 inno is understood whether its clause is used in sentence first or second position. Compare examples (14) and (18) above.

Second, still and yet can have the function of semantic constraints on relevance only when they are used in clause initial position (see chapter four section 4.4.2). However, ma6 heik differs from these two words in that its "denial" sense may be revealed whether it is used in clause initial or non-initial position. Compare (33) and (34) with (13):

33- Jon 6alem lugha ma biefham
John scholar-3SGM language not understand-3SGM
ma6 heik Tshomski.
however Chomsky.
John is a linguist. He, however, doesn't understand Chomsky.
Concerning the "denial" sense indicated by *ma6 heik* there is no difference whether it is used in clause initial position as in (13) above or in clause non-initial position as in (33) and (34) except that the former is more common than the latter. This means that *ma6 heik* can receive the translation of *however* and *nevertheless* whether it is used in clause-initial or non-initial position but not that of *still* or *yet* except when it is used in clause initial-position. In that case it can be translated by either one of the four words *however*, *nevertheless*, *still* or *yet*.

*Raghm inno* and *raghm kawno* generally do not contribute to the propositional content. But there are examples in which they seem to contribute to the propositional content because they fall within the scope of the conditional (if...then). Consider (35) and (36):

35- Iza hweh shuja6 *raghm inno* inglizi

If he brave in spite of the fact that Englishman

ma6natu lazem ghayer ra?yi bil?ingliz.

then should revise opinion-1SM in the English.

If he is brave in spite of the fact that he is
Englishman then I will have to revise my opinions about the English.

36- Iza hweh shuja6 **raghm kawno** inglizi ma6natu
  If he brave in spite of being English then
  lazem ghayer ra?yi  ' bil?ingliz.
  should revise opinion-1SM in the English.
  If he is brave in spite of being English then I will
  have to revise my opinions about the English.

Here we are suggesting that Englishmen are not brave.

They may also contribute to the propositional content because they fall within the scope of negation as in (37) and (38):

37- Hweh mano **shuja6 raghm inno**
  He not-3SGM brave in spite of the fact that
  inglizi.
  Englishman.
  He isn’t brave in spite of the fact that he is an
  Englishman.

38- Hweh mano **shuja6 raghm kawno** inglizi.
  He not-3SGM brave in spite of being Englishman.
  He isn’t brave in spite of being an Englishman.

Finally, following Blakemore (1987), we have seen that dependent relevance is a relation that arises between two segments combined together by a semantic constraint on relevance where the proposition conveyed by one affects the interpretation of the other and each segment is consistent with the Principle of Relevance
individually. As far as ma6 heik, ma6 inno, raghm inno and raghm kawno are concerned they are all alike in that they give rise to this relation. In this respect English and Syrian are similar. Consider example (39) and (40):

39- Jon siasi ma6 heik shareef.
John politician-3SGM however honest-3SGM.
John is a politician. However, he’s honest.

40- Jon shareef ma6 inno siasi.
John honest-3SGM although politician-3SGM.
John is honest although he’s a politician.

The effect of the clause introduced by ma6 heik in example (39) is to impose a constraint on the interpretation of the first clause. This effect is represented in that it denies the proposition that the hearer is expected to derive from the first clause like the one in (41):

41- Jon mano shareef.
John isn’t-3SGM honest.
John isn’t honest.

By contrast, ma6 inno in (40) affects the interpretation of the clause it introduces by indicating that the proposition expressed by it might lead one to assume the negation of the main clause. I have demonstrated how the relation of dependent relevance arises using the expression ma6 heik and ma6 inno. However, the same thing is also true of raghm inno and raghm kawno.
8.2 Further Indicators of Contrast

8.2.1 The syntax of bainama and 6aks

I argued that indicating a relation of contrast in English is not exclusive to but: other items like while, whereas and unlike can operate as indicators of a contrast relation too (see chapter four section 4.5). Similarly, in Syrian contrast is a relation that can be indicated by more than one word. It can be indicated either by means of a word like bass (see section 5.3) which corresponds to but or by the items bainama or 6aks. Bainama corresponds to each of while and whereas and 6aks to unlike. These two items will be my concern both in this section and in the next one. In the following section I will illustrate their function as indicators of contrast and consider what features they have in common or differ from their English counterparts. In the present section, however, I will examine their syntax and what syntactic category they might belong to.

They cannot be classified as adverbs because they do not fulfill their conditions. First, neither bainama nor 6aks can be used in clause-internal position. Consider (42) and (43) (which are Syrian translations of examples (134) and (136) (mentioned in section 4.5 respectively):
42- Jon bieheb yishrab shay inglizi bainama
John like-3SGM drink-3SGM tea English while/whereas
Mari bitfadhel issini.
Mary prefer-3SGF the-Chinese.
John likes to drink English tea while/whereas Mary prefers chinese.

43- Jon bieheb yishrab shay inglizi 6aks Mari.
John like-3SGM drink-3SGM tea English unlike Mary.
John likes to drink English tea unlike Mary.

While bainama in (42) introduces a clause, 6aks in (43) introduces a phrase. As I have already said 6aks cannot be used in clause-internal position because it is always associated with a phrase as is the case in (43) above. Its phrase, however, may be used parenthetically in the middle of a clause. Bainama, by contrast, does introduce a clause as in (42), but it does not allow the possibility of being used in clause-internal position as it is illustrated in (44):

44- * Jon bieheb yishrab shay inglizi Mari
John like-3SGM drink-3SGM tea English Mary bainama bitfadhel issini.
while/ whereas prefer-3SGF the-Chinese.
* John likes to drink English tea Mary while/whereas prefers Chinese.

Second, as we know, an adverb allows, though to a limited extent, the possibility of another adverb to be used next to it. This is possible with bainama but not with 6aks. Thus, it will be grammatical to use an
adverb like 6adatan (usually) next to bainama but not next to 6aks as in (45) and (46):

45- Jon bieheb yishrab shay inglizi bainama
   John like-3SGM drink-3SGM tea English while/whereas

6adatan Mari bitfadhel issini.
   usually Mary prefer-3SGF the-Chinese.
John likes to drink English tea while/whereas Mary usually prefers Chinese.

46- * Jon bieheb yishrab shay inglizi 6aks
   John like-3SGM drink-3SGM tea English unlike

6adatan Mari.
   usually Mary.
   * John likes to drink English tea unlike usually Mary.

The fact that Bainama and 6aks cannot be used in clause-internal position shows that they cannot be classified as adverbs. If bainama in (45) has allowed the adverb 6adatan to follow it does not mean that it is an adverb. Bainama and 6aks cannot be used next to a coordinating conjunction. Consider (47) and (48):

47- * Jon bieheb yishrab shay inglizi u
   John like-3SGM drink-3SGM tea English and

bainama Mari bitfadhel issini.
   while/whereas Mary prefer-3SGF the-Chinese.
   * John likes to drink English tea and while/whereas Mary prefers Chinese.
John likes to drink English tea and unlike Mary.

*Bainama and *6aks can perhaps be classified as subordinating conjunctions because they seem to fulfill the condition of subordinating conjunctions. That is, they allow what they introduce to be preposed with the sentence retaining its meaning. Compare (49) and (50) with (42) and (43) above:

49- *Bainama Mari bitfadhel issini, Jon While/Whereas Mary prefer-3SGF the-Chinese John bieheb yishrab shay inglizi. like-3SGM drink-3SGM tea English. While/Whereas Mary prefers Chinese, John likes to drink English tea.

50- *6aks Mari, Jon bieheb yishrab shay inglizi. Unlike Mary John like-3SGM drink-3SGM tea English. Unlike Mary, John likes to drink English tea.

Semantically, there is hardly any difference between (49), (50) and (42), (43). In all these examples it is understood that what is preferable to John is contrasting with what is preferable to Mary whether what is introduced by *bainama and *6aks is preposed or not. One apparent difference, however, is that *bainama and *6aks are more commonly used in examples like (42) and (43) than (49) or (50). Notice that the ungrammatical result
of using bainama and 6aks next to a coordinating conjunction as in (47) and (48) shows that these expressions can be classified as coordinating conjunctions. Notice also that both items do fulfill the condition of subordinating conjunctions, nevertheless, only bainama can be listed under that category. Recall that I mentioned in my discussion of the syntax of the further Syrian indicators of denial (section 8.1.1) that subordinating conjunctions may introduce either a clause or a phrase. 6aks being capable of introducing a phrase only means that it cannot be classified as subordinating conjunction but as a preposition.

8.2.2 Bainama and 6aks

While, can indicate either a "denial" or a "contrast" function (see chapter four sections 4.4.1 and 4.5). In Syrian, however, these two functions are indicated by two separate words. We saw in section 8.1.2 that when while indicates a "denial" sense it is translated as ma6 inno in Syrian and when it is indicating a "contrast" relation it can be translated, as we will see in the course of discussion, as bainama. The word bainama not only corresponds to contrast while but also to contrast whereas. Thus, while bainama in Syrian corresponds to two lexical items, 6aks corresponds
to a single item unlike alone.

Like their English counterparts, bainama and 6aks can indicate a "contrast" relation whether they are used in sentence initial position as in (51) and (52) or sentence internal-position as in (53) and (54) (mentioned in 8.2.1 as (38) and (39) respectively):^5

51- Bainama  Mari bitfadhel tishrab Shay
While/Whereas Mary prefer-3SGF drink-3SGF tea
sini Jon bieheb yishrab shay inglizi.
Chinese John prefer-3SGM drink-3SGM tea English.
While/Whereas Mary prefers to drink Chinese tea, John
likes to drink English.

52- 6aks Mari Jon bieheb yishrab shay inglizi.
Unlike Mary John like-3SGM drink-3SGM tea English.
Unlike Mary, John likes to drink Chinese tea.

53- Jon bieheb yishrab shay inglizi bainama
John like-3SGM drink-3SGM tea English while/whereas
Mari bitfadhel issini.
Mary prefer-3SGF the-Chinese.
John likes to drink English tea while/whereas Mary
prefers Chinese.

54- Jon bieheb yishrab shay inglizi 6aks Mari.
John like-3SGM drink-3SGM tea English unlike Mary.
John likes to drink English tea unlike Mary.
All these examples are similar in that what Mary prefers
is understood to be contrasting with what John prefers.
But the use of bainama and 6aks in examples like (53) and
(54) has more contextual effects than those in (51) or
Bainama and 6aks can be used to draw attention to a two-way contrast only. In other words, they can merely be used to draw attention to the fact that two things and not more are different from each other. In this respect bainama and 6aks are like their English counterparts as is illustrated in (55) and (56) (which are Syrian translations of examples (138) and (140) mentioned in section (4.5):6

55- Mari btil6ab risheh u Ann btil6ab skwash u
Mary play-3SGF feather and Anne play-3SGF squash and
Jan btil6ab kurt sallleh bainama Jon
Jane play-3SGF ball basket while/whereas John
bieheb ishuuf ittilfizyoun.
like-3SGM see-3SGM the-TV.
Mary plays badminton, Anne plays squash, Jane plays basketball whereas John just watches TV.

56- Mari btil6ab risheh u Ann btil6ab skwash u
Mary play-3SGF feather and Anne play-3SGF squash and
Jan btil6ab kurt sallleh 6aks Jon illi bieheb
Jane play-3SGF ball basket unlike John who like-3SGM
ishuuf ittilfizyoun.
see-3SGM the-TV.
Mary plays badminton, Anne plays squash, Jane plays basketball unlike John who just watches TV.
The contrast indicated by bainama in (55) and 6aks in (56) is not between each of Mary, Anne, Jane and John.
On the contrary, the point of (55) and (56) lies in the fact that John watches TV; therefore, he is different from all the others. The listener’s task in this case is to determine in what respect John is different from the others.\(^7\)

I argued in section 4.5 that in a dialogue where a second speaker delivers an utterance understood to convey a contrast with the state of affairs described by the first, the speaker can preface his utterance by unlike but not by while or whereas. Similarly, a speaker of Syrian can in such a situation preface his utterance by 6aks but not by bainama as is illustrated in (57) (which is a Syrian translation of example (144) and (145) mentioned in section 4.5:\(^8\)

57- Inte: Ahli aghnia.

You : Parents-1SG rich-3PL.

My parents are rich.

A- \(\alpha\) Ana: Bainama ahli fi?ra.

Me : While/Whereas parents-1SG poor-3PL.

While/Whereas mine are poor.


Me : Unlike parents-1SG the poor-3PL.

Unlike mine who are poor.

These are the three fundamental points in which bainama and 6aks seem to be similar to their English counterparts. Now I will look at one way in which bainama and 6aks are different from their English counterparts.
One of the differences I discussed between whereas and each of while and unlike is that while and unlike are more appropriately used in cases where the contrast is between gradable antonyms. Whereas, by contrast, is more appropriately used in examples where the contrast is between two clauses of variable degrees on continuous scale. In Syrian bainama can be appropriately used in both cases unlike 6aks the use of which is more appropriate in cases where the contrast is between gradable antonyms. Compare (A) and (B) in each of (58) and (59). (A) and (B) in (58) are translations of examples (146) and (149) mentioned in section 4.5 respectively and (A) in (59) is a Syrian translation of example (147):

   John fat-3SGM while/whereas Peter slim-3SGM.
   John is fat while/whereas Peter is slim.

   B- Jon naseh bainama Peter sehtu
   medium-3SGF.
   John fat-3SGM while/whereas Peter is of medium build.

   John fat-3SGM unlike Peter.
   John is fat unlike Peter.

   B- Jon naseh 6aks Peter issahtu
   medium-3SGF.
   John fat-3SGM unlike Peter is of medium build.
mitwasta.
medium-3SGM.

John is fat unlike Peter who is of medium build.

While the use of bainama is appropriate in both (58 A-B), the use of 6aks in (59 B) is less appropriate than that in (A) because, as I mentioned above, the use of 6aks is more acceptable in cases where the contrast is between two gradable antonyms than in situations where the contrast is established between two clauses of variable degrees on a continuous scale as in (59 B).

8.3 The syntax of gala kil hal, gala fikra and bilmunasabeh

The Syrian gala kil hal, gala fikra, and bilmunasabeh are regarded as phrases rather than words, but what they correspond to in English can be either a word or a phrase. Thus; gala fikra and gala kil hal correspond to the words incidentally and anyway respectively and bilmunasabeh to the phrase by the way. In regard to their form, two of these expressions gala kil hal and bilmunasabeh are composed of three morphemes each. Both of them begin with a preposition but while gala kil hal starts with gala (on), bilmunasabeh starts with b (in). Kil (any) the second morpheme in gala kil hal is a determiner and il (the) the second one in bilmunasabeh is a definite article. Furthermore, both
of them end with a noun but 6ala kil hal ends with hal (case) while the last morpheme in bilmunasabeh is munasabeh (occasion). 6ala fikra, by contrast, contains two morphemes the preposition 6ala (on) in first place and the noun fikra (idea) in second place.

The fact that 6ala fikra, bilmunasabeh and 6ala kil hal are associated with a digression makes it fairly obvious that they cannot be subordinating conjunctions because a digression is an additional piece of information. They cannot be coordinating conjunctions either. Consider the following examples:

60- Tasmeem ijjeser 6ala fikra Faransi
Style the-bridge incidentally French-3SGM
6ala tari?et jeser asgar 6ala nahr Issin.
on model bridge smaller on river the-Seine.
The style of the bridge incidentally is modelled on a smaller bridge across the Seine.

61- Mawa?ef issayarat bilmunasabeh was6a kteer
Parks the-cars by the way vast-3SGF very
lizalek i6reif wein safeit sayartak.
so know-2SGM where parked-2SGM car-2SGM.
The car parks by the way are vast so make sure where you have parked.

62- Aktar sir6a masmuh fiya 6ala kil hal
More speed allowed in-3SGF anyway
hieh khamsa usteen meel bissa6a ma6 inno it five and-sixty mile in-the-hour although

284
sita ukhamseen hieh ilgalbeh.
six and-fifty it the-common-3SGF.
The maximum speed limit anyway is sixty-five miles an hour though fifty-six is more common.
The fact that these expressions, as we can see in examples (60), (61) and (62), can be used in clause-internal position suggests that they cannot be coordinating conjunctions.

Additional support for this suggestion comes from the fact that both 6ala fikra and bilmunasabeh, like their English counterparts, can be preceded by the coordinating conjunction u. 6ala kil hal, by contrast, does not allow the coordinating conjunction to precede it but seems to allow the coordinating conjunction bass. Consider the following examples:

63- U 6ala fikra isti?qjar issayaray tariiban
And incidentally hire the-care almost bshakl automatiki u mu6zamun in manner automatically and most-3PL mkayafat.
And incidentally hire cars are nearly always automatic and many have air conditioning.

64- U bilmunasabeh lulad illi biydafa6u nafs
And by the way the-children who pay-3PL same idkhulyeh mitl likbaar biyla?u the-entrance-fee like the-adults find-3PL
ihtimamatt khasa mitl manti?at al6aab. attentions special like area games.

65- Bassa 6ala kil hal lazem shuuf idiktour
But anyway should see-1SG the-doctor marah tanyeh ba6dma Khalles iddawa.
once again after finish-1SG the-medicine.
But anyway I have to see the doctor again after I have completed the course.

As they cannot be classified as subordinating or coordinating conjunctions, their clause-internal use in (60), (61) and (62) suggests that they are adverbs. The fact that these expressions can be use in sentence final-position serves to support this claim. Consider the following:

66- Tasmeem ijjeser Faransi 6ala tari?et
Style the-bridge French-3SGM on model ijjeser asgar 6ala nahr Issin 6ala fikra.
bridge smaller on river the-Seine incidentally.
The style of the bridge is modelled on a smaller bridge across the Seine incidentally.

67- Mawa?ef issayarat was6a kteer lizalek
Parks the-cars vast very so i6reif wein safeit sayartak bilmunasabeh.
know-2SGM where parked-2SGM car-2SGM by the way.
The car parks are vast so make sure where you have parked by the way.

68- Aktar sir6a masmuh fiya hieh khamsa
More speed allowed in-3SGF it five
Although the use of *gala fikra* and *bilmunasabeh* is acceptable at the end of the digression, I suggest they are best at the end of a very short digression (e.g. a phrase) otherwise the hearer knows too late that he is dealing with a digression. Finally, I would suggest that *gala fikra*, *bilmunasabeh* and *gala kil hal* can be classified as adverbs.

8.4 *gala kil hal*, *gala fikra* and *bilmunasabeh*

In section 4.6 it was argued, following Blakemore (1987), that *anyway* is an item that can be used to indicate that the relevance of the proposition it introduces is understood to lie in a context that does not include the immediately preceding remark. However, items like *incidentally* and *by the way* can indicate the opposite. That is, they indicate that what precedes provides the context for the interpretation of a later proposition. Similarly, the three Syrian items *gala kil hal*, *gala fikra* and *bilmunasabeh* have the same function as their English counterparts. Consider the use of *gala*
"kil hal" in example (65) (which is a Syrian translation of example (152) mentioned in section 4.6):

Gayaru qitarun biwahed gareeb min
Changed-3PL train-3PL with-one strange from
naw6u. ma bitshuuf mitlu halla?. Ma
kind-3SGM not see-2SG like-3SGM now. Not
bitzakkar shu kan ismu. Kanu i?ululu
remember-1SG what was name-3SGM. Were-3PL call-3PL
"6arabeh bukharyeh" ? Ma bitzakkar. 6ala kil hal
coach steam Not remember-1SG. Anyway
kanet 6arabeh wahdeh bass kanet timshi
was-3SGF coach one-3SGF but was-3SGF walk-3SGF
6ala bukhar u kanet ittale6 sawt bidhahhek.
on steam and was-3SGF give-3SGF sound funny.
They changed over to a most peculiar kind of train
which you don't see now. I have forgotten what it
was called. Was it called a "steam coach" ? I
can't remember. Anyway, it was just one coach but it
ran by steam and it made a funny noise.

Like its counterpart 6ala kil hal here indicates the
termination of the digression. This digression, as I
said, does not provide the context for the interpretation
of the proposition introduced by 6ala kil hal. The
context for interpreting the proposition of 6ala kil hal
should be provided by the proposition immediately
preceding the digression. But in cases where the
beginning of a digression is left unspecified as in (69)
above the hearer is expected to face more processing

288
effort because the digression could be one utterance or it could be more than one. Therefore, he does not know how far back he is supposed to go for recovering the context in the light of which he will be able to interpret the proposition introduced by 6ala kil hal.

It may be clear from the content of the sentence that a digression is beginning without any explicit marking. Nevertheless, speakers aiming at optimal relevance should make clear the beginning as well as the end of digression they make using 6ala fikra or bilmunasabeh to mark the beginning and 6ala kil hal to mark the end as it is illustrated in (70) (which is a Syrian translation of example (156) mentioned in section 4.6):

70- Bimhattat ilkhidmeh izzatieh lilbanzeen
In-stations the-service the-self for-the-petrol
btidfa6 ?abl ma bit6abbi. Bi?amrica bitshagel
pay-2SG before not fill-2SG. In-America start-2SG
ilmadhakhkha bil?awal. 6ala fikra/bilmunasabeh,
the-pump in-the-first. Incidentally/By the way,
kil issayarat illi lil?iijaar biestakhdmu binziin
all the-cars which for-hiring use-3PL petrol
ma fi rsaas. 6ala kil hal, aktar sir6a masmuuh
not in lead. Anyway more speed allowed
fia hieh khamsa usteen bissaa6a ma6 inno
in-3SGF it five and-sixty in-the-hour although
sitta ukhamseen hieh lgalbeh.
sixty and-fifty it the-common.
At self-drive stations you pay before you fill up.
In America you have to switch on the pump first.
Incidentally/By the way, all hire cars use unleaded petrol. Anyway, the maximum speed limit is 65 miles
an hour though 56 is more common.

This, however, may mean that there is a sort of
correlation between 6ala kil hal and each of 6ala fikra
and bilmunasabeh though this is not always the case. I
argued in section 4.6 that a speaker may make the
beginning of a digression clear whether he specified where
it begins or not by taking the hearer back by saying
(6ala kil hal, mitl ma ?ilt, X)
(Anyway, like not said-1SG X)
(Anyway, as I said X)
with X the last utterance before the digression as in
(71) (which is a Syrian translation of example (154)
mentioned also in section 4.6):

71- Il?isbuu6 lmadhi innadi Issuri iqtarah .
The-week the-last the-club the-Syrian suggested-3SGM
rihleh 6ala Manshester. Aktar il?a6dha? wafa?u
trip on Manchester. More the-memders agreed-3PL
yruhu 6ala Manshester. Ba6dhun ma wafa?
go-3PL on Manchester. Some-of-3PL not agreed-3SGM
6ala halmahal. Irfi?i wassani jiblu
on this-place. Friend-1SG asked-3SGM-1SG bring-3SGM
Last weekend the Syrian Society suggested a trip to Manchester. Most members agreed to go to Manchester. However, few didn’t agree on the place chosen. A friend of mine asked me to bring him some Indian spices which are not available in Bangor. Anyway, as I said, not all members did agree to go to Manchester. Some of them suggested Birmingham, others London.

It is clear now that there is a great resemblance in terms of function between 6ala kil hal, 6ala fikra and bilmunasabeh and their English counterparts. One conceivable difference between 6ala fikra and 6ala kil hal is that speakers usually tend to prefer to use 6ala fikra more than bilmunasabeh. Apart from this slight difference, 6ala fikra and bilmunasabeh are interchangeable.
CONCLUSION

The main concern of this study has been to account for certain elements of linguistic form which make no contribution to the propositional content of their utterances. Following Blakemore (1987), they have been analysed as semantic constraints on relevance. That is, their function is to constrain the inferential computations in which their proposition may enter. The framework for this study is supplied by Sperber and Wilson's Relevance theory (1986). Within this relevance-based framework I have tried to account for inferential constraints in both English and Syrian Arabic.

The fact that human beings are constrained by one general communicative principle, the Principle of Relevance, means that it is possible to find similar items which guide the hearer towards the intended range of contextual effects in different languages (Blass, 1990: 160). This, as we have seen in the study, is true. Syrian, though different from English in many ways, seems like English to contain expressions whose function is to guide the hearer towards the intended contextual effects.

The fact that Syrian Arabic differs in many ways from English means that, although both languages contain semantic constraints on relevance, one expects to find
differences as well as similarities between the two. Indeed, we did find similarities and differences but similarities seem to prevail. As for similarities we found that there are Syrian expressions which have a similar function to their English counterparts like that of ma6natu (see section 6.3) which is similar to so, and bidhawl, tab6ann and ba6d kil shi (see section 7.2) which are similar to after all.

As for differences I will point out two, one involving but and the other involving while. But, as we have seen in chapter three, has two main uses: first, it has the function of indicating a "denial-of-expectation" sense; second, it is used to indicate a relation of "contrast" between two clauses. This means that but can account for all the uses of Syrian innama but not for all the uses of bass. Syrian innama (see section 5.2) is used to indicate only part (denial-of-expectation) of what but in English is used to indicate. English but cannot account for all the uses of Syrian bass because bass could have three different uses: first, it could be used to indicate a "denial-of-expectation" sense; second, it is used to indicate a relation of "contrast"; and third, it is used to denote what I called a relation of "exclusion" where its use is similar to that of only in English (see section 5.2).

As for the second difference we have seen that while in English can indicate either a "denial" or a "contrast" function (see sections 4.4.1 and 4.5) respectively. In
Syrian, however, these two functions are indicated by two separate lexical items. When while is used to indicate a "denial-of-expectation" sense it is translated as ma6 inno and when it is used to indicate a "contrast" relation it is translated as bainama. This shows that English is, perhaps, more condensed than Syrian Arabic although in certain cases more than one English item can have only one counterpart in Syrian like that of ma6 heik which is the Syrian counterpart of the four English words however, yet, nevertheless and still. This case is an exceptional one because for almost every English word, as we have seen, there is more than one lexical item in Syrian.

I have sought to conduct a contrastive analysis to a full extent between the two languages. The results, as we have seen, point clearly to similarities and differences. The importance of this study lies in the help which, I believe, it offers to Syrian teachers of English as a second language. I cannot, however, offer any methodological guidelines concerning teaching techniques.

Finally, I do not claim to have accounted for each and every semantic constraint on relevance in Syrian as it is impossible to do so within this limited work. The Syrian counterparts of the English expressions discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3 have been left for further research.
Notes

Notes To Chapter Two

1- Wilson and Sperber (1981) argue that there are three areas of dissatisfaction in Grice’s approach. First, the distinction between what is said and what is implicated is not so easy as Grice thinks. Second, there are many interpretations which are due to such figures as irony and metaphor rather than to the knowledge of the maxims. Third, there are some problems with the maxims themselves. It is not known what is meant by "as informative as required"? What is meant by "clarity" and "brevity"? It is not known whether these maxims are universal or whether they can be reduced. For further details see Wilson and Sperber (1981: 155-175). See also Sperber and Wilson (1986: 32).

Notes To Chapter Three

1- Grice’s term "Conventional Implicature" (1975) is one of different terms which Karttunen and Peters (1975) refer to as "Pragmatic Presuppositions." For further details see Karttunen and Peters (1975: 266-278). See also Grice (1975: 41-58).

2- I am grateful to Dr. D.R. Borsley for this example.
3- This idea is based on personal correspondence with Diane Blakemore.

4- For, according to Sperber and Wilson's theory interpreting an utterance does not just involve establishing its propositional content. In addition to this the hearer has to establish its relevance. In this case the hearer seems to have a problem with establishing the relevance of the utterance rather than with establishing its propositional content. For more information see above section 2.6.2. See also Sperber and Wilson (1986) section 4.3.

5- See her article (1989:15-37).

6- R. Lakoff (1971) calls the "contrast but" "semantic opposition but."

7- lakinna and ball are two items in the standard Arabic that correspond to but in English. They are both regarded as particles. The central function of lakinna is to denote emendation. That is to say, the proposition it introduces is used to deny an assumption derived by the hearer from the first clause. For example, if we assume that there is a fellowship between Zaid and Amr and so whenever Zaid goes he would be accompanied by Amr, then the hearer of (1) would derive (2) from the first clause.

1- Jaa?anni Zaidun lakinna Amran lam yaje?.
   Came-3SGM-1SG Zaid but Amr not come-3SGM.
Zaid came to me but Amr didn’t.

2- Jaa?a Amr.

Came-3SGM Amr.

Amr has come.

The function of the proposition introduced by lakinna in (1) is to deny the assumption in (2) derived by the hearer from the first clause of (1) alone. See M.S. Howell, (trans.), (1880) part III: pp. 425-426. For Arabic readers see J. Al-Ansaari, (1972: 383-385).

On the other hand, ball has two prominent functions. First, it has the function of indicating a digression. This digression could be of two types: annulment and transition as in (3) and (4) respectively:

3- Waqalu ittakhaza irrahmanu

And-said-3Pl took-3SGM The-Compassionate

waladan subhanahu ball 6ibadun mukramuunn.

boy extoll-3SGM but servants honored.

And they said: "The Compassionate hath gotten offspring." Extolled be His Perfection: Nay they are honored servants.

(The Holy Quran: XXI. 26)

4- Qad aflaha mann tazakka

Already prospered-3SGM who was-good-3SGM

wa zakara isma rabihe fa

and mentioned-3SGM name God-3SGM and
zalla  ball  tu? siruna  alhayata
prayed-3SGM  but  prefer-3PL  the-life
addunia.
the-secular.
He has prospered that hath purified himself, and
celebrated the name of his Lord, and prayed: but
ye prefer the present life.

(The Holy Quran, LXXXVII. 14-16)
In (3) ball indicates an invalidation of what has
come in the previous clause and introduces a
contrary proposal to what has gone before. In
(4) it denotes that what has gone before has no
relation to what is preceded.

The second function of ball is when it
functions as a copulative. This function is
achieved when ball is followed by a single term
and preceded either by a command or by affirmation
as in (5) and (6) respectively:
5- Khuz  kitaban  ball  qalaman.
   Take-2SGM book  but  pen.
   You should take a book: nay but a pen.
6- Zahaba  Ahmadun  ball  Jamal.
   Went-3SGM Ahmad  but  Jamal.
   Ahmad has gone: nay but Jamal.

See, M.S. Howell, (trans.), parts II & III (1880: 514-
519). For the Arabic readers see J. Al-Ansaari, (1972:
151-153).
Notes To Chapter Four

1- In addition and as well do not contribute to the higher-level-explicatures Wilson and Sperber discuss in their article (1990a). This is because the internal structure of these two expressions does not allow them to expand; therefore, they have a semantic constraint on relevance function only.

2- See, for example, Lila R. Gleitman (1965: 260-293). See also Edward S. Klima (1964: 246-323).

3- The difference between the elements with which the "denial" sense is associated reflects a syntactic difference between the words in the first section and those in the second. The items in the first section are labelled as "subordinating conjunctions" while those in the second are syntactically classified as "conjuncts".

4- Notice that it does not have to be "being". It could be the "ing" form of other verbs too.

5- except while where in its sentence the "denial-of-expectation" sense is always associated with the clause immediately following the one it introduces as in:

1- While he is a linguist, John doesn’t understand Chomsky.

6- In this respect however, yet and still are like but because in cases where but is used to indicate a
"denial", the denial indicated is always associated with its clause.

7- Rouchota (1990: 75) argues further that the relation of dependent relevance does not only include items like therefore, after all... etc., but it may also be established by items like but and although.

8- This is what Blakemore (1989: 26) says about the use of but.


10- Notice that in this respect while, whereas and unlike differ from but because when indicating a contrast but has always to be used in clause initial rather than sentence-initial position. Compare its use in (2) with that in (3):

2- Mary likes dancing but Anne enjoys playing piano.

3- ? But Mary likes dancing Anne enjoys playing piano.

Notes To Chapter five

1- Innama is a combination of two particles: (inna) and (ma). (Inna) denotes corroboration and (ma) indicates negation. For further details see Howell (1880: 387-395). For Arabic readers see, Al-Hassan Ibn Qassem Al-Muradi (1973: 393-402). See also Ahmad Ibn abd Al-Noor Al-Maliqi (1974: 198-204 and 377-385).

2- The fact that lakinna varies in form does not mean that it is a verb. It is usually classified in by standard Arabic grammarians as a preposition. Since
the field of my interest is the Syrian dialect and *lakinna* is an item of the standard Arabic language, I will not discuss its syntax. For more information see Howell, (1880: 425-428). For Arabic readers see Al-Muradi, (1973: 615-620).

**Notes To Chapter Six**

1- Although adverbs have the possibility of occurring next to each other, there seems to be some sort of constraint on their order. In English, for instance, we can have *so therefore* but not *therefore so*. As far as the Syrian words discussed in this section are concerned, a certain order is imposed on their successive use particularly with adverbs similar to those ending with *-ly* in English where they have always to be in the preceding position. So we can have *lizalek bishuleh* but not *bishuleh lizalek*.

2- This is because when they are used to mean *because* their meaning tends to contribute towards the propositional content of their utterances hence they cannot be regarded as semantic constraints on relevance.

3- This further explanation is based on personal correspondence with Diane Blakemore.

4- See Blakemore (1987: 88).

**Notes To Chapter Seven**

1- For a detailed discussion of the syntax of *bass* see
2- The reason we mentioned bta6ref rather than shaif in connection with this point is because when shaif is used in examples where a causal connection is assumed to be taken for granted, it does not function as a semantic constraint on relevance.

3- For the use of in addition, as well and too in connecting two propositions as two premises in English see chapter four section 4.1.

Notes To Chapter Eight

1- Still receives this translation only when it functions as a semantic constraint on relevance. In cases where it contributes to the propositional content it can be translated either as mazal or ba6do.

2- I referred to the element 9 as a word because it stands for the third person singular pronoun hweh (he) which is a word. In Syrian Arabic there is nothing that corresponds to the English pronoun (it). The pronoun hweh in Syrian is usually used to refer to the singular masculine both human and nonhuman and the pronoun heyeh (she) refers to the singular feminine whether human or nonhuman. When the implied pronoun is a singular feminine the letter 9 is usually changed into an a as in ma6 inna where the last a refers to an implied singular feminine
pronoun heye (she).

3- Except when the clause of ma6 inno, raghm inno and raghm kawno is shifted to initial position in which case the "denial" sense will have to be associated with the clause following the one which they are part of.

4- This is why whenever the clause of ma6 inno is used in sentence second position it is translated as although. ma6 inno can receive the translation of although or while only when its clause is occupying the first position in the sentence.

5- In this respect bainama and 6aks are different from but which can indicate a "contrast" only when it is used in clause-initial position.

6- This feature is also common of but and of its Syrian contrast counterpart bass which can be used to draw attention to a binary opposition alone. For the discussion of contrast but in English see section 3.4.2 and for the discussion of contrast bass in Syrian see section 5.3.

7- See Blakemore's (1989: 32-33) example (37).

8- Bainama in this respect is similar not only to while and whereas but also to English but and its Syrian contrast counterpart bass.
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